Deprivation as Un-Experienced Harm?

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 469-486
Author(s):  
Külli Keerus ◽  
Mickey Gjerris ◽  
Helena Röcklinsberg

AbstractTom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

2020 ◽  
Vol 98 (Supplement_4) ◽  
pp. 468-468
Author(s):  
Sharon Kuca ◽  
Lindsey McKinney ◽  
Cia Johnson

Abstract Established in 2001, the Animal Welfare Assessment Contest® (AWJAC®) aims to be an innovative educational tool for enhancing understanding and awareness of welfare issues affecting animals used for human purposes (e.g., research, agriculture, entertainment, companionship). The contest is open to participation by veterinary, undergraduate, and graduate students who may participate as individuals or as part of a team. A limited number of veterinarians are also eligible to compete as non-placing participants. Participation in the contest entails assessment of live and computer-based scenarios encompassing data, photographs, and videos of animals in comparable situations. Students then use the information obtained to rank the welfare of the animals in those situations on the basis of physiologic and behavioral indicators, with attention to facilities and management, and present their analyses orally to expert judges. The species featured change each year of the contest. At the completion of each contest, participants and coaches are asked to anonymously complete a written survey. The quantitative and qualitative results of this survey are used to determine if the contest has achieved its aims and incorporate suggestions for improvement of future contests. The majority of survey respondents from the five contests held between 2014–2018 report they either strongly agree or agree that the AWJAC increased their knowledge of animal welfare science (98%, n = 549) and was an overall valuable experience (99%, n = 547) that they would recommend to their peers (98%, n = 550). Respondents cited networking opportunities and diversity of species featured in the contest as key reasons the contest is valuable. Given these results, the AWJAC is successfully achieving its aims to increase animal welfare knowledge in an innovative way.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN CAPPS

Abstract:Suppose that a colleague proposed a fantastic experiment: to introduce human stem cells into a neonatal mouse so that its entire brain developed into “human-like” neuronal structures. The colleague claimed it would still be a mouse, and that its chimeric brain would be nothing like a “human” one. It would not, as a result, have a moral status beyond its nonhuman animal origins. Thus, the “human neuron mouse” would allow scientists to tinker with human-like neurology in ways that would be precluded if it were a human being, and that would promise to lead to substantial understanding of the destructive and incurable brain diseases that befall humanity. The colleague does admit, however, that for reasons of comparative fidelity, experiments in human patients would be scientifically preferable, although in this case, neither ethically justified nor legally permitted. For that reason, it might be desirable to create a human brain in a nonhuman primate, where it would be more likely that significant human-like neuronal development would occur, but still could not become a person. This article explores the significance of a “human neuron chimpanzee,” and suggests that contradictions in the design of the experiment make it unethical to proceed in either murine or primate models.


2006 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vonne Lund ◽  
Grahame Coleman ◽  
Stefan Gunnarsson ◽  
Michael Calvert Appleby ◽  
Katri Karkinen

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Mills

<p>Patient values represents one of the three cornerstones of contemporary human EBM definitions, and are considered vital to both protect the patient from the tyranny of unsuitable treatment and to ensure the individual is central in clinical decisions. They comprise “unique preferences, concerns and expectations of each patient” (Sackett et al 1996). By stark contrast, EBVM replaces individual patient values with “circumstances of each patient, and the circumstances and values of the owner/carer” (CEVM 2015). There is a danger that in such a conception, animal welfare may not be prioritised in EBVM practice.</p><p>Animal patients are not philosophically or scientifically likely to possess the complex values of humans, but it is conceivable that they possess ‘values’ in the context of veterinary interventions, such as preferences, wants, needs and desires; indeed these underlie much animal welfare science. They may be basic, such as the avoidance of suffering and a desire to continue life, or more complex, such as a desire to maximise pleasure or natural behaviour. They are likely to be individual and dynamic. They may be defined as the unique dynamic mental preference state of an animal during the period of veterinary medical or surgical intervention, including avoidance of suffering and maximisation of health and pleasure.</p><p>EBVM’s current consideration of patient values only extends to demonstrating effectiveness, or not, of an intervention for an animal. Any intervention involves some physical or mental welfare compromise for animal patients, which may be severe; EBVM aims to ensure this harm 'cost' is consistently outweighed by therapeutic 'benefit'. However, in current EBVM the evidence is often weak, incomplete, contradictory, fuzzy, non-existent or inapplicable, meaning there is a significant risk of causing harm to the patient’s welfare when practising EBVM. This stands in opposition to a veterinary surgeon’s oath and ethical imperative to do no harm, and to do the best for her patients’ welfare (RCVS 2015).</p><p>At what point does the risk become ethically unacceptable? The answer comprises both philosophical considerations, and empirical, critically anthropomorphic attributions of values to animals. Such conceptions and techniques are not currently explicitly expounded in EBVM research or practice. Rather than being marginalised or excluded from definitions of EBVM, this presentation will argue that patient values should be the central, primary and overriding consideration in both its practice and research if EBVM is to be an ethically acceptable pursuit.</p><br /> <img src="https://www.veterinaryevidence.org/rcvskmod/icons/oa-icon.jpg" alt="Open Access" />


Author(s):  
Michael Mendl ◽  
Georgia J. Mason ◽  
Elizabeth S. Paul

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelia R. Cornish ◽  
Brayden Ashton ◽  
David Raubenheimer ◽  
Paul D. McGreevy

AbstractConsumers are increasingly concerned about nonhuman animal welfare in food production and, as their awareness continues to rise, demand for welfare-friendly products is growing. The current study explores the Australian market for welfare-friendly food of animal origin by outlining and clarifying how consumers’ welfare concerns affect their purchasing decisions. It reports the findings of an Australian face-to-face survey of consumers’ knowledge of and attitudes to farm animal welfare and their reported purchasing of welfare-friendly animal-derived products. A novel aspect of this survey was its effort to establish consumers’ understanding of welfare-friendly labels, their motivation to purchase welfare-friendly products, and the barriers to doing so. The survey was deployed in four shopping districts in New South Wales, Australia, in 2016. Data were collected from 135 respondents, and the results are discussed below.


Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Butler ◽  
Mathilde Valenchon ◽  
Rachel Annan ◽  
Helen Whay ◽  
Siobhan Mullan

The purpose of the study was to explore the perceptions held by British racing industry stakeholders of factors influencing racehorse welfare. Ten focus groups were held across the UK with a total of 42 stakeholders from a range of roles within racehorse care including trainers, stable staff and veterinarians. Participants took part in three exercises. Firstly, to describe the scenarios of a ‘best life’ and the minimum welfare standards a horse in training could be living under. Secondly, to identify the main challenges for racehorse welfare and thirdly, to recall any innovative or uncommon practices to improve welfare they had witnessed. Using thematic analysis, eight themes emerged from the first exercise. Two strands, factors that contribute to maintaining health and the horse-human relationship ran through all eight themes. Across all themes horses living the ‘best life’ were perceived as being treated as individuals rather than being part of a ‘one size fits all’ life when kept under minimum welfare standards. Health was both perceived as the main challenge to welfare as well as one open to innovative practices such as improved veterinary treatments. Data obtained, informed by the knowledge and expertise of experienced stakeholders, combined with practical animal welfare science will be used to develop the first British racehorse welfare assessment protocol.


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