Legal Rules for Recovery

Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

This chapter deals with the legal theory and procedural framework under which patients can obtain redress for their injuries resulting from treatment administered in the absence of informed consent. The evolution of the legal doctrine was driven by the demands of patients for redress for injuries, and more attention has been given by courts and legislatures to the questions of when and how compensation might be obtained than to providing guidance for clinicians. In some important respects, the distinction between the law as it applies to the physician engaged in medical decision making with a patient and the law as it applies to that same patient who later seeks compensation in the courts is an artificial one. Insofar as the spirit of informed consent is not embraced voluntarily by the medical profession, but is adhered to in large part to avoid the likely consequences of failure to observe the legal rules, physician behavior will be shaped not only by the rules themselves but also by the way they are enforced. If, for example, the rules governing the means of redress were complex, time-consuming, and unlikely to yield the desired compensation, few injured patients would pursue a judicial remedy. As a result, physicians would eventually realize that adverse consequences were unlikely to follow from a failure to observe the relevant rules and, except to the extent that they had accepted the ethical theory of informed consent, their adherence to the doctrine would crumble. Some critics of the present system contend that this has already happened (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, rules that make recovery easier and more certain would be likely to encourage compliance with the requirements for informed consent. Differential emphasis by the courts on particular kinds of lapses by clinicians might also shape their actions accordingly. For example, the courts’ focus on risk information has led many physicians to tailor disclosure to emphasize risks. Thus, the issues addressed in this chapter, although framed in legal terminology, are important (some would argue crucial) determinants of the ultimate impact of informed consent.

Author(s):  
Anne C. Dailey

This chapter describes the contribution contemporary psychoanalysis has to make in three specific areas: legal theory, legal doctrine, and adjudication in the courtroom. Psychoanalysis improves the law’s theoretical foundations by modifying its foundational presumption of rationality. Psychoanalysis also helps to reform legal doctrine by identifying those particular subject matter areas, primarily family law and criminal law, where the law’s presumption of rationality leads to unjust legal rules. With domestic violence as its example, this chapter shows how psychoanalysis offers a body of practical knowledge that humanizes the law by bringing legal rules into line with actual, everyday lived experience. And finally, psychoanalysis reveals the deep tension between the law’s focus on individual moral responsibility for behavior and the law’s objective methods of proof in the courtroom. Psychoanalytic insights into the art of proving what really happened in a case can move law in the direction of a more empathic and forgiving model of judging. Overall, the psychoanalytic study of the law unveils the damaging consequences of the law’s rationalist assumptions about who we are as human beings, and offers an alternative, humanistic perspective in line with law’s foundational ideals of individual freedom and systemic justice.


1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-248 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractWithin the common law world, the use of the term informed consent implies the American doctrine. Informed consent as a doctrine is not part of the law in the United Kingdom. However, it is possible to predict a way forward in disclosure cases yet to be heard in the courts of the United Kingdom. These predictions are based on current developments in the common law in the United Kingdom as well as those in Canada and Australia, on the European convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and on trends within the medical profession itself in the light of the Bolam test.


Author(s):  
Maxwell Mehlman ◽  
Mette Hartlev ◽  
Sonia Suter

This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between genetics and the law. Advances in genetics and genomics have created both hopes and concerns and raise a number of legal issues in both the United States and Europe. To understand the legal issues in genetics, it is helpful to have some understanding of the different types of genetic analysis that can be used and for which purposes. In virtually all these contexts, the doctrine of informed consent is important. While the law in the United States and Europe does not generally require non-directiveness, the legal doctrine of informed consent applies in all jurisdictions, imposing on physicians and genetic counselors the legal obligation to disclose material information that could influence a patient's decisions about genetic testing. The other ethical and legal issues that arise with genetic or genomic analysis differ depending on the purpose, context, and technology used. These legal issues concern the methods of regulating genetic tests offered in the clinical setting and through the “direct-to-consumer” online genetic testing industry; genetic discrimination; the scope of privacy protections of genetic information; and the regulation of human gene therapy, gene therapy research, and germline modifications.


2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime Staples King ◽  
Benjamin W. Moulton

In law, with rare exception such as legislative action, change is evolutionary and methodical. Unlike biomedical science where a breakthrough can quickly lead to dramatic changes in medical practice, legal precedent is more adherent and must evolve either through the legislative process or on a court by court basis in case law. Nevertheless, compelling evidence will pave the road to change within the law. Health care research conducted over the last three decades has produced a body of empirical evidence that suggests an overhaul of our current legal standards of informed consent is overdue.This article uses health services research to examine the fundamental assumptions of our current informed consent laws and propose legal reform. Much has been written on how to bring the law to bear on medical practice in order to improve patient rights and protect physicians, but far less has been done to bring the practice of medicine to inform our legal standards. Prior legal scholarship on informed consent has made arguments regarding reform from both ethical and legal perspectives; however, only a small few have incorporated clinical and health services research as well as ethical and legal principles to analyze informed consent.


Author(s):  
Sarah M. Buel

Feminist jurisprudence has amplified the voices of gender violence survivors long silenced by trauma and male-biased legal doctrine. In critiquing self-defense law’s treatment of survivors, some feminists pressed for recognition of a distinctive set of characteristics purportedly associated with survivors, termed “battered woman syndrome” (BWS). Intended to ameliorate the harsh effects of criminal law on survivors, BWS sought to explain why battered women responded as they did in terms that judges and juries might better relate to the legal requirements for self-defense. One argument is that the law of self-defense must be further recalibrated—beyond the problematic, operative lens of BWS—to better protect those who engage in survival crime. By instead utilizing “battering and its effects” as the framework for relevant evidence, the criminal justice system could become more responsive to survivors. Even beyond recalibrating the law of self-defense to better suit survivors, legal stakeholders can learn much from activists and feminist legal theory about pursuing gender and racial justice, by embracing diverse lenses to actually hear the raced, classed, and gendered narratives of survivors’ lives. Despite missteps with the development of BWS, feminist jurisprudence is gradually increasing understanding of, and empathy for, survival crime.


Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

A number of goals have been posited for the legal doctrine of informed consent. One author, for example, highlights four goals: “1) an ethical goal, in which the law promotes patient autonomy; 2) a decision making goal, in which the law promotes the ability of patients to make medical decisions; 3) a regulatory goal, in which the law attempts to control physicians’ disclosure practices; and 4) a compensatory goal, in which the common law functions as a mechanism to provide monetary compensation for injuries” (1). Another author posits six goals: “1) promoting individual autonomy; 2) respecting human dignity; 3) encouraging professional self-scrutiny; 4) promoting rational decisionmaking; 5) avoiding deceit and coercion; and 6) educating the public” (2). According to critics, the result has been a doctrine and a set of practices that compromise all values and satisfy none in their entirety (1). But commentators who have analyzed the law and practice of informed consent have each generally represented one point of view to the exclusion of others. The resulting debate over informed consent among healthcare practitioners, legal experts, and ethicists should come as no surprise. As long as one relies on a single perspective, it is remarkably easy to find critical things to say about informed consent. Those who would elevate any single value above all others, and steadfastly resist compromise, usually can offer a powerful, even devastating, analysis of the current state of affairs. In this chapter we focus on three critiques—a perspective concerned with promoting individual autonomy, an approach that emphasizes the value of health, and a perspective that places primary emphasis on encouraging discourse and interaction between caregivers and patients—and assess their validity from a perspective that recognizes that the doctrine of informed consent must accommodate a number of competing interests and values. The most trenchant criticism of the state of informed consent law today focuses on the discrepancies between the goals highlighted by the ethical theories of informed consent—primarily, the enhancement of individual autonomy in making medical decisions—and the practical effects of the current system.


1987 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. E. Simmonds

In his first book, Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin opposed the view that law is a body of publicly ascertainable rules identifiable by some basic master test or rule of recognition. In place of that account he offered a rival vision. Law was portrayed as inherently controversial in content. Discovering the law on this or that subject is not, Dworkin argued, simply a matter of looking up the established rules: it is a matter of constructing a justificatory theory beneath which the established legal rules can be subsumed. In his latest book, Law's Empire, that account of the nature of law has been backed up by an analogous account of the nature of legal theory. A sound theory of law, we are told, is not one that unearths semantic rules governing the use of the word ‘law’. Disputes between rival legal theories do not hinge on the discovery of such deep semantic criteria, any more than disputes about the content of the law in hard cases hinge on the correct application of a rule of recognition. Disputes of both kinds are interpretive disputes: they concern the proper interpretation of legal practices.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy T. Campbell

[T]each the law to empower physicians individually and collectively to use the law and law colleagues to serve patients and promote public welfare; in short to better foster the goals of the medical profession.And yet:[A]ntipathy appears to be deeper and more pervasive than ever before, making it hard to imagine that relations between attorneys and physicians can get much worse.It has long been recognized that an understanding of at least some core legal rules and concepts is an important piece of medical training. To address this, law is now typically part of the core medical school curriculum, often incorporated into bioethics and/or practice of medicine coursework — whether as part of a distinct course or series of courses or threaded through the curriculum (or both). While often this education focuses on rules, some have recommended that it also include fundamentals of legal reasoning, and go beyond knowledge to include skills, attitudes, and behaviors vis-à-vis the law.


Legal Studies ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A Harrington

In the last twenty-five years consent has emerged as central to ethical and legal thinking on medical treatment. The meaning of consent and its importance and applicability in the medical context has been tested by scholars and judges in most western jurisdictions. This essay seeks to re-examine the role of consent in medical law in England having regard to a recent series of cases concerning the refusal of treatment. By linking the law, as it has emerged from these decisions, with that developed in the 1980s concerning the doctrine of informed consent it should be possible to draw some conclusions regarding the role of law and the courts in medicine. Throughout we shall be contrasting the supposedly traditional and outdated paternalism of the medical profession with the liberal, pro-autonomy strategies of (mainly) academic commentators.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-210
Author(s):  
Rami Koujah

While jurisprudents agree that the Sharīʿa serves to benefit human beings because God is wise and merciful, they disagree as to the nature of the correlation between God’s rulings and these benefits. Does God legislate with the purpose of benefitting consumers of the law? In this essay I investigate the Ashʿarī doctrine on whether God can be said to act purposively and how this doctrine influences legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). I will examine Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī’s position on this issue in his theological writings and his work on legal theory. By focusing on one particular aspect of legal theory, I will demonstrate how the issue of purposiveness in God’s acts substantively impacts methodologies for the derivation of legal rules. I will then highlight the mechanisms al-Āmidī develops as a means of constructing a theory that maintains consistency and integrity, and compare his view to that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1209).



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