The Achmea Judgment and the Applicability of the Energy Charter Treaty in Intra-EU Investment Arbitration

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Robert Basedow

Abstract The Energy Charter Treaty is the most frequently used investment treaty worldwide to launch investment arbitration against host states. The vast majority of disputes is of intra-European Union nature in that they involve an EU investor as claimant and an European Union member state as respondent. The recent Achmea judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union may thus have ramifications for the Energy Charter Treaty. The judgment has triggered a heated legal and political debate within the European Union over the future of intra-European Union investment arbitration. In the context of this debate, the European Commission claimed that the application of the Energy Charter Treaty in intra-European Union investment disputes is based on an incorrect interpretation of this treaty. This article critically assesses the Commission’s statement by evaluating the travaux préparatoires of the Energy Charter Treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation. It finds that the European Union member states and the European Commission in all likelihood opted for a mixed ratification for legal reasons rather than to ensure its intra-European Union applicability. Indeed, the EU initially pushed for a disconnection clause to prevent the application of the Energy Charter Treaty in intra-European Union relations but dropped this request during the negotiations. At least from a historical perspective then, the Commission’s claim that the Energy Charter Treaty is not meant to apply in intra-European Union relations is inaccurate in that the European Union consciously accepted this possibility.

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

This article questions whether the law of the European Union (eu) can impose jurisdictional constraints on so-called intra-eu investment arbitration proceedings. Would an arbitral tribunal hearing an intra-eu case under either a bilateral investment treaty (bit) or under the Energy Charter Treaty (ect) have to declare itself incompetent to conduct the case proceedings owing to the operation of eu law? This article subjects that proposition to criticism, finding that, for a number of reasons, connected either with the drafting of the bit or the ect or the operation of general principles of international law, it does not withstand scrutiny. An arbitral tribunal seized of a treaty claim under a bit or the ect cannot rely on eu law to negate rights expressly granted under the instrument providing for its jurisdiction.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Daniel Kelemen ◽  
Tommaso Pavone

Why would a supranational law enforcer suddenly refrain from wielding its powers? We theorize the supranational politics of forbearance– the deliberate under-enforcement of the law– and distinguish them from domestic forbearance. We explain why an exemplary supranational enforcer– the European Commission– became reluctant to launch infringements against European Union member states. While the Commission’s legislative role as “engine of integration” has been controversial, its enforcement role as “guardian of the Treaties” has been viewed as less contentious. Yet after 2004, infringements launched by the Commission plummeted. Triangulating between infringement statistics and elite interviews, we trace how the Commission grew alarmed that aggressive enforcement was jeopardizing intergovernmental support for its policy proposals. By embracing dialogue with governments over robust enforcement, the Commission sacrificed its role as guardian of the Treaties to safeguard its role as engine of integration. Our analysis holds broader implications for the study of forbearance in international organizations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-67
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Górniewicz

Abstract The aim of the article is to present budget deficit and government debt in the European Union member states, with particular consideration of the countries that belong to the PIIGS group. This paper has focused on the scale of these phenomena, on their reasons and on some attempts made to improve the unfavourable situation. In the main thesis presented in the article, it is stated that budget deficit and general government debt come as significant threats to economic security of the European Union (EU) countries. The research methods that have been applied in the study involve descriptive analysis and statistical data analysis.


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