Pain, Suffering, and Death

Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson

Lewis’s affirmation of Christian theism—based on its greater explanatory power in regard to the phenomena of rational thought, morality, and the existential need for joy and meaning—faces its toughest test in the problem of evil and suffering. This chapter reviews Lewis’s general philosophical responses to the problem of pain and suffering, noting their insights and critiquing their inadequacies, and placing his work in the larger context of contemporary philosophical discussions of the problem of evil. Interestingly, when Lewis met and fell in love with Joy Gresham, he experienced personally those pangs of pain and loss that he had previously dealt with only theoretically. Joy’s suffering and death by cancer caused Lewis to question his old answers and even to question God. He journals the troubled thoughts and feelings of his grief in a frank and honest way that gives permission to all who grieve to express their feelings and not be intimidated by supposedly proper answers. His “grief observed” ultimately works through to an even stronger faith than his original faith in which joy did not encounter suffering, concluding that suffering cannot be erased but can actually be subsumed by joy. An item of particular interest is the Lewis–Van Osdall correspondence (recently discovered, never before published) in which Lewis identifies with Van Osdall’s loss of his only son in a fatal car crash.

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David Basinger

The problem of evil normally discussed in philosophical theology is concerned with the pain and suffering experienced in this life. Why do so many innocent children die slow, torturous deaths as the result of disease, famine or earthquakes? Why do so many seemingly innocent adults suffer as the result of the greed, indifference or perversity of others? If God is all-good, then he certainly does not want such suffering. If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do away with such evils. Thus, must we not conclude that the existence of such evil counts against belief in the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful God?


Think ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (37) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Tim Fisher

A traditional defense of God in the face of pain and suffering is that humans learn from encounters with suffering – learn something wonderfully valuable that could not be learned in any other way. God is a teacher, and we humans are the students. This article examines the Problem of Evil through this paradigm. It argues that any God-as-teacher defense of evil fails on its face because God does not meet even the most lax standard for teacher behavior and action.


Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa

This chapter contends that the problem of evil arises not only for theists but also for atheists. To demonstrate this, focus is placed on ‘the problem of systemic evil’, where this is the problem of accounting for the violent, cruel, and unfair system of natural selection, a system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient beings. Unlike the traditional problem of evil, which concentrates on specific events, the more challenging problem of systemic evil emphasizes that the entire biological system is evil. Despite the systemic nature of evil, both theists and atheists typically uphold ‘existential optimism’, the thesis that the world is overall a good place and that we should be grateful for our existence in it. The combination of systemic evil and existential optimism gives rise to the ‘existential problem of systemic evil’, and this is a problem that theists have greater resources in answering than do atheists.


Lumen et Vita ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chelsea King

One of the most difficult challenges facing belief in the Christian God is the problem of evil. How can there be a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God, who allows pain, suffering and death in the world? Various theodicies have been constructed to address this question, and historically theologians have pointed to the Fall to explain such pain and suffering. However, theology in a post-evolutionary context is faced with a new challenge; the problem of pain and suffering is amplified by the millions of years of suffering and pain that have occurred before the advent of human beings.  Today, the theologian must wrestle with the claim that pain, suffering, and death not only precedes human beings, but are in fact instruments in the very process of creation itself.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.


Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).


Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This chapter provides a detailed characterization of the various meanings of the term “divine hiddenness,” carefully and rigorously articulates the version of the problem of divine hiddenness that has dominated contemporary philosophical discussion for the past twenty-five years, and then explains the relationship between that problem and the problem of evil.


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