scholarly journals Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 712-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Da Ré ◽  
Federico Pailos ◽  
Damian Szmuc
Keyword(s):  
Proof Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sequent Calculi ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Teller ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar

AbstractInfectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated (i) as a way to treat different pathological sentences (like the Liar and the Truth-Teller) differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and (ii) as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems.

Function words and polarity

2021 ◽  
pp. 66-85
Author(s):  
Matteo Greco
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Function Words ◽  
Closed Class ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Syntactic Derivation

Function words are commonly considered to be a small and closed class of words in which each element is associated with a specific and fixed logical meaning. Unfortunately, this is not always true as witnessed by negation: on the one hand, negation does reverse the truth-value conditions of a proposition, and the other hand, it does not, realizing what is called Expletive Negation. This chapter aims to investigate whether a word that is established on the basis of its function can be ambiguous by discussing the role of the syntactic derivation in some instances of so-called Expletive Negation clauses, a case in which negation seems to lose its capacity to deny the proposition associated with its sentence. Both a theoretical and an experimental approach has been adopted.

scholarly journals Indexical Relativism?

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Personal Taste ◽  
Faultless Disagreement ◽  
Predicates Of Personal Taste ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One

AbstractThe particular behavior exhibited by sentences featuring predicates of personal taste such as “tasty” may drive us to claim that their truth depends on the context of assessment, as MacFarlane does. MacFarlane considers two ways in which the truth of a sentence can depend on the context of assessment. On the one hand, we can say that the sentence expresses a proposition whose truth-value depends on the context of assessment. This is MacFarlane’s position, which he calls “truth relativism” and, following Weatherson, I rebrand as “nonindexical relativism”. On the other hand, we can say that what proposition a sentence expresses depends on the context of assessment. MacFarlane calls this position “content relativism” and rejects it on the grounds that it leads to implausible readings of certain sentences and is unable to account for the speaker’s authority over the content of her assertions. In this paper, I too argue against content relativism, which, again following Weatherson, I rebrand as “indexical relativism”. However, my arguments against the theory are different from MacFarlane’s, which I prove unsound. In particular, I show that any version of indexical relativism will be unable to account for at least one of the phenomena that have been standardly used to motivate nonindexical relativism—faultless disagreement and retraction—in most of the ways in which it has been proposed to understand them.

What Is Wrong With a Thumping Liar

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 83-96
Author(s):  
Yotam Benziman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Henry James ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar

I address the puzzle of the supposed wrongness of “a thumping liar” (a term I borrow from a story by Henry James.) On the one hand, it seems that the more you lie, the more wrong you commit. On the other hand, the more you lie, the more people are aware that you are not telling the truth, the less can you deceive them, the less can you wrong them. The liar who is known as such seems to cause no harm. I show how according to some analyses such a person would not even be considered to be lying, which is surely mistaken. I claim that he is both lying and bullshitting, thus challenging Frankfurt’s distinction between the two terms. The thumping liar excludes himself from being a meaningful part in the joint venture of conversation. It is himself that he mainly harms.

scholarly journals Truth-Graph Method: a Handy Method Different from that of Leśniewski’s

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-111
Author(s):  
Lei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Visual Representation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Graph Method ◽  
Convenient Tool ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Truth Tables

Abstract The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.

Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox and Its Reception in Qāḍī Mubārak and Mullā Mubīn

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan John Rezakhany
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Other ◽  
Major Premise ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
False Self ◽  
Liar Sentence ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

AbstractI examine the views of Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī (d. 1502) on the Liar paradox and their reception in the work of Qāḍī Mubārak (d. 1748) and Mullā Mubīn (d. 1810). Dawānī argues that the Liar sentence is neither true nor false since it is not the kind of utterance that is capable of bearing a truth-value (i.e., it is not truth-apt). In the course of justifying this view, he proposes a criterion for a sentence’s being truth-apt and attempts to counter a number of objections. I address two of these: one involves certain intuitively true or false self-referential sentences and the other is the ‘strengthened Liar.’ I then argue that both Qāḍī Mubārak and Mullā Mubīn present a version of the solution Dawānī gives in his Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb and, moreover, that Dawānī does not endorse this solution in all his other works. Furthermore, the solution they attribute to Dawānī differs slightly from the one he gives in his Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb in terms of how the major premise is justified. I present evidence which shows that this modification was inspired by Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī’s (d. 1689) gloss on Dawānī’s Sharḥ at-Tahdhīb.

scholarly journals On the Costs of Classical Logic

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Castaldo
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Fixed Point Semantics ◽  
Theoretical Equivalence ◽  
The One

AbstractThis article compares classical (or -like) and nonclassical (or -like) axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics developed by Kripke (J Philos 72(19): 690–716, 1975). Following the line of investigation of Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Logic 47(2): 227–257, 2018), we do not compare and qua theories of truth simpliciter, but rather qua axiomatisations of the Kripkean conception of truth. We strengthen the central results of Halbach and Nicolai (2018) and Nicolai (Stud Log 106(1): 101–130, 2018), showing that, on the one hand, there is a stronger sense in which some variants of and some variants of can be taken to be, truth-theoretically, equivalent. On the other hand, we show that this truth-theoretical equivalence is not preserved by some other variants of and , arguing that the variants are more adequate axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics than the corresponding variants.

scholarly journals What the Tortoise Said to Achilles: Lewis Carroll’s paradox in terms of Hilbert arithmetic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Penchev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Logical Paradox ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar ◽  
As If

Lewis Carroll, both logician and writer, suggested a logical paradox containing furthermore two connotations (connotations or metaphors are inherent in literature rather than in mathematics or logics). The paradox itself refers to implication demonstrating that an intermediate implication can be always inserted in an implication therefore postponing its ultimate conclusion for the next step and those insertions can be iteratively and indefinitely added ad lib, as if ad infinitum. Both connotations clear up links due to the shared formal structure with other well-known mathematical observations: (1) the paradox of Achilles and the Turtle; (2) the transitivity of the relation of equality. Analogically to (1), one can juxtapose the paradox of the Liar (for Lewis Carroll’s paradox) and that of the arrow (for “Achilles and the Turtle”), i.e. a logical paradox, on the one hand, and an aporia of motion, on the other hand, suggesting a shared formal structure

On epithets qua attributive anaphors

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
EROS CORAZZA
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Re ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
De Se ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

A multiple-proposition theory is proposed, according to which a single utterance can express several distinct propositions. An utterance of “Jon, the idiot, missed the train” expresses the official proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT JON IS AN IDIOT. It is argued that only the official proposition affects the truth-value of the utterance, while the background proposition(s) may be treated similarly to pragmatic presuppositions. The multiple-proposition theory helps us to defend the thesis that, in an utterance such as “Jon1 promised to come but the idiot1 missed the train”, the epithet the idiot must be understood as an attributive anaphor, for it inherits its value from Jon and attributes to Jon the property of being an idiot. It is argued that epithets in such constructions should be viewed in a way similar to quasi-indicators, insofar as the latter are also attributive anaphors. The quasi-indicator she herself in “Jane1 believes that she (herself)1 is rich” inherits its value from Jane and attributes an I-thought to Jane. In focusing on the similarities and differences between epithets and quasi-indicators, we can explain some alleged difficulties, difficulties which suggest that epithets cannot be anaphoric (e.g. “*Jon1 claimed/said/thinks/ … that the bastard1 was honest”). It is shown that the ungrammaticality of sentences like these rests on the fact that the epithet is embedded in what should be a de se attribution (e.g. “Jon1 claimed/said/thinks that he (himself)1 was honest”) while its nature is to contribute to the expression of a de re attribution. This helps us to understand the ungrammaticality of “*Jane1 said/thinks/promised/ … that the idiot1 will come” vs. the grammaticality of “Jane1 said/thinks/promised/ … that she (herself)1 will come” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the ungrammaticality of “Jon1 ran over a man who was trying to give him (*himself)1 directions” vs. the grammaticality of “Jon1 ran over a man who was trying to give the idiot1 directions”.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

Radioimmunotherapy for treatment of acute myeloid leukaemia and myelodysplastic syndrome

2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (03) ◽  
pp. 107-117
Author(s):  
R. G. Meyer ◽  
W. Herr ◽  
A. Helisch ◽  
P. Bartenstein ◽  
I. Buchmann
Keyword(s):  
Acute Myeloid Leukaemia ◽  
Myeloid Leukaemia ◽  
Primary Tumour ◽  
The Other ◽  
Haematopoietic Stem Cell ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Primary Reduction ◽  
The One ◽  
Acute Myeloid

SummaryThe prognosis of patients with acute myeloid leukaemia (AML) has improved considerably by introduction of aggressive consolidation chemotherapy and haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (SCT). Nevertheless, only 20-30% of patients with AML achieve long-term diseasefree survival after SCT. The most common cause of treatment failure is relapse. Additionally, mortality rates are significantly increased by therapy-related causes such as toxicity of chemotherapy and complications of SCT. Including radioimmunotherapies in the treatment of AML and myelodyplastic syndrome (MDS) allows for the achievement of a pronounced antileukaemic effect for the reduction of relapse rates on the one hand. On the other hand, no increase of acute toxicity and later complications should be induced. These effects are important for the primary reduction of tumour cells as well as for the myeloablative conditioning before SCT.This paper provides a systematic and critical review of the currently used radionuclides and immunoconjugates for the treatment of AML and MDS and summarizes the literature on primary tumour cell reductive radioimmunotherapies on the one hand and conditioning radioimmunotherapies before SCT on the other hand.

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