Unpacking Justifications

This chapter examines justifications. The common law knows a range of rationale-based defences according to which otherwise pro tanto wrongs may become permitted. By articulating justificatory defences like self-defence and necessity, the legal system adds the interstitial nuance that its prohibitions require. Unlike most other justifications, however, lesser-evils necessity is unconfined by reference to specific contexts, such as protecting oneself from attack or executing an arrest. Its field of application is amorphous and open-ended. The chapter then considers why necessity differs from those other, ‘primary’, justifications. It develops two theses: wrong-dependence and justification-dependence. In wrong-dependence, whether a person’s offence is justified depends on the type of (pro tanto) wrong that offence is. In justification-dependence, whether a person’s offence is wrong (simpliciter) depends on the type of justification that the person has. The chapter argues that cases of lesser-evils necessity are special, in that they are cases of a justified wrong. By contrast, primary justifications such as self-defence do not involve a wrong but only a pro tanto one. The importance of urgency requirements in rationale-based defences is also discussed.

Petróleo y minería

En este artículo se analiza de manera empírica la política mexicana en materia de extracción de petróleo, gas natural y otros minerales para discernir su naturaleza y alcance. Se concluye que el aprovechamiento de estos recursos se inscribe en un esquema extractivista que beneficia primordialmente a las empresas del ramo y se aleja del neoextractivismo practicado por gobiernos progresistas en América Latina. Asimismo, se señala que el extractivismo petrolero se ha potenciado con la liberalización de 2013–2014. En este marco, la degradación ambiental, las tensiones sociales y el agotamiento prematuro del patrimonio geológico son considerados como males menores de un progreso irrenunciable. Taking an empirical approach, this article analyzes policies in Mexico concerned with the extraction of petroleum, natural gas and other minerals to establish their nature and reach. It concludes that the exploitation of these resources falls into an extractivist framework that primarily benefits the businesses of this industry and has moved away from neoextractivism as carried out by progressive governments in Latin America. Therefore, this article demonstrates that petroleum extractivism has been strengthened with the liberalization of 2013–14. In this framework environmental degradation, social tensions and the premature depletion of geological assets are considered lesser evils of unavoidable progress.

Bellamy on Dirty Hands and Lesser Evils: A Response

This article offers a response to Alex Bellamy's article ‘Dirty Hands and Lesser Evils in the War on Terror’. It outlines deep errors in his claims about ‘dirty hands’ and ‘lesser evils’. Essentially, these errors result from his failure to grapple with the complexity of dirty hands theory, coupled with his uncritical acceptance that dirty hands scenarios are essentially defined as a clash between a public and private morality. Furthermore, we argue that Bellamy's distinction between ‘dirty hands’ and ‘lesser evils’ is a spurious one since all dirty hands cases require a choice between lesser evils. In addition, we reject his claim that dirty hands makes no political sense. For illustrative purposes, we then briefly examine one problematic philosophical issue which needs attention if the notion of dirty hands is to be taken seriously. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of dirty hands by applying it to the issue of torture in the so-called ‘war on terror’.

Dirty Hands and Lesser Evils in the War on Terror

To what extent are political leaders entitled to violate embedded moral and legal rules in response to national emergencies? Do they have a duty to do so? This article assesses two prominent liberal approaches to this question. The ‘dirty hands’ thesis insists that there is a radical separation between private and public ethics and that the latter may require the commission of acts prohibited by the former. A ‘lesser evil’ approach holds that leaders may even violate the more permissive public ethics if there is a consequentialist case for doing so. Both suggest to some extent that certain acts remain wrong but may be necessary nonetheless. While this position makes good philosophical sense, it makes little political sense. In practice, societies choose either to validate or reject the legitimacy of certain acts. This article aims to overcome this problem by suggesting a new way of thinking about the way that ‘dirty hands’ and ‘lesser evil’ ethics work in practice through Ian Clark's work on legitimacy. It argues that in particular cases actors evaluate between competing political, ethical and legal claims, a point illustrated by a brief case study on the torture debate.