Preamble

Author(s):  
David DeGrazia ◽  
Tom L. Beauchamp

Research involving animals has advanced since its inception without the aid of a framework of general moral principles. The need for such a framework might therefore be doubted, but several developments call for a reconsideration and reconstruction of animal research ethics. First, public concerns about animal welfare have increased substantially in recent decades and continue to increase. Second, the scientific study of animals has afforded a wealth of new insights into their behaviors, mental lives, and basic needs. Third, animal ethics emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century as an important field of interdisciplinary scholarship and has expanded for several decades, frequently challenging traditional ways of thinking about animals’ moral status and human responsibilities for their care and use....

ILAR Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David DeGrazia ◽  
Tom L Beauchamp

Abstract We have produced a framework of general moral principles for animal research ethics in a book, Principles of Animal Research Ethics, which is forthcoming with Oxford University Press in fall 2019. This book includes a detailed statement and defense of our framework along with critical commentaries on our work from seven eminent scholars: Larry Carbone, Frans de Waal, Rebecca Dresser, Joseph Garner, Brian Hare, Margaret Landi, and Julian Savulescu. In the present paper, we explain the motivation for our project and present our framework of principles. The first section explains why a new framework is both needed and timely, on the basis of six important developments in recent decades. The second section challenges assertions of an unbridgeable gulf dividing the animal-research and animal-protection communities on the issue of animal research. It does so, first, by indicating common ground in the core values of social benefit and animal welfare and, then, by presenting and briefly defending our framework: three principles of social benefit and three principles of animal welfare. These six principles, we argue, constitute a more suitable framework than any other that is currently available, including the canonical 3 Rs advanced in 1959 by William M. S. Russell and Rex L. Burch.


Author(s):  
David DeGrazia ◽  
Tom L. Beauchamp

The centerpiece section of this book on animal research ethics presents a new moral framework of general principles. It is preceded in the front matter by a preamble that explains the overall project in the book as well as in the sections specifically on the six principles. The centerpiece section first discusses the essential place of ethical justification in the animal research arena and then presents the framework of three principles of social benefit and three principles of animal welfare. Next it examines both the critical role played by ethics committees in a well-functioning system of ethical review of animal research and the idea of scientific necessity as a justification for harming animal subjects. The section closes with an analysis of the influential Three-Rs framework, as presented in Russell and Burch’s Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Despite the Three Rs’ important advance in the promotion of animal welfare, it does not adequately address the costs and benefits of animal research to human beings and lacks a comprehensive program of animal-subjects protection.


Author(s):  
Tom L. Beauchamp ◽  
David DeGrazia

This book is the first to present a framework of general principles for animal research ethics together with an analysis of the principles’ meaning and moral requirements. This new framework of six moral principles constitutes a more suitable set of moral guidelines than any currently available, including the influential framework presented in the Principles of Humane Experimental Technique published in 1959 by zoologist and psychologist William M. S. Russell and microbiologist Rex L. Burch. Their “principles”—commonly referred to as the Three Rs—are better described as specific directives than as general moral principles, and they are insufficient as a moral framework of basic values in the context of contemporary biomedical and behavioral research. The framework presented in Principles of Animal Research Ethics is more comprehensive in addressing ethical requirements pertaining to societal benefit (the most important consideration in justifying the harming of animals in research) and features a more thorough, ethically defensible program of animal welfare (the area on which Russell and Burch focus). The present framework is also more likely than the Three Rs to foster extensive agreement between the biomedical and animal protection communities—an agreement deeply needed at the present time. The book features commentaries on the framework of principles written by eminent figures in animal research ethics representing an array of relevant disciplines: veterinary medicine, biomedical research, biology, zoology, comparative psychology, primatology, law, and bioethics. The seven commentators on the authors’ Principles are Larry Carbone, Frans B. M. de Waal, Rebecca Dresser, Joseph P. Garner, Brian Hare, Margaret S. Landi, and Julian Savulescu.


Author(s):  
Kathleen Pritchett ◽  
Anna Olsson ◽  
Peter Sandøe ◽  
Paul Robinson

Antiquity ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 9 (34) ◽  
pp. 190-194
Author(s):  
Lancelot Hogben

In a stimulating lecture recently published in ANTIQUITY (1933, VII, 410–18) Gordon Childe raises the question : is Prehistory practical ? He suggests that the disastrous social consequences of applying ethnological hypotheses based on flimsy foundations of fact are sufficient justification for insisting on the scientific study of prehistory and archaeology as an essential part of the intellectual equipment of a civilized person in our generation. Current events certainly sustain the justice of his plea. Still it may be argued that there is an even stronger reason, and one which is perhaps more durable, for asserting the claims of such studies to occupy a pivotal position in twentieth - century culture. The publication of Neugebauer‘s Vorlesungen ueber Geschichte der antiken mathematischen Wissenschaften is a timely reminder of the contribution which students of prehistory and archaeology working together can make to the solution of one of the great intellectual issues of our own time.


Author(s):  
Xiaoqun Xu

A history of Chinese law and justice from the imperial era to the post-Mao era, the book addresses the evolution and function of law codes and judicial practices in China’s long history and examines the transition from traditional laws and practices to their modern counterparts in the twentieth century and beyond. From ancient times to the twenty-first century, there has been an enduring expectation or hope among the Chinese people that justice should and will be done in society, which is expressed in a popular Chinese saying, “Heaven has eyes.” To the Chinese mind in the imperial era, justice was, and was to be achieved as, an alignment of Heavenly reason, state law, and human relations. Such a conception did not change until the turn of the twentieth century, when Western-derived notions—natural rights, legal equality, the rule of law, judicial independence, and due process—came to replace the Confucian moral code of right and wrong, which was a fundamental shift in philosophical and moral principles that informed law and justice. The legal-judicial reform agendas since the beginning of the twentieth century (still ongoing today) stemmed from this change in the Chinese moral and legal thinking, but to materialize these principles in everyday practices is much more difficult to accomplish, hence all the legal dramas, including tragedies, in the past century or so. The book lays out how and why that is the case.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 469-486
Author(s):  
Külli Keerus ◽  
Mickey Gjerris ◽  
Helena Röcklinsberg

AbstractTom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.


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