Sociology as Practical Philosophy and Moral Science

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédéric Vandenberghe
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Moral Science ◽  
Sociological Tradition ◽  
Norms And Values

The philosophical assumptions that organize moral sociology as practical philosophy are the outcome of a secular quest to investigate the principles, norms and values behind the constitution of society. As a protracted response to the whole utilitarian-atomistic-individualistic tradition that systematically deemphasizes the constitutive role that morality plays in the structuration of self and society, the sociological tradition has continued, by its own means, the tradition of moral and practical philosophy in theoretically informed empirical research of social practices. Going back to classic moral philosophy, I want to show in this article how social theory is involved in the quest for ‘the good life with and for the others in just institutions’ (Ricoeur).

Friendship

2020 ◽  
pp. 249-283
Author(s):  
Phillip Mitsis
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
Original Theory ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Individual Self

The surviving evidence for Epicurus’s view of friendship has given rise to divergent scholarly interpretations. For some, Epicurus recommends narrowly self-regarding relations with friends, while for others, he seems to recognize the commonly held opinion that reliable and rewarding friendships require us to treat our friends not solely as instruments to our own pleasure. Both of these views have been bolstered by larger considerations from within the wider theory, practice, and history of Epicureanism. Thus, some have made inferences from what they take to be Epicurean social practices, while others have tried to view friendship within the larger context of Epicurean social theory. Still others have posited various kinds of developmental accounts that see Epicurus’s original theory changing as later Epicureans confronted new practical and theoretical questions raised by their conception of the good life. A further question is raised by later Epicurean evidence about divine friendships, which are not based on mutual need. To what extent can humans, enmeshed in the practical demands of human friendship, hope to realize Epicurus’s injunctions to live a life worthy of the gods, and hence, perhaps, form friendships untainted by mutual need? Again the evidence seems muted, but Epicurus’s concerns about the nature of ataraxia, autonomy, and our invulnerability to chance puts questions about the relations among philosophical philoi at the very center of what we might call his high philosophical discourse about the nature of the individual self and the external requirements of hedonistic happiness.

Mathematics and the Good Life

2018 ◽  
pp. 52-78
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Feke
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Continuous Activity ◽  
Good Order ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ordered State ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter demonstrates how Ptolemy's distinctly mathematical ethics emerges from his response to a contemporary debate over the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. He first asserts that the two are independent, differentiated by the manner in which one attains virtues in each domain, whether by instruction or continuous activity. Thereafter, he diminishes the distinction by revealing how they relate. Theoretical philosophy, specifically mathematics, transforms the soul. The study of astronomical objects—the movements and configurations of heavenly bodies—reveals their constancy, good order, commensurability, and calm. Mathematicians, aided by habit, come to appreciate these qualities and transform their souls into a fine and well-ordered state. Organizing their actions in accordance with astronomical theories, they never forget their ultimate objective, the divine-like condition of the soul. The study of mathematics is crucial to obtaining this good life.

Recognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Honneth
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The State ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Ancient Times ◽  
Different Levels

The concept of recognition has played an important role in philosophy since ancient times, when the good life was thought to depend partly on being held in regard by others. Only Hegel, however, made recognition fundamental to his practical philosophy. He claimed that human self-consciousness depends on recognition, and that there are different levels of recognition: legal or moral recognition, and the forms of recognition constituted by love and the state. A similar tripartite distinction can be used to ground a plausible modern account of ethics.

scholarly journals Die Idee einer Hegelianischen ,Wissenschaft‘ der Gesellschaft

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Neuhouser
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Normative Commitment ◽  
Constitutional State ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Senses ◽  
State Form

AbstractThis paper sets out the kind of intellectual enterprise Hegel’s science of society is by explaining its aim (reconciliation) and the method it employs to achieve that aim. It argues that Hegel’s science of society, similar to Smith’s and Marx’s, offers an account of the good social order that is grounded in both an empirical understanding of existing institutions and a normative commitment to a certain vision of the good life. It spells out the criteria Hegel appeals to in his judgment that the modern social order is fundamentally good and worthy of affirmation, namely, that its three principal institutions−the family, civil society, and the constitutional state−form a coherent and harmonious whole that promotes the basic interests of all its members in a way that also realizes freedom in all three of the senses relevant to social theory: personal, moral, and social freedom.

Drawn to the Good? Brewer on Dialectical Activity

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-631
Author(s):  
Lorraine Besser-Jones
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life

In The Retrieval of Ethics, Talbot Brewer defends an Aristotelian-inspired understanding of the good life, in which living the good life is conceived of in terms of engaging in a unified dialectical activity. In this essay, I explore the assumptions at work in Brewer’s understanding of dialectical activity and raise some concerns about whether or not we have reason to embrace them. I argue that his conception of human nature and that towards which we are drawn stands in tension with empirical research on motivation. Given this tension, I conclude that it is implausible to construe living the good life as a unified dialectical activity.

Responses, Corrections, Applications

2020 ◽  
pp. 294-316
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Research Perspectives ◽  
Social Fields ◽  
Art Historians

This concluding chapter offers some commentary on various topics covered in the preceding chapters. It first discusses the need for a comparative study of social norms. The investigation of social norms still largely follows their respective provenance from law, politics, religion, or other social fields, and accordingly is disciplinarily divided up among jurists, political scientists, theologians, art historians, or psychologists. The chapter considers how this volume approached the topic in a different way. In addition, the chapter addresses critiques from practical philosophy about the distinction highlighted between norms and their justification. Afterward, the chapter lists some brief reflections on the automation and rule-bound determination of social practices, before discussing further empirical research perspectives.

scholarly journals Aristotle and Ricœur on Practical Reason

Humanitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 151-167
Author(s):  
Gonçalo Marcelo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Nichomachean Ethics ◽  
Life Worth Living

This paper analyzes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, such as it appears in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, detailing what sort of model to grasp practical reason it entails: a practical wisdom. Setting it against the backdrop of a reflection on the prevalent uses and meanings of reason today, and the consequence these views have for a depiction of selfhood and human action, the paper shows how, amid the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Paul Ricœur updates this phronetic model in Oneself as Another. The paper discusses the implications of such a thick account of selfhood and human action, such as it being a potential key to overcome some difficulties caused by Kantian moral philosophy, while it also calls, with and beyond Ricœur, for a refinement of the phronetic model by taking into account not only its thick intersubjective grounding but also the limits to rationality and the need to take the plurality of life forms that can count as being examples of a ‘life worth living’ (a good life).

scholarly journals Prostitution and the Good of Sex

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 765-784
Author(s):  
Natasha McKeever ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Sex Work ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Good Life

In Sascha Settegast’s recently published article, “Prostitution and the Good of Sex” in Social Theory and Practice, he argues that prostitution is intrinsically harmful. In this article, I object to his argument, making the following three responses to his account: 1) bad sex is not “detrimental to the good life”; 2) bad sex is not necessarily unvirtuous; 3) sex work is work as well as sex, and so must be evaluated as work in addition to as sex.

Moral Science

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-79
Author(s):  
Craig Smith
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Observation ◽  
Moral Science ◽  
The Real ◽  
Central Claim

This chapter outlines Ferguson’s commitment to an empirical, observation based, form of moral science. It begins by looking at Ferguson’s critique of the philosophical vices of existing schools of thought. Ferguson criticises these as being excessively abstract, imprecise in the use of language and overly complex, or subtle, in their arguments. The chapter argues that Ferguson sought to create a practical philosophy for use in the real world and was in the mainstream of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to use history as data for social theory. The chapter then discusses the various underlying universals of human nature and social life that form the basis of Ferguson’s moral science. A central claim is that Ferguson believed it to be a fact that all humans are censorial creatures who pass judgement on each other leading to the claim that morality is a human universal even while humans disagree on its content.

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