Kantian Ethical Duties

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 78-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera

Perfect ethical duties have usually puzzled commentators on Kant's ethics because they do not fit neatly within his taxonomy of duties. Ethical duties require the adoption of maxims of ends: the happiness of others and one's own perfection are Kant's two main categories. These duties, he claims, are of wide obligation because they do not specify what in particular one ought to do, when, and how much. They leave ‘a latitude for free choice’ as he puts it. Perfect duties, however, such as the duties of respect, to avoid suicide, lying, and servility, do not appear to require the adoption of ends but only the performance or omission of specific types of actions. The puzzle is how these duties can be ethical, and therefore wide. Faced with this difficulty, Mary Gregor denies that perfect ethical duties are wide. She claims that they are an ‘anomaly’ and that they do not belong to ethics proper but to moral philosophy in general. She argues that these duties are derived from the categorical imperative, instead of, as Kant himself appears to have thought, the first principle of virtue. Taking a very different approach, Onora O'Neill finds the perfect/imperfect distinction of little importance and suggests doing without it altogether. Most other interpreters also assume that ‘wide’ is opposed to ‘perfect’ so that a wide perfect duty is a conceptual impossibility.

Author(s):  
Kamil Michta

The essay discusses the correlation between Immanuel Kant’s ethics, especially his views on human duties toward animals, and John Maxwell Coetzee's literary depiction of man’s struggle to rediscover the meaning of humanity by tending unwanted animal corpses. Hence, it firstly concentrates on the key issues concerning Kant's moral philosophy, placing particular emphasis on the third formula of his categorical imperative, the so-called formula of humanity as an end in itself, and on elucidating the thinker's contention that good treatment of animals, that is, as if they were moral agents, improves in humans the propensity to treat other people well. The essay argues that the manner in which people treat animals, approached from the Kantian perspective, partakes in the duty to improve their own morality and, thus, their humanity. After examining Kant's outlook on animals, the essay discusses Coetzee's 1999 novel Disgrace. In particular it scrutinizes the figure of an aging literature professor, David Lurie, who, having been expelled from his university for sexual abuse, moves to the country. Here he engages in putting down unwanted animals and also in taking personal care for incinerating their bodies with decency and respect. Adopting the perspective of Kantian philosophy, the essay argues that Lurie's concern for animal corpses, despite its apparent pointlessness, can be seen as indicating the renewal of his humanity. In a sense, then, it is nature (unwanted animals and their corpses) that makes Lurie rediscover his humanity. The essay concludes by maintaining that Disgrace, when coupled with Kant's moral theory, is a novel conveying the (Kantian) idea that the manner in which people frame nature, that is, how they relate to it, is formative of the manner in which they frame their own humanity. Resumen   Este ensayo analiza la correlación existente entre la ética de Immanuel Kant, especialmente sus opiniones sobre las obligaciones de los seres humanos hacia los animales, y la descripción literaria que hace John Maxwell Coetzee de la lucha de un hombre por redescubrir el significado de su humanidad ocupándose de cadáveres de animales no deseados. Se centra, por ello, en su primera parte en los temas clave de la filosofía moral de Kant, haciendo especial hincapié en la tercera formulación de su imperativo categórico, es decir, la llamada formulación de la humanidad como un fin en sí misma, y en la elucidación de la controversia kantiana de que el buen trato dado a los animales, o sea, el hecho de tratarlos como si fueran agentes morales, mejora la propensión del ser humano a tratar bien a las demás personas. El ensayo sostiene que la manera en que la gente trata a los animales, examinada desde una perspectiva kantiana, contribuye al deber de mejorar su propia moralidad y, con ello, su humanidad. Tras la parte dedicada al punto de vista kantiano sobre los animales, el ensayo examina la novela Desgracia de Coetzee, publicada en 1999, y, en particular, el personaje de un profesor de literatura cincuentón, David Lurie, quien, tras haber sido expulsado de su universidad por acoso sexual, se traslada al campo donde se dedica a eutanasiar e incinerar con decencia y respeto a animales no deseados. Desde la perspectiva de la filosofía kantiana, el ensayo argumenta que la preocupación de Lurie por los cadáveres de animales, a pesar de su aparente falta de sentido, podría ser considerada como un signo de la renovación de su humanidad. En cierto modo, es la naturaleza (los animales no deseados y sus cadáveres) la que hace redescubrir a Lurie su humanidad. El ensayo concluye sosteniendo que Desgracia, combinada con la teoría moral de Kant, es una novela que transmite la idea (kantiana) de que la forma en que los seres humanos encuadran a la naturaleza, es decir, su forma de relacionarse con ella, configura la manera en que encuadran a su propia humanidad.  


Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Iracheta Fernández

In this article I intend to show that Kant’s ethics is teleological (ethics of purposes), in contraposition to what a venerable neo-aristotelic and neo-hegelian moral tradition thinks. It is true that law ideas and categorical imperative are central to Kant’s moral theory, and therefore, it can be classified as deontological. However, here I want to prove that Kant’s deontological moral philosophy can’t be appropriately understood without assuming that, at the same time, it is a teleological moral theory in a sense very similar to the one that makes aristotelian ethics teleological, namely, based on a purpose of the action that consists in the fulfilment of a flourishing and good life.


2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 402-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Robertson ◽  
Kirsty Morris ◽  
Garry Walter

Objective: The aim of this paper is to describe the ethical theories of utilitarianism and the ethics of duty (Kant's ethics) and to evaluate their value as theoretical bases of psychiatric ethics. Conclusions: Utilitarianism is a well-established moral philosophy and has significant instrumental value in dealing with common ethical problems faced by psychiatrists. Despite its capacity to generate solutions to ethical problems, utilitarianism requires a process of what Rawls described as ‘reflective equilibrium’ to avoid morally repugnant choices, based on utility. The criticisms of utilitarianism, such as the problems of quantifying utility and the responsibility for consequences, are very relevant for psychiatry. Singer's model of utilitarian thinking is particularly problematic for our profession. Kant's ethics provides the pretext for duty bound codes of ethics for psychiatrists, but suffers from problems of flawed claims to the universalizability prescribed by Kant's ‘categorical imperative’. Kant's valorization of reason as the core of the autonomy of persons is a valuable insight in understanding psychiatrists’ ethical obligations to their patients.


2021 ◽  
pp. 149-169
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter considers the category of duties to oneself as an animal being: duties to avoid suicide and forms of self-mutilation, sexual self-abuse, and drunkenness and gluttony. Kant’s arguments for the claim that each of these types of action is morally wrong appeals to the “humanity formula” of his supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative). Importantly, the role of teleology in some of Kant’s arguments is discussed and a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ teleology is introduced. The chapter argues that while Kant mentions the natural purpose of one’s sexual powers in his argument against sexual self-abuse, his argument does not depend on it. However, as explained in later chapters, Kant’s ethics does rely on appeals to moral teleology, referring to the moral end of self-perfection.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Katarina Majstorovic

The aim of this paper is to emphasize the importance of the problem of moral integrity in Kant's ethical teachings. First, we tried to locate the moral integrity within Kant's original teachings, considering its relationship to the notions of dignity, duty, respect and autonomy. In the wake of further conceptualization of the problem of moral integrity, particularly interesting seemed the issue of threats of moral integrity, which we illustrated. The second part of the paper is concerned with critics to charge that Kant does not provide a satisfactory treatment of the moral integrity of the individual because his insistence on impartiality. In response to critics, we offered a presentation of the main arguments of Barbara Herman, where she is trying to improve the Kantian position. Nevertheless, the focus of argumentation which attempts to defend Kant is on the suggestions made by Henning Jensen. His suggestions call our attention to a little known part of Kant's original text, which explicitly shows the existence of perfect duties to oneself. It is also argued that perfect duty to oneself is at the same time the duty of higher order, determined as the right of humanity in our own person. Jensen manages to find the possibility of establishing moral integrity within Kant's conception and to preserve the essential significance of moral law in Kant's ethics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (316) ◽  
pp. 456
Author(s):  
Nadir Antonio Pichler ◽  
Talia Castilhos de Oliveira

The purpose of the text is to describe and analyze the contemplative life as an ideal of beatitude in the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. By assimilating, remodeling and criticizing the ancient and medieval philosophical-theological tradition, Thomas structures an original and complex synthesis, immersing itself in the essence of the divine nature through knowledge and in the human soul through the contemplative life, and from there to erect the pillars of an ontology theocentric, where God is the supreme good and promoter of human happiness, the first principle of all reality. From him comes the world, man and all creatures, and everything tends to return to its essence, in a special the man. For this reason, God is the alpha and omega, propitiator of the deepest beatitude. The text is organized into four items: the context of beatitude, the excellence of the intellectual soul by the activity of the contemplative life, the reasons for the contemplative life and the comparison between the active and the contemplative life. Síntese: O objetivo do texto é descrever e analisar a vida contemplativa como ideal de beatitude na filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino. Assimilando, remodelando e criticando a tradição filosófico-teológica antiga a medieval, Tomás estrutura uma síntese original e complexa, mergulhando na essencia da natureza divina pelo conhecimento e na alma humana pela vida contemplativa, para, a partir daí, erigir os pilares de uma ontologia teocentrica, onde Deus é o bem supremo e promotor da felicidade humana, o primeiro princípio de toda a realidade. Dele procede o mundo, o homem e todas as criaturas, e tudo tende a retornar a sua essencia, de modo especial, o homem. Por isso, Deus é o alfa e o ômega, propiciador da mais profunda beatitude. O texto está organizado em quatro itens: Contexto da beatitude, a excelência da alma intelectiva pela atividade da vida contemplativa, as razoes da vida contemplativa e a comparaçao entre a vida ativa e a contemplativa.Palavras-chave: Beatitude; Vida contemplativa; Filosofia moral; Tomás de Aquino; Deus.


Author(s):  
Karif Jal Basara

The categorical imperative is the central philosophical concept in the deontological moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Introduced in Kant's 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it may be defined as a way of evaluating motivations for action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-692
Author(s):  
Simon Hollnaicher

Abstract According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.


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