scholarly journals How mood tunes prediction: a neurophenomenological account of mood and its disturbance in major depression

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Mark Miller ◽  
Erik Rietveld
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Future Consequences ◽  
Measure Of Uncertainty

Abstract In this article, we propose a neurophenomenological account of what moods are, and how they work. We draw upon phenomenology to show how mood attunes a person to a space of significant possibilities. Mood structures a person’s lived experience by fixing the kinds of significance the world can have for them in a given situation. We employ Karl Friston’s free-energy principle to show how this phenomenological concept of mood can be smoothly integrated with cognitive neuroscience. We will argue that mood is a consequence of acting in the world with the aim of minimizing expected free energy—a measure of uncertainty about the future consequences of actions. Moods summarize how the organism is faring overall in its predictive engagements, tuning the organism’s expectations about how it is likely to fare in the future. Agents that act to minimize expected free energy will have a feeling of how well or badly they are doing at maintaining grip on the multiple possibilities that matter to them. They will have what we will call a ‘feeling of grip’ that structures the possibilities they are ready to engage with over long time-scales, just as moods do.

scholarly journals Confucian Free Energy: The Predictive Mind in Ancient China

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Thestrup Waade
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Statistical Physics ◽  
Ground Truth ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Full Spectrum ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Action Orientation ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
The World

Roger Ames presents an interpretation of the classic Confucian philosophy where the world is seen as an always ongoing, radically interrelational, holistic process best described in terms of focus and field. Without any permanent ground truth, its inhabitants must be action-oriented way-makers: irreducibly social optimizers, and contextual co-creators, of their shared cosmos. Meanwhile, a prag- matic turn is happening in the cognitive sciences, instantiated in a new and ambitious theoretical framework: Karl Friston’s free energy principle, which aims to be a unifying paradigm for the sci- ences of brain, life and mind. Based on first principles from statistical physics, it describes humans - and self-organizing systems in general - as continually modelling and predicting the world. The full spectrum of human cognition and behavior is then generated by a single mechanism: the mini- mization of the difference between predicted and actual sensory inputs. Although still controversial, the free energy principle is gaining traction within robotics, biology, neuroscience, psychology, so- cial sciences and philosophy of mind. I here compare these two worldviews from so vastly different backgrounds, and find, perhaps surprisingly, that they in many respects are immediately compati- ble. Social co-creativity across spatio-temporal scales, contextualization, action-orientation and the Confucian virtues naturally translate to or integrate with free energy principle terms. Even when in seeming disagreement, for example on the question of the appearance/reality dichotomy, or that of reductive materialism which often separates the sciences and humanities in general, the two frame- works seem able to positively inform or nuance each other. This multidisciplinary comparison is interesting because it can potentially inform or guide the two theories, and address recent critiques of Ames, and as a proof of concept that bridges can be built across times, cultures and academic traditions.

scholarly journals Cognitive Penetration and Cognitive Realism

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Majid D. Beni
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Cognitive Penetrability ◽  
Cognitive Realism ◽  
Theory Ladenness

Abstract The paper addresses the issue of theory-ladenness of observation/experimentation. Motivated by a naturalistic reading of Thomas Kuhn's insights into the same topic, I draw on cognitive neuroscience (predictive coding under Free Energy Principle) to scrutinise theory-ladenness. I equate theory-ladenness with the cognitive penetrability of perceptual inferences and argue that strong theory-ladenness prevails only under uncertain circumstances. This understanding of theory-ladenness is in line with Thomas Kuhn's view on the same subject as well as a cognitive version of modest realism rather than downright antirealism.

Encultured minds, not error reduction minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mirski ◽  
Mark H. Bickhard ◽  
David Eck ◽  
Arkadiusz Gut
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Error Reduction ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Current Article

Abstract There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.

scholarly journals Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Sims ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Functional Aspects ◽  
Structural Content ◽  
Unified View

AbstractPredictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

scholarly journals Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Matt Sims
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Energy Minimisation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Evolution Of Life ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

AbstractA mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive causes of behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required to settle the question of when in the evolution of life cognition first emerged. An answer to this question should however avoid two pitfalls. It should avoid overintellectualising the minds of other organisms, ascribing to them cognitive capacities for which they have no need given the lives they lead within the niches they inhabit. But equally it should do justice to the remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed in the behaviour of microorganisms that do not have a nervous system. We should resist seeking non-cognitive explanations of behaviour simply because an organism fails to exhibit human-like feats of thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. We will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) can serve as the basis for a mark of the cognitive that avoids the twin pitfalls of overintellectualising or underestimating the cognitive achievements of evolutionarily primitive organisms. The FEP purports to describe principles of organisation that any organism must instantiate if it is to remain well-adapted to its environment. Living systems from plants and microorganisms all the way up to humans act in ways that tend in the long run to minimise free energy. If the FEP provides a mark of the cognitive, as we will argue it does, it mandates that cognition should indeed be ascribed to plants, microorganisms and other organisms that lack a nervous system.

Learned Uncertainty: A Free Energy Principle Perspective on Anxiety

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh McGovern ◽  
Alexander De Foe ◽  
Pantelis Leptourgos ◽  
Philip R. Corlett ◽  
Kavindu Bandara ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Anxiety Disorder ◽  
Biological System ◽  
Predictive Modelling ◽  
Generative Models ◽  
Generalized Anxiety ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle

Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders. Affecting an eighth of the world’s population, it often manifests as persistent apprehension which is difficult to control. Despite its prevalence, neuroscientific efforts to understand the cognitive mechanisms of GAD remain sparse. This has resulted in a fractured theoretical landscape, lacking a unitary framework. While prior theories of anxiety describe the cognitive, affective and behavioral dimensions of anxiety, a unified theory is lacking. Here, we point out that postulates derived from the Free Energy Principle (FEP) may allow for a unified theory to emerge. We argue an approach focused on predictive modelling may afford opportunities to re-conceptualize anxiety within the framework of working generative models, rather than static beliefs. We suggest that a biological system—having had persistent uncertainty in its past—will form posteriors in line with uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether that uncertainty is real. After discussing the FEP, we explain how anxiety develops through learning uncertainty before suggesting predictions for how the model can be tested.

Generalization of Fuels Swelling Data by Means of Linear Free Energy Principle

2014 ◽  
pp. 125-149
Author(s):  
Roman Makitra ◽  
Halyna Midyana ◽  
Liliya Bazylyak ◽  
Olena Palchykova
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Linear Free Energy
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