The relevant market in competition law: a legal concept

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-176
Author(s):  
Viktoria H S E Robertson

Abstract In competition law, the relevant market acts as a filter that delineates that part of commerce within which competition law assesses companies’ market behaviour. This contribution considers how competition law can reconcile the legal concept of the relevant market with its economic roots. It argues that for market definition—like for many an economic concept—a spectrum opens up between law and economics. On the economics side of the spectrum, economics may take on a more determinative role almost amounting to normative force. This places considerable pressure on the integrity of economics. On the law side of the spectrum, the relevant market is looked at through the prism of the law and is seen as a legal concept building upon an economic one. Here, economics is assigned an interpretive role. A plethora of different positions are possible along the spectrum, and different actors may place themselves at different locations under different circumstances or at different points in time. If it is acknowledged that the relevant market concept acquires a distinct legal conception through its incorporation into the competition laws, then this has far-reaching repercussions on our entire conception of competition law. This view effectively calls into question not only competition law’s understanding of the relevant market, but also the prevailing understanding of other shared legal and economic concepts.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Kunda

<span>Issues arising in the context of determining the law governing competition law breaches are numerous and complex. The situation is no different following the harmonisation of the national rules as a result of the recently adopted Directive on damages for infringements of the competition law provisions. This paper is aimed at scrutinising various such issues, in particular it deals with interpretation of the concepts found in Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations and the related aspects of interaction between EU and national competition laws. From the scope of application ratione materiae of the mentioned conflict-of-law provision and defining the “market” as an essential component of the connecting factor lex mercati, to the functioning of the general provisions aimed at protecting public interests, the author presents the opposing views expressed in legal theory and points out the principles which should be taken into account in the course of the analysis. Additional emphasis is put on the thorny questions which originate from erroneous translation of the EU legislation into the Croatian language.&nbsp;</span>


Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová ◽  

Competition law serves as an important tool for regulation of undertakings. In order to conduct a competition law analysis, one must first define the relevant market. However, this task is becoming more intricate in today’s digital era, especially in relation to so-called zero-price markets. These markets are characterised as markets where users of products or services do not pay for the use, at least they do not pay by money. This paper asks how to define relevant market in such case. Three methods of relevant market definition are presented, namely qualitative analysis, SSNIP test and SSNDQ test. The paper briefly explores positive and negative elements of these tests and compares the findings with the European Commission’s 2019 report. It leads to the answer that qualitative method might have certain advantages in this regard.


Author(s):  
Tilottama Raychaudhuri

An ongoing debate in competition jurisprudence today is with respect to the enforcement of competition law in digital markets. Digital markets are newer markets in context of which traditional tools of competition law have to be understood and applied. Though the challenges of competition enforcement in digital markets are manifold, this paper focusses on the assessment of dominance and abuse in platform markets, particularly in light of the 2019 Supreme Court judgement in the Uber matter. The Supreme Court’s opinion that loss-making pricing can be an indicator of dominance is inconsistent with the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) views, which had cautioned against this circular interpretation of dominance and put the issue to rest. The author submits that conflicting interpretations such as these erode the certainty of the law. Competition laws can be flexible but not uncertain or unpredictable. The author identifies areas of concern in digital platforms that are yet unresolved and need to be addressed urgently by guidelines/amendments before the law on this issue becomes incoherent.


Author(s):  
Lavinia Brancusi

This chapter discusses possible negative effects on market competition resulting from registration and exercise of NTTMs. A first insight into EU judicial precedents dealing with trademarks reveals the risk of different practices violating competition rules. A following inquiry from a “law and economics” approach emphasizes certain competition concerns characteristic of NTTMs. The focal point concerns the issue of product substitutability, with a consideration as to whether competition law perspective may be of some use for trademark law, especially for functionality cases featuring NTTMs. After articulating the need of applying a functionality test based on product delineation and an assessment of substitutable alternatives, separate remarks discuss market definition in competition law underlining cases of narrowly defined markets because of branding strategies. The study advocates the use of methods and proofs modeled on those applied in competition law for examining the registrability and resolution of conflicts related to NTTMs.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.


Author(s):  
David J. Gerber

All competition laws have goals, and these goals direct decisions about what the law is and how it should be enforced. Some goals are set out in statutes; others are set by competition law institutions and courts (these are usually consistent with the formal statutory goals, but not always) formal government goals. In order to understand a specific competition law regime, it is necessary to identify the goals that shape them. Some goals are economic. These include efficiency, consumer welfare, and economic development. Other goals include fairness, privacy, and economic freedom. This chapter identifies each of these goals, probes the reasons for them, traces relationships among them, and follows some of their consequences. A key question here is: What factors determine how much influence stated goals will have on the decisions of institutions? Some institutions and individuals pursue goals that are not stated, but rather serve their own interests (e.g., corruption). The chapter refers to these goals, their origins, and their influence.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘Who enforces the law?’ identifies who enforces competition and antitrust laws. In most countries, competition and antitrust laws can be utilized by the public enforcer (the competition agency) that is tasked with maintaining a competitive environment, or by private entities that use the competition provisions to protect their commercial interests, or to claim damages for loss caused by violation of competition law. In the US, at the federal level, two agencies share responsibility for competition enforcement. These are the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition (FTC) and The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Meanwhile, EU law grants the European Commission primary responsibility for enforcing EU competition laws.


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