Unpacking Justifications

Author(s):  
A P Simester

This chapter examines justifications. The common law knows a range of rationale-based defences according to which otherwise pro tanto wrongs may become permitted. By articulating justificatory defences like self-defence and necessity, the legal system adds the interstitial nuance that its prohibitions require. Unlike most other justifications, however, lesser-evils necessity is unconfined by reference to specific contexts, such as protecting oneself from attack or executing an arrest. Its field of application is amorphous and open-ended. The chapter then considers why necessity differs from those other, ‘primary’, justifications. It develops two theses: wrong-dependence and justification-dependence. In wrong-dependence, whether a person’s offence is justified depends on the type of (pro tanto) wrong that offence is. In justification-dependence, whether a person’s offence is wrong (simpliciter) depends on the type of justification that the person has. The chapter argues that cases of lesser-evils necessity are special, in that they are cases of a justified wrong. By contrast, primary justifications such as self-defence do not involve a wrong but only a pro tanto one. The importance of urgency requirements in rationale-based defences is also discussed.

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helge Dedek

Every legal system that ties judicial decision making to a body of preconceived norms has to face the tension between the normative formulation of the ideal and its approximation in social reality. In the parlance of the common law, it is, more concretely, the remedy that bridges the gap between the ideal and the real, or, rather, between norms and facts. In the common law world—particularly in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth—a lively discourse has developed around the question of how rights relate to remedies. To the civilian legal scholar—used to thinking within a framework that strictly categorizes terms like substance and procedure, subjective right, action, and execution—the concept of remedy remains a mystery. The lack of “remedy” in the vocabulary of the civil law is more than just a matter of attaching different labels to functional equivalents, it is the expression of a different way of thinking about law. Only if a legal system is capable of satisfactorily transposing the abstract discourse of the law into social reality does the legal machinery fulfill its purpose: due to the pivotal importance of this translational process, the way it is cast in legal concepts thus allows for an insight into the deep structure of a legal culture, and, convergence notwithstanding, the remaining epistemological differences between the legal traditions of the West. A mixed jurisdiction must reflect upon these differences in order to understand its own condition and to define its future course.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriela Shalev

Chapter 4 of the new Israeli Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, introduces the concept of a contract in favour of a third party, while granting express recognition to the right of a third party beneficiary. Even those, (including the author) who maintain, that the right of a third party beneficiary could and should be derived, even before the commencement of the new Law, from the general principles and premises of the old Israeli law of contract, cannot fail to see in the above-mentioned chapter an important innovation in the Israeli legal system.This paper is a comparative analysis of the institution of third party beneficiary. The analysis will consist of a presentation and critical examination of the central concepts and doctrines involved in the institution under discussion, and it will be combined with a comparative survey of the arrangements adopted in various legal systems. The choice of this approach stems from the particular circumstances of the new legislation.While in most countries, comparative legal research is a luxury, in Israel it is a necessity. The new legislation in private law is inspired to a great extent by Continental codifications. As far as the law of contract is concerned, Israel is now in the process of becoming a “mixed jurisdiction”: departing from the common law tradition and technique, and heading towards an independent body of law, derived from various sources, mainly Continental in both substance and form.


Author(s):  
Arabella di Iorio

The legal system of the British Virgin Islands is a common law system based on the English model, comprising statute law and binding case precedents. The principles of English common law and equity apply in the BVI (subject to modification by BVI statutes) pursuant to the Common Law (Declaration of Application) Act (Cap 13) and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) Act (Cap 80) respectively. The general principles of trust law are based on English law.


1969 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Sebastian Poulter

Whereas the reception and operation of English law in West and East Africa have been the subject of much study over the last few years, the introduction and application of Roman-Dutch law in Southern Africa (apart from South Africa itself) have received scant treatment.1 This article deals only with the position in Lesotho and attempts to show the extent to which Lesotho's legal system is tied to that of the Republic of South Africa, and thus strengthens the geographical and economic bonds which link the two countries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Omar Hisham Al-Hyari

Abstract In 2017, the FIDIC launched a new edition of its Red Book—a recommended construction-related contract for building and engineering works designed by the employer. The roots of this book were influenced by the common law legal system, whereas many countries follow the civil law legal system. Amongst the latter countries is the United Arab Emirates, which has attracted construction parties from all over the world. Those who wish to use the Red Book amongst such parties should be acquainted with the local limitations on its applicability. Such acquaintance can provide them with a proper understanding of their rights and obligations. This article discusses these limitations using the doctrinal research method, which included, inter alia, an examination of all relevant decisions by local higher courts during the 2009-2019 period. The discussion shows that such limitations can be confronted owing to conflicts with local judicial jurisprudence and/or mandatory statutory provisions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lionel D. Smith

The French jurist Pierre Lepaulle argued that the common law trust could be best understood, in civilian terms, as a patrimony by appropriation. This argument has been influential in some civilian receptions of the trust. In fact, Lepaulle misunderstood the nature of the common law trust, which is founded on the obligations owed by the trustee in relation to the trust property. The rights of beneficiaries in the common law trust are neither purely personal rights against the trustee, nor are they real rights in the trust property, but rather they are rights over the rights which the trustee holds as trust property; they have a proprietary character since they persist against many third party transferees of the trust property. This analysis of the common law trust leads to the conclusion that it would be a fundamental change to turn the common law trust into a legal person. More generally, it is argued that any legal system that characterizes the trust as a legal person will find that it has ceased to understand the trust as a fundamental legal institution.


2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 126-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nada Korac‐Kakabadse ◽  
Alexander Kouzmin ◽  
Phillip Reeves Knyght
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2/2020) ◽  
pp. 38-61
Author(s):  
Milica Ristić

The arrival of the Norman tribes in the territory of England inevitably meant the influence of the customs of these tribes on the formation of a new legal system, known as „common law”. Soon after, this system established the judicial precedent as the basic source of law, which made it significantly different from European continental legal systems. However, when it came to the position of women, the common law world was the same as the continental legal systems. It was the male world, as evidenced by the famous Blackstone’s thought that husband and wife are one, and that one is the husband. In the moment of marriage, the wife would lose her legal capacity, and her personality would be drowned in her husband’s power over her and her property. Considering many other restrictions on women’s rights that will be addressed in the paper, it is not surprising that widows enjoyed the best status in medieval England, mostly owing to the institute of dower. This injustice was corrected by the emergence of the justice system and especially the trust institute. This paper is dedicated to the stages of development of the rights of married women in medieval England from complete denial to their affirmation, and especially to the contribution of the institutions of equity law to that development.


Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


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