Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
L. Syd M Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Ethical Significance

Consciousness is notoriously difficult to define. Several things are meant by consciousness: sentience, self-awareness, wakefulness, phenomenal consciousness, and more. There are also several consciousness-related ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions, including questions about what consciousness is, what creatures are conscious, how we can know who is conscious, and, importantly, questions about the ethical significance of consciousness. This chapter provides a sketch of several philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness as an introduction to medical, scientific, and philosophical inquiries into consciousness and unconsciousness.

Varieties of Self-Awareness

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thor Grünbaum ◽  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Conscious Thinking ◽  
Self Reference

This chapter argues that explicit (reflective) self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit (pre-reflective) form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion of a number of prominent theories of self-knowledge and self-reference relating them to forms of self-consciousness. It is then argued that getting these various relations right is important to a proper understanding of a number of psychopathological phenomena.

Methods and Roles of Experience in Christian Wolff’s “Deutsche Metaphysik”

2020 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-166
Author(s):  
Kristina Engelhard
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Sources Of Knowledge ◽  
Inductive Methods ◽  
Contemporary Perspective

Abstract The main thesis of this article is that in Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik, empirical sources of knowledge play important if not foundational roles and that inductive methods of reasoning are extensively applied. It is argued that experiential self-awareness plays a foundational role and that empirical evidence, phenomena, and scientific theories from the empirical sciences of Wolff’s time are used for inferential purposes. Wolff also makes use of inductive reasoning, i.e., abduction to hidden causes of empirical phenomena, and inferences to the best or to the only possible explanation. Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik is therefore a prefiguration and an interesting case of inductive metaphysics in the contemporary sense. From this contemporary perspective, Wolff draws the distinction between valid and speculative abductions in a different way – but it is also different from that of his more empirically oriented contemporaries.

The Value and Disvalue of Consciousness

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 600-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
WALTER GLANNON
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Setting ◽  
Terminally Ill ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Disorders Of Consciousness ◽  
Intraoperative Awareness ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Neurological Conditions ◽  
Ethical Significance ◽  
Compromised Patients ◽  
Experience Pain

Abstract:Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one’s experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

Reflexivity, Transparency, and Illusionism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 142-156
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Present Contribution

The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is much more accepted today than 20 years ago and has become part of the standard repertoire in philosophy of mind. The notion’s increasing popularity has not surprisingly also led to an increasing amount of criticism. My focus in the present contribution will be on a particular radical objection that can be found in Jay Garfield’s book Engaging Buddhism. It seeks to undercut the appeal to pre-reflective self-awareness by arguing that there ultimately is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness.

Being for no-one

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Chris Letheby
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Altered States ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Depersonalization Disorder ◽  
Total Lack ◽  
Fast Acting

Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal consciousness and (b) total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent (I argue) from my counterexamples. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states.

Practioner Reflection That Enhances Interprofessional Collaborative Practices for Serving Children Who Are Deaf/Hard-of-Hearing

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 3-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina M. Blaiser ◽  
Mary Ellen Nevins
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Professional Practice ◽  
Hard Of Hearing ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Interprofessional Collaboration ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Collaborative Practices ◽  
Interprofessional Teams ◽  
Client Care

Interprofessional collaboration is essential to maximize outcomes of young children who are Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing (DHH). Speech-language pathologists, audiologists, educators, developmental therapists, and parents need to work together to ensure the child's hearing technology is fit appropriately to maximize performance in the various communication settings the child encounters. However, although interprofessional collaboration is a key concept in communication sciences and disorders, there is often a disconnect between what is regarded as best professional practice and the self-work needed to put true collaboration into practice. This paper offers practical tools, processes, and suggestions for service providers related to the self-awareness that is often required (yet seldom acknowledged) to create interprofessional teams with the dispositions and behaviors that enhance patient/client care.

Review of The structure of scientific theories. 2nd ed.

1978 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 473-473
Author(s):  
DAVID L. KRANTZ
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theories
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