The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention in Africa

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Will ◽  
Global Peace ◽  
External Interventions

AbstractThis essay investigates the connection between humanitarian intervention and R2P within an historical, legal, and conceptual context. It challenges the widely held view that Africa lacks the capacity to intervene in areas of conflict and human rights violations, arguing instead that the continent possesses the will and instruments to protect human rights. The author notes that, while the UN Security Council retains the primary responsibility for promoting global peace and security, the R2P norm remains contested even within the UN. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were initially undertaken without UN approval, but were later sanctioned by the world body. These interventions undermined the idea of state sovereignty as independence from external interventions, which had previously constrained humanitarian missions in Africa. However, the essay argues that the R2P principle was boosted by the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 to prosecute persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide. In addition, the intervention clause in the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 supports the R2P principle while prohibiting unilateral interventions. Notwithstanding these developments, the author notes that the AU and Africa's regional bodies still have a long way to go in translating the R2P doctrine into practice.

Humanitarian Intervention

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Caplan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Real Effect ◽  
General Decline ◽  
Humanitarian Crises ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Way

States – Western ones, at least – have given increased weight to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of international concern, with the authorization of legally binding enforcement measures to tackle humanitarian crises under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These concerns were also developed outside the UN Security Council framework, following Tony Blair’s Chicago speech and the contemporaneous NATO action over Kosovo. This gave rise to international commissions and resulted, among other things, in the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. The adoption of this doctrine coincided with a period in which there appeared to be a general decline in mass atrocities. Yet R2P had little real effect – it cannot be shown to have caused the fall in mass atrocities, only to have echoed it. Thus, the promise of R2P and an age of humanitarianism failed to emerge, even if the way was paved for future development.

Gaddafi and Grotius: Some Historical Roots of the Libyan Intervention

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Glanville
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Deep Roots ◽  
Modern Thought ◽  
The Will ◽  
Rich History

It is increasingly well understood that concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ enjoy a long and rich history. Nevertheless, it is surprising how plainly the arguments offered by states seeking to justify intervention in Libya in 2011 echo those used by theologians, jurists, and philosophers to justify intervention in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Those advocating intervention in Libya drew not just on the language of ‘human rights,’ that emerged relatively recently, but on a wider and much older range of idioms and ideas to make their case. In this article, I identify three key arguments that were employed by states in support of the intervention and I demonstrate their parallels with three principal arguments that have been advanced to justify intervention in response to tyranny since the sixteenth century. The three arguments are: the need to protect ‘innocents’; the need to hold ‘tyrants’ to account; and the need to defend the will of a sovereign people. After exploring each argument, I conclude by noting that the claim often heard today, that intervention is under certain circumstances a responsibility rather than merely a right, also has deep roots in early modern thought.

‘Humanitarian Intervention’

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel S. Rodley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Human Rights Violation

This chapter examines whether so-called humanitarian intervention is a lawful exception to the international law prohibiting use of force when rescuing populations from widespread grave human rights violations, without UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VII. It considers what type or level of human rights violation or abuse justifies ‘humanitarian intervention’ if it were permitted, with reference to the R2P categories of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It discusses the UN Charter provisions and state practice on the prohibition on use of force, and criteria used to determine the legality of action deemed humanitarian intervention. The chapter describes tests that an intervention would have to pass and would be applicable to mitigate culpability, including gravity of the situation, political neutrality, the circumstances of the Security Council’s inability to act, and principles of necessity and proportionality. It argues that there is no humanitarian exception to the prohibition of the use of force in international law.

The Responsibility to Protect and the Fate of the Rohingya

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Un Security Council

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.

The Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-based Perspective

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota Gierycz
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
High Commissioner ◽  
The Individual

AbstractThis article analyses the responsibility to protect from a legal and rights-based perspective. It shows that the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is rooted in existing International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and evoke serious international legal consequences under all circumstances, also if tried by national courts. Protection of the individual against atrocities is a primary responsibility of states. However, if a state is unable or unwilling to exercise its protection obligations, these shift to international organisations, including the United Nations or any other authority controlling the territory and its population. The article further analyses various protection tools available within the UN human rights machinery, in particular the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and concludes that they could play a much stronger role in preventing and addressing the atrocities and that the most important obstacle in this respect is the prevailing institutional gap between human rights and security matters within the UN. The article concludes that the responsibility to protect clause adopted by consensus by the 2005 World Summit in its Outcome Document (GA Resolution A/60/1) constitutes an important commitment towards implementing these universal rights and obligations which are lacking enforcement and continue to be violated, especially in armed conflicts. It also identifies research and policy recommendations that may facilitate operationalisation of this important clause.

Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 134-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Hassler
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Sovereign State ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
International Solidarity ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Peacekeeping Forces

This article examines the debate surrounding the responsibility to protect [R2P] with particular reference to the use of peacekeeping forces in that regard. Post-Cold War, human protection had expanded into a matter of international concern. Yet, where formerly humanitarian intervention was the mot du jour, a change in conceptual vocabulary led to the introduction of R2P and to a redefinition of sovereignty. Accordingly, the primary responsibility to protect its citizens rests with the sovereign state but, owing to international solidarity, the residual responsibility rests with the international community. Contextually, R2P is embedded in a continuum of responsibilities: prevent, react and rebuild. Proponents of the concept already see a norm in development. Still, divisions and confusion remain concerning the concept’s legal basis, its scope and its parameters. This is particularly relevant in view of peacekeeping forces, which have been increasingly deployed for humanitarian purposes. Because of ill-defined mandates and an overextension of resources, however, traditional peacekeeping is no longer suitable, lacking the resources, the personnel and the necessary expertise. To be able to fulfil the goals of R2P, peacekeeping will have to be redefined and the forces equipped with more robust mandates or fail.

International Criminal Court

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
pp. 41-51
Author(s):  
Charles B.A Ubah ◽  
Osy E. Nwebo
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Justice System ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Domestic Jurisdiction ◽  
National Governments

The principle of domestic jurisdiction in international law makes national governments responsible for protecting their citizens, investigating alleged abuses of human rights in their countries and bringing the perpetrators to justice. They governments may also extradite those accused of abuse of human rights to any other states prepared to give them a fair trial. Problem arises however, when governments are unable or unwilling to perform this duty or are themselves perpetrators of these crimes. Thus, millions of people have fallen victims of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of humanitarian laws. But only very few of these perpetrators have been brought to justice in national courts as many governments claim sanctuary under the principle of domestic jurisdiction. The need therefore arises for the international community to act in order to protect helpless or defenseless citizens from being victims of crimes against humanity and human rights abuses, by bringing the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. The thrust of this article therefore, is that the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) fills this void by fulfilling a central and pivotal goal in international jurisprudence. This article, therefore, provides insights and lessons into the history and prospects of the International Criminal Court. These are insights and lessons that are too important and too costly to ignore in the 21st century understanding of international criminal justice system.

Indian Perspectives on the ‘Responsibility to Protect'

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-316
Author(s):  
Akanksha Singh
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Initial Phase ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
World Summit ◽  
The Us ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The World ◽  
Case Basis

The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) took shape to refine the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In the initial phase, the concept of R2P did not receive enthusiastic endorsement. Developing countries including India perceived it as a new body with the old spirit and likened it with the concept of humanitarian intervention, and this was reinforced by the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. However, the 2005 World Summit proved to be a watershed in the evolution of R2P, just as it is a landmark to understand an important phase of India’s approach to the idea. It would not be accurate to characterize India as a determined nay-sayer on R2P endorsement, particularly in view of the widely known priority India attached at the World Summit to the question of United Nations (UN) Security Council enlargement. Eventually, by 2009 (with the introduction of ‘three- pillar principles’ of R2P), India became a major proponent for the cautious and legitimate implementation of R2P. However, the experiences gained from Libya made India become a voice of caution in invoking forcible options under the R2P principle in Syria. In this article, the attempt has been made to articulate various permutations and combinations regarding India’s evolving approach to R2P on a case-by-case basis.

Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
The Face ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Relationship

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

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