Community

2020 ◽  
pp. 144-165
Author(s):  
Owen Ware

This chapter and the next consider the final shape of Fichte’s moral philosophy as it appears in Part III of the System of Ethics. It has surprised many readers that Fichte ends up defending a vision of our ethical vocation in terms of acting for the sake of the rational community to which we belong. This chapter traces the origin of this claim to Fichte’s social theory of intersubjective relations, in particular his theory that we require a ‘summons’ issued by another rational being to exercise free choice at all. A crucial feature of Fichte’s moral philosophy comes to light when we begin to understand the parallels between his view of our natural drive, which strives to unite with objects in reciprocal interaction, and his view of our ethical vocation to agree with others in open dialogue.

2002 ◽  
pp. 193-202
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic

The article contains an explanation of the topic to be dealt with by the author within the work on the project 'Applying Modern Philosophical-Political Paradigms on Processes of Social Transformation in Serbia/FRJ'' of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory. In the first part of the paper the basic conception of the work as well as theoretical and practical relevance of the proposed topic are presented. In the second part, author emphasis the weight of the 'two-level theory' of moral thinking, which was elaborated by Richard Mervyn Hare, utilitarian philosopher. In the third part, the plan and the content of the forthcoming work are outlined. Basic and selective bibliography which author will be rely on in the elaboration of the proposed topic is given at the end of this article.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédéric Vandenberghe

The philosophical assumptions that organize moral sociology as practical philosophy are the outcome of a secular quest to investigate the principles, norms and values behind the constitution of society. As a protracted response to the whole utilitarian-atomistic-individualistic tradition that systematically deemphasizes the constitutive role that morality plays in the structuration of self and society, the sociological tradition has continued, by its own means, the tradition of moral and practical philosophy in theoretically informed empirical research of social practices. Going back to classic moral philosophy, I want to show in this article how social theory is involved in the quest for ‘the good life with and for the others in just institutions’ (Ricoeur).


Author(s):  
Owen Ware

This book develops and defends a new interpretation of Fichte’s moral philosophy as an ethics of wholeness. While virtually forgotten for most of the twentieth century, Fichte’s System of Ethics (1798) is now recognized by scholars as a masterpiece in the history of post-Kantian philosophy and a key text for understanding the work of later German idealist thinkers. This book provides a careful examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte’s moral philosophy evolved and of the specific arguments he offers in response to Kant and his immediate successors. A distinctive feature of the study is a focus on the foundational concepts of Fichte’s ethics—freedom, morality, feeling, conscience, community—and their connection to his novel but largely misunderstood theory of drives. By way of conclusion, the book shows that what appears to be two conflicting commitments in Fichte’s ethics, a commitment to the feelings of one’s conscience and a commitment to engage in open dialogue with others, are two aspects of his theory of moral perfection. The result is a fresh understanding of Fichte’s System of Ethics as offering a compelling resolution to the personal and interpersonal dimensions of moral life.


Author(s):  
Thomas Schneider

The writings of Edward Shils have been widely neglected in contemporary sociology. One major reason for this neglect is due to the contradictory receptions of his ideas. There have been two dominant lines of interpretation—the functionalist as well as the practice-theoretical paradigm of understanding of Shils’ writings—and they are not consistent with each other. Therefore, a more comprehensive understanding of Shils’ thinking needs to take into account his close attachment to the University of Chicago and to some of its pragmatist traditions. The suggestion in this paper is that we should read Shils from a standpoint which is called a human scientific approach. Thus, placing Shils in the context of contemporary social theory and moral philosophy reveals similarities to what has been called ‘sacralisation’ and ‘affirmative genealogy’.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 78-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera

Perfect ethical duties have usually puzzled commentators on Kant's ethics because they do not fit neatly within his taxonomy of duties. Ethical duties require the adoption of maxims of ends: the happiness of others and one's own perfection are Kant's two main categories. These duties, he claims, are of wide obligation because they do not specify what in particular one ought to do, when, and how much. They leave ‘a latitude for free choice’ as he puts it. Perfect duties, however, such as the duties of respect, to avoid suicide, lying, and servility, do not appear to require the adoption of ends but only the performance or omission of specific types of actions. The puzzle is how these duties can be ethical, and therefore wide. Faced with this difficulty, Mary Gregor denies that perfect ethical duties are wide. She claims that they are an ‘anomaly’ and that they do not belong to ethics proper but to moral philosophy in general. She argues that these duties are derived from the categorical imperative, instead of, as Kant himself appears to have thought, the first principle of virtue. Taking a very different approach, Onora O'Neill finds the perfect/imperfect distinction of little importance and suggests doing without it altogether. Most other interpreters also assume that ‘wide’ is opposed to ‘perfect’ so that a wide perfect duty is a conceptual impossibility.


2020 ◽  
pp. 166-186
Author(s):  
Owen Ware

After considering recent efforts to read Fichte as a deontologist or as a consequentialist, this final chapter gives evidence for understanding the final shape of Fichte’s moral philosophy as a form of social perfectionism. The chapter then returns to what looks like a final puzzle threatening the integrity of Fichte’s position in the System of Ethics: the puzzle of whether cases of moral disagreement are resolvable on the basis of a personal principle (one’s own conscience) or on the basis of an interpersonal principle (rational dialogue). The solution this chapter proposes is that, for Fichte, the verdicts of one’s own conscience are never meant to overrule the process of rational dialogue that makes a living community between persons possible.


1977 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 410
Author(s):  
Gerald J. Postema ◽  
Nicholas Rescher

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