Reconsidering Kant’s Rejection of Indirect Arguments in Transcendental Philosophy

Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.

Hegel, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy

La intención de esta presentación es ofrecer una descripción del sistema filosófico de Hegel como condicionado a una síntesis del naturalismo y la filosofía trascendental, cuyas características generales serán elaboradas. A pesar de su reputación de larga data como sucesor crítico del proyecto idealista de Kant, la comprensión de Hegel de la relación dinámica entre filosofía y ciencia empírica no puede acomodarse fácilmente dentro de los horizontes formalistas del trascendentalismo kantiano. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, Hegel atribuye a la razón filosófica una función sintética que pocos naturalistas contemporáneos reconocerían. Como tal, la metodología de Hegel combina características de las persuasiones filosóficas a menudo consideradas fundamentalmente irreconciliables. Tal síntesis de naturalismo y filosofía trascendental es posible gracias al rechazo de Hegel de cualquier dicotomía kantiana entre una naturaleza animal heterónoma y una libertad racional autónoma, y su propuesta de que la mente o el espíritu se entiendan como la ‘verdad’ o la autorrealización de la naturaleza. en lugar de su antítesis. Para Hegel, entonces, la conformidad de la naturaleza con los principios racionales de unidad sintética no necesita explicarse como necesariamente condicionada a criterios a priori de inteligibilidad que se originan en un sujeto no natural. Más bien, sostiene Hegel, la naturaleza fundamenta la posibilidad ontológica de un Espíritu que fundamenta la posibilidad de la naturaleza, de modo que la naturaleza y el Espíritu se fundamentan mutuamente.

Does Kant Fall into the Myth of the Given?

According to McDowell, conceptualism necessarily follows from the thesis that Kant falls into Sellars’ myth of the given. However, by comparing Sellars’ and McDowell’s versions of the myth of the given, it emerges that while Sellars introduces the myth of the given as a critique of empirical fundamentalism, McDowell’s critique is directed at minimal empiricism. The aim of this paper is to show that Kant’s theory of cognition does not fall into either of the two variants of the aforementioned myth. It thus argues against a conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It shows this by examining the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Tower of Babel: transcendental linguistics in Friedrich von Hardenberg’s (Novalis) Fichte Studies

This article provides a new interpretation of the linguistic aspects of Friedrich von Hardenberg’s Fichte Studies. It argues that Hardenberg was searching, among other things, for a transcendental language for philosophy. The possibility of such a language was discussed intensely among his contemporaries, such as Maimon, Niethammer, Reinhold, Weißhuhn, and Fichte. Its necessity, however, had become apparent with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Readers had noticed a disturbing discrepancy between the objective knowledge of transcendental philosophy—which, according to Kant, was supposed to be generally communicable—and Kant’s actual failure to communicate it. Hardenberg’s original insight into the inseparable unity of sign and signified, anticipating modern linguistic theories, led him to the assumption of a lawful relationship between both. From his unsuccessful attempt to disclose these laws, he went on to discover language as an independent realm fundamentally opposed to nature. Precisely because language is a necessary illusion, only the ‘presenting I’ (das darstellende Ich) achieves its end, namely absolute freedom. Philosophy, therefore, is pure as long as it remains within the boundaries of language alone, that is a language which does not refer to anything outside itself.

Krytyka czystego rozumu jako krytyka czystego doświadczenia. Kant a współczesne spory wokół treści percepcji

Critique of Pure Reason as a critique of pure experience. Kant and contemporary disputes over the content of perception:­ The ­article ­is ­an­ attempt ­at critically ­analysing­ the ­conceptual­ content ­of ­perception ­in ­Immanuel ­Kant’s transcendental philosophy.­ The ­author ­claims­ that ­unity ­as ­the ­feature ­of ­forms ­of ­intuition ­is ­closely ­related­ to unity ­as ­the ­category ­of ­the­ intellect ­and ­as ­such ­with ­the ­uniting ­synthesis ­of ­apperception. The­ author­ also claims­ that defending ­the ­non­‐conceptual ­content ­may ­result ­in ­losing ­the essence ­of ­Kant’s ­identification­ of empirical ­realism ­with ­transcendental­ idealism.­ Kant’s conceptualism ­leads ­to ­the ­thesis ­that­ non‐­conceptual content­ is ­only ­abstracted ­from the context ­of ­perception ­and ­may ­be­ treated­ as ­an ­object ­of ­thinking, ­but ­not as ­an ­object ­of perceiving.