scholarly journals Truth-Graph Method: a Handy Method Different from that of Leśniewski’s

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-111
Author(s):  
Lei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Visual Representation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Graph Method ◽  
Convenient Tool ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Truth Tables

Abstract The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.

Function words and polarity

2021 ◽  
pp. 66-85
Author(s):  
Matteo Greco
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Function Words ◽  
Closed Class ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Syntactic Derivation

Function words are commonly considered to be a small and closed class of words in which each element is associated with a specific and fixed logical meaning. Unfortunately, this is not always true as witnessed by negation: on the one hand, negation does reverse the truth-value conditions of a proposition, and the other hand, it does not, realizing what is called Expletive Negation. This chapter aims to investigate whether a word that is established on the basis of its function can be ambiguous by discussing the role of the syntactic derivation in some instances of so-called Expletive Negation clauses, a case in which negation seems to lose its capacity to deny the proposition associated with its sentence. Both a theoretical and an experimental approach has been adopted.

The evidential and doxastic dimensions of the Basque particle bide

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Kepa Korta ◽  
Larraitz Zubeldia
Keyword(s):  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Semantic Meaning ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Degree Of Belief ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Semantics And Pragmatics ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
The One

Two kinds of meanings are usually associated to the Basque particle bide.1 On the one hand, it has been taken to point to the indirect nature of the speaker’s evidence for the truth of the proposition put forward. According to this view, it would be a sort of inferential particle. On the other hand, bide has been associated to the expression of a certain degree of belief or certainty on the truth of the proposition. This double dimension of bide resembles various aspects of the meaning and use of another Basque particle – omen. The morpho-syntactic behaviour of these two particles is practically identical, and their semantics and pragmatics invite a close comparison. Thus, starting from our conclusions regarding omen, we explore the similarities and differences between both particles. We find two main differences. First, bide encodes a doxastic dimension that is absent from the semantic meaning of omen. And, second, bide can be taken to be an illocutionary force indicator that does not contribute to the proposition expressed, while omen does contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance.

scholarly journals Indexical Relativism?

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Personal Taste ◽  
Faultless Disagreement ◽  
Predicates Of Personal Taste ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One

AbstractThe particular behavior exhibited by sentences featuring predicates of personal taste such as “tasty” may drive us to claim that their truth depends on the context of assessment, as MacFarlane does. MacFarlane considers two ways in which the truth of a sentence can depend on the context of assessment. On the one hand, we can say that the sentence expresses a proposition whose truth-value depends on the context of assessment. This is MacFarlane’s position, which he calls “truth relativism” and, following Weatherson, I rebrand as “nonindexical relativism”. On the other hand, we can say that what proposition a sentence expresses depends on the context of assessment. MacFarlane calls this position “content relativism” and rejects it on the grounds that it leads to implausible readings of certain sentences and is unable to account for the speaker’s authority over the content of her assertions. In this paper, I too argue against content relativism, which, again following Weatherson, I rebrand as “indexical relativism”. However, my arguments against the theory are different from MacFarlane’s, which I prove unsound. In particular, I show that any version of indexical relativism will be unable to account for at least one of the phenomena that have been standardly used to motivate nonindexical relativism—faultless disagreement and retraction—in most of the ways in which it has been proposed to understand them.

scholarly journals Poetic formulas of Belarusian carol and volochebnye songs. Problems of correlation of Irtysh region migrants' and maternal traditions

2019 ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
S. A. Myasnikova
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Visual Representation ◽  
Significant Degree ◽  
The Other ◽  
Strong Connection ◽  
Text Corpora ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

The article analyzes the poetic formulas of the Belarusian carol and volochebnye songs recorded in Omsk Irtysh region. The poetic formula is stable and repeatable, like the motive, but it does not have the motivation and the structure of the sentence, most often it is expressed in a quotation from the song text, which is absolutely not characteristic of the motive. The isolation and analysis of the poetic formulas of text corpora can provide a visual representation of a particular tradition. The aim of the study is to demonstrate the folk material recorded in the Irtysh through the prism of comparative analysis with the material of the maternal tradition. To isolate poetic formulas, the author has compiled a systematic, informative catalog that does not allow the full scope of the article to be published. But for clarity, the work demonstrated selected groups reflecting the architectonics of songs and containing their classification and systematization sections. The study resulted in conclusions that, on the one hand, the classification and systematization of regional Omsk records demonstrates a significant degree of loss of resettlement material. This is manifested in a small number of selected poetic formulas (in comparison with the place of outcome of the tradition), in the fragmentaryness and loss of textual elements, as part of subject groups. On the other hand, there is a strong connection with the maternal tradition which is reflected in the presence of typical ritual formulas, their full or partial coincidence with the formulas of а Belarusian texts.

scholarly journals Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 712-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Da Ré ◽  
Federico Pailos ◽  
Damian Szmuc
Keyword(s):  
Proof Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sequent Calculi ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Teller ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
The Liar

AbstractInfectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated (i) as a way to treat different pathological sentences (like the Liar and the Truth-Teller) differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and (ii) as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems.

Propositional logic

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman
Keyword(s):  
Fuzzy Logic ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
English Word ◽  
The Other ◽  
American Women ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The Relationship

In propositional logic, atomic formulas are propositions. Any assertion will do. For example, . . . A = “Aristotle is dead,” B = “Barcelona is on the Seine,” and C = “Courtney Love is tall” . . . are atomic formulas. Atomic formulas are the building blocks used to construct sentences. In any logic, a sentence is regarded as a particular type of formula. In propositional logic, there is no distinction between these two terms. We use “formula” and “sentence” interchangeably. In propositional logic, as with all logics we study, each sentence is either true or false. A truth value of 1 or 0 is assigned to the sentence accordingly. In the above example, we may assign truth value 1 to formula A and truth value 0 to formula B. If we take proposition C literally, then its truth is debatable. Perhaps it would make more sense to allow truth values between 0 and 1. We could assign 0.75 to statement C if Miss Love is taller than 75% of American women. Fuzzy logic allows such truth values, but the classical logics we study do not. In fact, the content of the propositions is not relevant to propositional logic. Henceforth, atomic formulas are denoted only by the capital letters A, B, C,. . . (possibly with subscripts) without referring to what these propositions actually say. The veracity of these formulas does not concern us. Propositional logic is not the study of truth, but of the relationship between the truth of one statement and that of another. The language of propositional logic contains words for “not,” “and,” “or,” “implies,” and “if and only if.” These words are represented by symbols: . . . ￢ for “not,” ∧ for “and,” ∨ for “or,” → for “implies,” and ↔ for “if and only if.” . . . As is always the case when translating one language into another, this correspondence is not exact. Unlike their English counterparts, these symbols represent concepts that are precise and invariable. The meaning of an English word, on the other hand, always depends on the context.

scholarly journals Bide partikula: eduki doxastikoa eta ebidentziala

Gogoa ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kepa Korta ◽  
Larraitz Zubeldia
Keyword(s):  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Semantic Meaning ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Degree Of Belief ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Semantics And Pragmatics ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
The One

Two kinds of meanings are usually attributed to the Basque particle bide. On the one hand, it is said to indicate the indirect nature of the speaker’s evidence for the truth of the proposition at issue. According to this view, it would be a sort of inferential particle. On the other hand, bide has been associated to the expression of a certain degree of belief or certainty on the truth of the proposition. This twofold dimension of bide parallels some features of the meaning and use of another Basque particle —omen. Their morpho-syntactic behaviour, for instance, is practically identical, and their semantics and pragmatics calls for a close comparison. Then, taking as a basis our independent conclusions about omen, we examine the similarities and differences between both particles. They both point to the indirect nature of the evidence the speaker has for the assertion. But we detect two main differences. First, bide encodes an epistemic or doxastic dimension that is not present in the semantic meaning of omen. Second, bide can be taken to be an illocutionary force indicator not contributing to the truth-conditions of the utterance, whereas omen cannot.

Properties of Interval Truth Values with Certainty Factor

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-234
Author(s):  
Masashi Emoto ◽  
◽  
Masao Mukaidono
Keyword(s):  
Fuzzy Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Certainty Factor ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Generalized Truth Values ◽  
Truth Value

Until now some truth values in fuzzy logic were suggested such as numerical truth value, interval truth value, fuzzy truth value and etc. Fuzzy truth value is considered as the most generalized truth values in fuzzy logic. Truth values except fuzzy truth value were suggested to clarify the properties of fuzzy truth values. However it is not sufficient to clarify the properties of fuzzy truth values from the properties of other truth values, because fuzzy truth value may not be convex or normal. On the other hand, the other truth values do have to be convex and normal. In this paper, we consider subnormal truth value and propose interval truth value with certainty factor. Then, we clarify the properties of interval truth value with certainty factor.

On epithets qua attributive anaphors

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
EROS CORAZZA
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Re ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
De Se ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One

A multiple-proposition theory is proposed, according to which a single utterance can express several distinct propositions. An utterance of “Jon, the idiot, missed the train” expresses the official proposition THAT JON MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT JON IS AN IDIOT. It is argued that only the official proposition affects the truth-value of the utterance, while the background proposition(s) may be treated similarly to pragmatic presuppositions. The multiple-proposition theory helps us to defend the thesis that, in an utterance such as “Jon1 promised to come but the idiot1 missed the train”, the epithet the idiot must be understood as an attributive anaphor, for it inherits its value from Jon and attributes to Jon the property of being an idiot. It is argued that epithets in such constructions should be viewed in a way similar to quasi-indicators, insofar as the latter are also attributive anaphors. The quasi-indicator she herself in “Jane1 believes that she (herself)1 is rich” inherits its value from Jane and attributes an I-thought to Jane. In focusing on the similarities and differences between epithets and quasi-indicators, we can explain some alleged difficulties, difficulties which suggest that epithets cannot be anaphoric (e.g. “*Jon1 claimed/said/thinks/ … that the bastard1 was honest”). It is shown that the ungrammaticality of sentences like these rests on the fact that the epithet is embedded in what should be a de se attribution (e.g. “Jon1 claimed/said/thinks that he (himself)1 was honest”) while its nature is to contribute to the expression of a de re attribution. This helps us to understand the ungrammaticality of “*Jane1 said/thinks/promised/ … that the idiot1 will come” vs. the grammaticality of “Jane1 said/thinks/promised/ … that she (herself)1 will come” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the ungrammaticality of “Jon1 ran over a man who was trying to give him (*himself)1 directions” vs. the grammaticality of “Jon1 ran over a man who was trying to give the idiot1 directions”.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

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