Hedge Fund Pricing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Pricing Theory ◽  
Funds Of Hedge Funds ◽  
Pricing Theory ◽  
Computational Platform ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

The two main differentiating features of hedge fund managers compared to traditional investment managers are their ability to leverage and to take both short and long positions. Asset-pricing models used in traditional investment management appraisal have evolved to take these two features into account to correctly specify the pricing of hedge funds. Modern hedge fund asset-pricing theory has its roots in two venerable fields of financial economics research: capital asset pricing and the theory of the firm. This chapter presents the theory and intuition behind the most widely used models for hedge fund performance analysis. MATLAB is used as a computational platform for examples in the chapter using 10 hypothetical hedge fund return vectors. Quants and managers of funds of hedge funds deal mostly with data as presented in net monthly column vectors typically in a Microsoft Excel format.

Style and Skill: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Momentum

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5505-5531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Grinblatt ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Lubomir Petrasek ◽  
Alexander Philipov
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Short Sales ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Liquidity Provision ◽  
Stock Picking ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

scholarly journals Home Bias and Local Contagion: Evidence from Funds of Hedge Funds

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (10) ◽  
pp. 4771-4810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Sialm ◽  
Zheng Sun ◽  
Lu Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Market Segmentation ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Local Bias ◽  
Funds Of Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance ◽  
Funds Of Funds

Abstract Our paper analyzes the geographical preferences of hedge fund investors and the implication of these preferences for hedge fund performance. We find that funds of hedge funds overweigh their investments in hedge funds located in the same geographical areas and that funds with a stronger local bias exhibit superior performance. Local bias also gives rise to excess flow comovement and extreme return clustering within geographic areas. Overall, our results suggest that while funds of funds benefit from local advantages, their local bias also creates market segmentation that can destabilize the underlying hedge funds.

Beta Active Hedge Fund Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (6) ◽  
pp. 2525-2558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Duanmu ◽  
Alexey Malakhov ◽  
William R. McCumber
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Common Factor ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

We reconsider whether hedge funds’ time-varying risk factor exposures are predictive of superior performance. We construct an overall measure (BA) of fund managers and present evidence that top beta active managers deliver superior long-term out-of-sample performance compared to top alpha active managers. BA captures the time-varying nature of beta exposures and can be interpreted as a common factor of both systematic risk (SR) and (1 - R2) measures. BA also compares favorably to extant measures of market timing, capturing the explanatory power of such measures of hedge fund performance.

Hedge Funds

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. Caslin
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
It Systems ◽  
Funds Of Hedge Funds ◽  
Key Characteristics ◽  
Data Points ◽  
Merger Arbitrage

ABSTRACTThe paper opens by showing how certain types of hedge funds can reduce the risk and increase the return on a traditional balanced managed fund. One of the key characteristics of such a hedge fund is that it has a low correlation with the balanced managed fund. The paper puts forward a new way of explaining correlation so that it can be more readily understood, and suggests methods of analysis for dealing with the fact that correlation is unstable. Volatility correlation is also examined because of its importance in reducing the risk of a portfolio.An outline of the characteristics and risks of three types of hedge funds, namely, long/short equity, convertible arbitrage and merger arbitrage, together with some questions investors might put to prospective hedge fund managers is given in Section 5.Some of the very basic statistical analysis techniques used in assessing the past performance of hedge funds are given in Section 6. Considerable emphasis is put on the need to examine daily return data as an insight into the quality of the manager's IT systems, his risk management, evidence of smoothing of returns, and to gain access to a higher number of data points for assessing the repeatability of performance.An entire section of the paper is devoted to gaining a clear understanding of a prospective hedge fund manager's volatility management strategy because of its importance in the context of the fee structure of hedge funds and its importance for assessing the ability of a hedge fund to reduce the risk and increase the returns of a balanced managed fund.Funds of hedge funds are examined in the final section, and the section concludes that large sophisticated institutional investors may wish to create a portfolio of hedge funds rather than invest in a fund of hedge funds.

An Asset Pricing Theory of Volatility Tail Behavior

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gurdip S. Bakshi ◽  
Dilip B. Madan ◽  
George Panayotov
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Tail Behavior ◽  
Asset Pricing Theory ◽  
Pricing Theory

Dynamic asset pricing theory with uncertain time-horizon

2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 1737-1764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophette Blanchet-Scalliet ◽  
Nicole El Karoui ◽  
Lionel Martellini
Keyword(s):  
Asset Pricing ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Asset Pricing Theory ◽  
Pricing Theory ◽  
Uncertain Time ◽  
Dynamic Asset Pricing

Financial Industry Affiliation and Hedge Fund Performance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingling Zheng ◽  
Xuemin (Sterling) Yan
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Internal Conflicts ◽  
Industry Affiliation ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Affiliation with a financial conglomerate may provide hedge funds with superior information about the conglomerate’s lending, investment banking, and brokerage clients; such affiliation can also lead to potential conflicts with the other units of the conglomerate and exacerbate the conflict between hedge fund companies and hedge fund investors. We find that affiliated funds significantly underperform unaffiliated funds. A difference-in-difference analysis confirms the negative relation between financial industry affiliation and hedge fund performance. Affiliated funds pursue asset-gathering strategies, overweight their conducted initial public offerings/seasoned equity offerings clients’ stocks, are more likely to commit legal and regulatory violations, and tend to exhibit a greater number of internal conflicts. Our results are consistent with conflict of interest exerting a negative impact on the performance of affiliated hedge funds. However, it is possible that lack of skill also contributes to the underperformance of affiliated funds. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Portraits of five hedge fund fraud cases

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb ◽  
Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Group ◽  
Fund Industry ◽  
Asset Managers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.FindingsThe five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.Originality/valueThis is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

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