Step 2: Telling Patients the Truth About Confidentiality’s Limits

Author(s):  
Mary Alice Fisher

Chapter 5 walks therapists through Step 2, and covers two conversations in which therapists must explain confidentiality and its limits, and how therapists are ethically required to conduct informed consent conversations about confidentiality in two different contexts. It discusses how patients must be given enough information to allow them to make an informed decision about whether to confide in this therapist in the first place, and how that conversation must be reopened if the therapist believes the patient has forgotten the rules about confidentiality, or if the disclosure risks have increased because of changes in the patient’s circumstances, changes in the law, or changes in the therapist’s policies. It shows how this later conversation allows the prospective patient to pause and assess the risks of confiding further, and why informed consent about confidentiality must be an ongoing process, not a static, one-time event.

BMJ ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 327 (7417) ◽  
pp. 731-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J Mazur
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

From its inception, the law of informed consent has been based on two premises: first, that a patient has the right to receive sufficient information to make an informed choice about the treatment recommended; and second, that the patient may choose to accept or to decline the physician’s recommendation. The legitimacy of this second premise should be underscored because it is too often belied by the everyday language of medical practice. Getting a consent is medical jargon that implies that patient agreement is the only acceptable outcome. Indeed, the term informed consent itself suggests that patients are expected to agree to be treated rather than to decline treatment. Unless patients are viewed as having the right to say no, as well as yes, and even yes with conditions, much of the rationale for informed consent evaporates. Nonetheless, the medical profession’s reaction to patients who refuse treatment often has been less than optimal. The right to refuse treatment is frequently ignored in practice because it is inconsistent with the history and ethos of medicine (1,2). Physicians are trained to treat illness and to prolong life; situations in which they cannot do either—not because of limitations of knowledge or technology, but because patients or third parties reject their recommendations for care—evoke profound feelings of frustration and even anger. It would not be too much to suggest that these confrontations challenge an essential element of the medical identity. Physicians’ reactions to these situations are varied. Some will contend with patients over their refusal, while others, having assimilated a distorted version of patients’ right to refuse treatment, may too quickly abandon their patients to the consequences of their choices, thereby depriving them of the guidance for which patients traditionally have turned to their physicians. Regardless of the quality of care offered to patients or the degree of concern of those who treat them, some patients will have reasons of their own to decline treatment. Before considering how clinicians might respond to these situations, this chapter reviews the status of the law regarding treatment refusal, surveying a legal landscape that has seen dramatic changes in the last decade.


Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

This chapter deals with the legal theory and procedural framework under which patients can obtain redress for their injuries resulting from treatment administered in the absence of informed consent. The evolution of the legal doctrine was driven by the demands of patients for redress for injuries, and more attention has been given by courts and legislatures to the questions of when and how compensation might be obtained than to providing guidance for clinicians. In some important respects, the distinction between the law as it applies to the physician engaged in medical decision making with a patient and the law as it applies to that same patient who later seeks compensation in the courts is an artificial one. Insofar as the spirit of informed consent is not embraced voluntarily by the medical profession, but is adhered to in large part to avoid the likely consequences of failure to observe the legal rules, physician behavior will be shaped not only by the rules themselves but also by the way they are enforced. If, for example, the rules governing the means of redress were complex, time-consuming, and unlikely to yield the desired compensation, few injured patients would pursue a judicial remedy. As a result, physicians would eventually realize that adverse consequences were unlikely to follow from a failure to observe the relevant rules and, except to the extent that they had accepted the ethical theory of informed consent, their adherence to the doctrine would crumble. Some critics of the present system contend that this has already happened (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, rules that make recovery easier and more certain would be likely to encourage compliance with the requirements for informed consent. Differential emphasis by the courts on particular kinds of lapses by clinicians might also shape their actions accordingly. For example, the courts’ focus on risk information has led many physicians to tailor disclosure to emphasize risks. Thus, the issues addressed in this chapter, although framed in legal terminology, are important (some would argue crucial) determinants of the ultimate impact of informed consent.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-59
Author(s):  
Melvin A. Shiffman

Because of the lack of adequate information in many physicians' charts, it is sometimes not possible to find that the physician discussed informed consent with risks and complications and alternative treatments. The law in some jurisdictions allows the use of usual and customary practice to establish that the physician has informed the patient.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-412
Author(s):  
María Teresa Requejo

AbstractThe enactment of Law 2/2010 on Sexual and Reproductive Health and on Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy represents a radical change in the regulation of abortion in Spain. The law moves from the medical indication model that has been in place since 1985 (which established certain cases in which abortion was legal) towards a time-limit model that, with some exceptions, allows free abortion during the first 14 weeks of pregnancy. Along with the hot debate that this fundamental change has caused, other features of the law have also arisen as a source of conflict, including the regulation of the informed consent of underage women for having an abortion and the rules regarding the conscientious objection by healthcare professionals.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuela Turillazzi ◽  
Margherita Neri ◽  
Irene Riezzo ◽  
Paola Frati ◽  
Vittorio Fineschi
Keyword(s):  

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