Evaluations for Sentencing of Juveniles in Criminal Court

Author(s):  
Antoinette Kavanaugh ◽  
Thomas Grisso

In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court imposed special requirements for sentencing juveniles who have been transferred to criminal court for conviction and sentencing as adults. Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) also required that all juveniles sentenced to life without parole in the past must be resentenced. For these cases, the Court required that consideration of life without parole and any alternative sentences must include a review of potentially mitigating factors associated with a youth’s developmental immaturity. This is the first book to offer guidance to forensic mental health examiners when performing evaluations to assist attorneys and judges in Miller sentencing and resentencing cases. The first three chapters review relevant legal, conceptual, and research background for examiners. The Court’s specific developmental factors are defined, as well as relevant case law and legal process for juvenile sentencing cases. Then psychological concepts and theory related to those developmental factors are reviewed, and a chapter identifies research that examiners can use to inform their assessment and interpretation process. With that conceptual background, the next four chapters offer recommendations for conducting these evaluations. Preparation for the evaluation is described, including managing the requirements and expectations of referring parties. Then the process of data collection is outlined, including interviews and psychological and developmental testing tailored for this type of evaluation. Final chapters offer guidance for interpreting the data to address the law’s relevant developmental factors, as well as an outline and advice for written reports and oral testimony in juvenile sentencing cases.

Author(s):  
Antoinette Kavanaugh ◽  
Thomas Grisso

The chapter begins with a brief introduction, describing the scope and types of evaluations for juvenile sentencing in criminal court, offering the reader relevant terminology and an introduction to the book’s purpose. The primary focus of the chapter is on the relevant law for these evaluations. It describes relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases, especially Miller v. Alabama, which abolished mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles and required developmental analysis to inform juvenile sentencing, as well as Montgomery v. Louisiana, which required resentencing for persons previously receiving mandatory life without parole sentences as juveniles. Miller’s definitions for the standards to be applied in juvenile sentencing and resentencing are then introduced and discussed: the legal concept of “irreparable corruption” and the five “Miller factors” defining characteristics of immaturity relevant for sentencing. Finally, the chapter describes the legal process for juvenile sentencing, identifying the role of Miller evaluations within that process.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-885 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADAMANTIA RACHOVITSA

AbstractThis article discusses the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to mitigating difficulties arising from the fragmentation of international law. It argues that the Court's case law provides insights and good practices to be followed. First, the article furnishes evidence that the Court has developed an autonomous and distinct interpretative principle to construe the European Convention on Human Rights by taking other norms of international law into account. Second, it offers a blueprint of the methodology that the Court employs when engaging with external norms in the interpretation process. It analyses the Court's approach to subtle contextual differences between similar or identical international norms and its position towards the requirements of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It concludes that international courts are developing innovative interpretative practices, which may not be strictly based on the letter of the VCLT.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-319
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Although EU states use the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) for the purpose of surrendering a person who is accused of committing an offence or who has been convicted of an offence, they use extradition when dealing with countries outside the EU. However, they use surrender when dealing with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Thus, extradition is one of the ways in which African and European countries (especially EU members) are cooperating in the fight against crime. Case law from courts in some African and European countries and from the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, shows that extraditions between African and European countries have been delayed or hampered by allegations of human rights violations in the requesting state. These allegations have focused on mainly two rights: the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom from torture. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the extradition of a person should not go ahead if his or her trial was or will amount to a flagrant denial of justice or where there is a real risk of being subjected to torture. Although African courts and international human rights bodies have also held that extradition should not go ahead where there is a real risk that the person will be subjected to torture or where his/her trial will be unfair, they have not adopted the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ test. The case law also shows that some people have challenged the legal basis for their extradition. This article highlights this case law and suggests ways in which some of the challenges associated with extradition could be overcome. The article demonstrates that courts in some African and European countries have considered the nature of extradition enquiries. In some countries, such as Kenya, courts have held that extradition enquiries are criminal proceedings. However, in the United Kingdom, courts have held that extradition enquiries are criminal proceedings of a special type. There is consensus that extradition enquiries are not civil proceedings.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-211
Author(s):  
Joanna Nicholson

International criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs) often refer to jurisprudence from other ICTs when reaching a decision. This can help increase the legitimacy of their decision-making. This article focuses on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and examines when the ICC may refer to the decisions from other courts; when it in fact does so; when it has chosen to deviate from the decisions of other ICTs; and how this has affected the legitimacy of its decisions. The ICC has generally been mindful in its approach towards referring to jurisprudence from other ICTs, but has not been afraid to deviate from it on occasion in decisions concerning both substantive and procedural law. The article argues that where possible the Court should interpret the law in line with other ICTs’ decisions. This will help increase the legitimacy both of the Court’s own decisions and the field of ICL as a whole.


2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 969-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon I. Singer

In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the sentencing of juveniles to death violated the constitutional amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. Similarly, the Court most recently decided that life without parole for nonhomicide offenses is also unconstitutional ( Graham v. Florida, 2010). Part of the reason for the Court’s decisions is the lack of consensus as to the appropriateness of punishing juveniles as if they were adults. To examine the extent to which there is consensus as to the capital penalties for capital crimes, this article examines a population of young juveniles who were initially charged with murder, and then subsequently convicted in criminal court and sentenced to life in prison. As is the case with adults, not all juveniles were convicted in criminal court for their initial charge of murder. But unlike for adults, a proportion of eligible juveniles were adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court or received youthful offender in criminal court, resulting in a less severe sentence than a maximum of life in prison. The author suggests that this reduced set of sanctions, which a segment of juveniles receive, is substantive justice and the reproduction of juvenile justice. He found significant differences in the reproduction of juvenile justice by place and prior offense.


2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-160
Author(s):  
Noora Arajärvi ◽  
Dov Jacobs

AbstractThis article covers the past two years of the activity of the International Criminal Court. Ten years after the signature of the Rome Statute, the Court has continued investigating situations in four countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Sudan and the Central African Republic). The activity of the Court has accelerated, with four indictees in custody in the DRC situation, one public arrest warrant in the CAR situation and two in the Sudan situation. The Court has developed its case law on victim participation and refined its procedural framework, through constant debate between the Prosecutor and the pre-trial chambers. It has also pursued its goal of increasing cooperation with State parties, and raising awareness of the Court through outreach programs. The Court faces difficult challenges in establishing itself as a credible court, balancing the necessary requirements of fairness in a criminal trial and the high expectations of victims and the international community. The recent stay of proceedings and granting of release in the Lubanga case, which is supposed to be the first trial of the Court, is an illustration of this challenge and the difficulty in finding this balance.


Author(s):  
van Sliedregt Elies

The concept of superior responsibility has been developed and critically discussed since the Second World War. It owes much of its recent development to the ad hoc tribunals that have relied on the concept to try military and non-military leaders for crimes committed by subordinates. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has drawn from this jurisprudence and developed it further, as evidenced by Article 28 of its Statute. Superior or command responsibility is the primary mechanism through which superiors can be held criminally responsible for failing to prevent or punish crimes committed by subordinates. This chapter describes the present day scope and meaning of command responsibility, which means discussing mainly International Criminal Tribunals for the case law of the Former Yugoslavia, to date the main source of case law on superior responsibility. It discusses superior responsibility through the prism of its nature, which is still ambiguous. This is problematic since it is the nature of the concept that determines its outer limits; limits that have expanded considerably over the years.


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