Being for no-one

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Chris Letheby
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Altered States ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Depersonalization Disorder ◽  
Total Lack ◽  
Fast Acting

Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal consciousness and (b) total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent (I argue) from my counterexamples. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states.

Stable neural representations of mental states across target people and stimulus modalities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
The Self ◽  
Similarity Analysis ◽  
Multiple Modalities ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Conceptual Core ◽  
Stimulus Modalities ◽  
Huge Variety

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

scholarly journals Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rocco Joseph Gennaro
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Conscious State ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Internal Organs ◽  
Thought Insertion ◽  
Previous Discussion ◽  
Delusional Belief ◽  
Conscious Mental State

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states.

Varieties of Self-Awareness

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thor Grünbaum ◽  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Conscious Thinking ◽  
Self Reference

This chapter argues that explicit (reflective) self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit (pre-reflective) form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion of a number of prominent theories of self-knowledge and self-reference relating them to forms of self-consciousness. It is then argued that getting these various relations right is important to a proper understanding of a number of psychopathological phenomena.

scholarly journals The Topography of The Female Self in Indian Therapeutic Cults

Ethnologies ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Marine Carrin
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
Crucial Issue ◽  
Female Self ◽  
Ritual Action ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship

Anthropologists have stressed the relationship between symptoms of distress, ritual action and unwanted possession. The article stresses the importance of language and performance in two therapeutic cults in India. The crucial issue here involves showing how ritual becomes a means for either representing or manipulating special mental states. We see how individuals may use possession as a strategy to frame a reformulation of the self. Healing thus involves self-awareness.

Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Southgate
Keyword(s):  
Executive Functions ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Human Infants ◽  
Second Year ◽  
Do So

From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others’ perspectives, and can do so even when the other’s perspective conflicts with the infant’s own. Infants’ success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other’s perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others’ attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants’ ability to take others’ perspectives, but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others’ mental states.

In Different Times and Places

2019 ◽  
pp. 146-164
Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands
Keyword(s):  
Episodic Memory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Detailed Consideration ◽  
Temporal Parameters ◽  
The Right

The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is extended to incorporate awareness of one’s mental states or acts and of the “lived” body. The temporal parameters of pre-intentional self-awareness are also extended by way of a detailed consideration of episodic memory in animals. Whether animals are capable of such memory is controversial, due to our inability to determine whether they represent past episodes in the right way. Even if animals cannot episodically remember, they still have pre-intentional awareness of themselves through time. This pre-intentional awareness of the self through time consists in a sense of familiarity, which is explained in parallel with perception: in terms of a generated series of anticipations in which the person who remembers is implicated.

Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Miguel Angel Sebastian
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Altered States ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Minimal Self ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Minimal Form

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness): a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects.

scholarly journals Peculiarities of Self-Image Dependence of the Students with High Level of Neuroticity

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-16
Author(s):  
Oleksandra KUZO ◽  
◽  
Lyubov KUZO ◽  
Olha ZAVERUKHA ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Sensitive Period ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Significant Other ◽  
Peripheral Part ◽  
Self Image ◽  
High Level

The article presents the authors’ theoretical model of Self-image functioning with a peripheral part on the border of the relationship between the Self and the significant other person. An experimental study of the peculiarities of Self-image dependence is provided. The study involved 150 students of Lviv State University of Internal Affairs. Peculiarities of self-relation (dependence of the Self-image on significant other people) of students with high and moderate levels of neuroticism have been studied. The method of rapid diagnosis of neurosis (K. Heck; H. Hess), methods of self-assessment of mental states (according to H. Eysenck), author's experimental study of the "dependent" characteristic of the Self-image were used. Correlation analysis and Mann-Whitney comparative analysis were used for statistical data processing. As a result of the ascertaining experiment, it was found that the peripheral part of the Self-image of boys and girls with a high level of neuroticism (HN) is more dependent on the opinion of reference other people (unstable Self-image) than of persons with moderate neuroticism (MN) and this is accompanied by high levels of anxiety, frustration and rigidity. The hypothesis that students with a high level of neuroticism will more often depend on the opinion of significant others than students with a moderate level of neuroticism was confirmed. The studentship is a sensitive period for effective psycho-correctional influences in order to form a stable, positive and independent Self-image, and therefore, the quality use of psychological services of psycho-corrective influences can significantly affect well-being, learning and quality of life. The self-awareness of students with a high level of neuroticism should be considered both as the main object and as a fundamental support for psycho-correctional influence, and the resource of this influence should be sought in an adequate relationship.

Mirror self-recognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Schilhab
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Concept ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Mark Test ◽  
Self Recognition

Mirror self-recognition (MSR) refers to the empirical investigation of self-awareness, also known as the ‘mirror and mark test’ introduced by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup (1970). The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth or to groom the eye by the aid of mirrors has been interpreted as the recognition of the self and evidence of a self-concept. Unknowingly, a similar approach was developed independently with children (Amsterdam 1972). The successful passing of the mirror and mark test has been widely used as a benchmark for distinguishing conscious and non-conscious species within fields with a general interest in evolutionary perspectives on consciousness and cognition such as comparative psychology and cognitive ethology, although controversies about the methodology and theoretical framework persist. These disputes question our intuitions about consciousness and accentuate the epistemic difficulty of obtaining evidence on mental states in others.

scholarly journals The Synthesis and Decoding of Meaning

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-70
Author(s):  
H. Georg Schulze
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Intelligent System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Quantum Component ◽  
Ordered Pairs

Abstract Thinking machines must be able to use language effectively in communication with humans. It requires from them the ability to generate meaning and transfer this meaning to a communicating partner. Machines must also be able to decode meaning communicated via language. This work is about meaning in the context of building an artificial general intelligent system. It starts with an analysis of the Turing test and some of the main approaches to explain meaning. It then considers the generation of meaning in the human mind and argues that meaning has a dual nature. The quantum component reflects the relationships between objects and the orthogonal quale component the value of these relationships to the self. Both components are necessary, simultaneously, for meaning to exist. This parallel existence permits the formulation of ‘meaning coordinates’ as ordered pairs of quantum and quale strengths. Meaning coordinates represent the contents of meaningful mental states. Spurred by a currently salient meaningful mental state in the speaker, language is used to induce a meaningful mental state in the hearer. Therefore, thinking machines must be able to produce and respond to meaningful mental states in ways similar to their functioning in humans. It is explained how quanta and qualia arise, how they generate meaningful mental states, how these states propagate to produce thought, how they are communicated and interpreted, and how they can be simulated to create thinking machines.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document