This chapter examines justifications. The common law knows a range of rationale-based defences according to which otherwise pro tanto wrongs may become permitted. By articulating justificatory defences like self-defence and necessity, the legal system adds the interstitial nuance that its prohibitions require. Unlike most other justifications, however, lesser-evils necessity is unconfined by reference to specific contexts, such as protecting oneself from attack or executing an arrest. Its field of application is amorphous and open-ended. The chapter then considers why necessity differs from those other, ‘primary’, justifications. It develops two theses: wrong-dependence and justification-dependence. In wrong-dependence, whether a person’s offence is justified depends on the type of (pro tanto) wrong that offence is. In justification-dependence, whether a person’s offence is wrong (simpliciter) depends on the type of justification that the person has. The chapter argues that cases of lesser-evils necessity are special, in that they are cases of a justified wrong. By contrast, primary justifications such as self-defence do not involve a wrong but only a pro tanto one. The importance of urgency requirements in rationale-based defences is also discussed.
Review: Lesser Evils: Ten Quartets by Gary Soto
