Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-644
Author(s):  
Karamvir Chadha

Abstract Some influential theorists have recently argued that if sex is in some sense ideal, then each partner’s consent is unnecessary: even absent each partner’s consent, neither partner infringes the other’s moral rights. I challenge a key premise in their argument for this alarming conclusion. I instead defend the Common-sense View: if you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. In the course of defending the Common-sense View, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account of Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of two existing accounts of consent while avoiding their shortcomings. I close by suggesting some benefits of my alternative picture and some implications for law reform.

Author(s):  
Manfred Gawlina

One needs specific initiation into the classics of transcendental philosophy (Kant’s "Criticism," Descartes’s "Metaphysics," and Fichte’s "Doctrine of Science") because all say farewell to the common sense view of things. The three types of transcendental thinking converge in conceiving rational autonomy as the ultimate ground for justification. Correspondingly, the philosophical pedagogy of all three thinkers is focused on how to seize and make that very autonomy (or active self-determination) intellectually and existentially available. In the concrete way of proceeding, however, the three models diverge. Descartes expects one to become master of oneself and "the world" by methodologically suspending his judgement on what cannot qualify itself to be undoubtable. Kant leads us to the point where we can triangulate universal conditions of the possibility of knowledge through individually acquiring the competence to judge the legitimacy of encountered propositional claims. Finally, Fichte confronts us with the idea of the identity of self-consciousness and objectivity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-274
Author(s):  
Marie I. George

Louise Mitchell discusses character in “Integrity and virtue: The forming of good character” ( The Linacre Quarterly 82, no. 2: 149–169). I argue that she is mistaken in identifying character as a potency and that it is rather the sum of one's moral habits and dispositions. I establish this by showing that if one correctly applies the division Aristotle presents in the text that Mitchell relies on, it follows that character belongs in the category of habit. I further support this conclusion by considering how people commonly speak of moral character. I then show that the text from the Summa Theologiae Mitchell relies on concerns sacramental character and not moral character; moreover, if we apply the reasoning contained there to moral character, we are again led to see that it should be categorized as a habit. Lastly, I explain that a human being's potency for character lies in the soul's rational powers. Summary I defend the common-sense view that moral character is the sum of one's moral habits and dispositions in response to Louise Mitchell who maintains that moral character is a potency. I do so by applying Aristotle's threefold division of things that exist in the soul—namely, potency, habit, and emotion—and also by examining how Aristotle speaks about character and how the average person speaks about character. In addition, I show why humans are the only animals that have the potential to develop character, and how this potential lies in the rational faculties of our soul.


Interpreting ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Anders Ericsson

This paper describes how the expert-performance perspective differs from the common-sense view of professional ability and how this approach can be applied to the study of professional interpreting. The expert-performance approach is first introduced with findings from many traditional domains of expertise, such as chess, music, medicine, and sports. Most importantly, expert performance is shown to be primarily acquired through the engagement in designed training activities, namely deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993). The second part of the paper briefly discusses earlier research on expert interpreting motivated by more traditional views of expertise in interpreting. Finally, the expert-performance approach is applied to the study of superior interpreting performance and potential studies of superior interpreting under representative conditions are outlined.


Philosophy ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 5 (17) ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
H. H. Price

We must begin by asking; What exactly is common sense? No doubt the word was originally used as a translation of Aristotle's; κοί⋯νη αἴσθησις but that is not its modern meaning. When Reid or more recent philosophers speak of common sense, they clearly have something else in view. At the present day, it is perhaps most often used to mean a quality of a mind, as when we say that jurymen or Members of Parliament should be men of common sense, meaning that they should show intelligence in the ordinary affairs of life; or again, we say that a little common sense would enable us to solve this or that political problem. But we are not concerned with that meaning either, though it would be interesting to discuss it. Common sense, as we are concerned with it here, means rather a body of very general principles commonly accepted by ordinary non-philosophical men in the ordinary affairs of life. These principles are really philosophical—that is to say, they belong to the proper subject-matter of philosophy—but, of course, the plain man who accepts or applies them at every moment of his life is far from being aware of this. Some of them are metaphysical, or (if we prefer to say so) epistemological, others are ethical; and whether or not there can be a common-sense theology, as a recent writer has asserted, it seems quite possible that there may be one or two among them which properly belong to the theologian's province. All these principles, taken together, make up what is usually called the common-sense view of the world. But in this discussion we shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical or epistemological ones, which are more frequently appealed to than the others, and which, besides, seem to be more interesting. But our conclusions, if valid, will apply to the others also.


1902 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen S. Colvin

Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

As the common sense view of perception, Direct Realism rightly stands in a privileged position in relation to rival perceptual theories, Idealism and Indirect Realism. For most thinkers, rejecting Direct Realism would require extensive and unwelcome revisions to many other views. Furthermore, Indirect Realism and Idealism fall short of accomplishing their oft-assigned task of solving the Problem of Illusion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document