Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Dov Fox

We’re used to blaming randomness or cosmic injustice when we don’t get the child we want, or when we get the one we don’t. Now cutting-edge interventions promise to deliver us from the vagaries of natural conception and the genetic lottery: Birth control and abortion prevent parenthood; gamete donation and IVF make procreation possible; and prenatal testing can detect debilitating offspring diseases even before pregnancy. These undertakings are still riddled with uncertainty—sometimes things just don’t work out; but that’s no reason to turn a blind eye when bad behavior is at fault. The American legal system protects against professional negligence in other inherently risky activities, from riding in a car to preparing a meal. Courts lay off when fate or accidents are responsible—when deer pop out onto dark roads, or homemade chicken is undercooked. But the law doesn’t hesitate to respond when auto crashes are traced to defective brakes, or food poisoning to unsanitary farming. Reproductive medicine and technology shouldn’t be any different—the stakes are high, and important interests hang in the balance. Just because would-be parents are accustomed to disappointment—because many of us have resigned ourselves to spontaneous miscarriage, or unplanned pregnancy, or an unexpected roll of the genetic dice—doesn’t make those outcomes any less serious, or misconduct that produces them any less worthy of recovery. Reproductive negligence today goes undeterred, unreported, and unredressed—the architecture of rights for procreation deprived, imposed, and confounded equips us to rethink and resolve the controversies that lie ahead.

Author(s):  
Dov Fox

A recent survey of half of all U.S. fertility clinics found that more than one in five misdiagnosed, mislabeled, or mishandled reproductive materials. These errors can’t be chalked up to reasonable slips of hand or lapses in judgment as often as deficient quality controls; and no statute or doctrine vindicates these injuries, or says they matter as a matter of law. Victims can’t point to any physical or financial harm they’ve suffered. Some courts point out that reproductive plans are easy to invent and hard to verify. Others wonder why plaintiffs whose plans were thwarted didn’t just turn to abortion or adoption instead. And most are unwilling to cast a child’s birth as a legal injury. The American legal system treats confounded procreation less like mischief than misfortune, closer to a star-crossed romance or a losing ticket in the natural lottery—the kind of adversity that, however fateful, you have no choice but to steel yourself against and move on from: You can’t always get what you want. This indifference is surprising in a country that’s constitutionalized rights to abortion and birth control since the 1960s and 1970s. But even this “fundamental rights” status hasn’t kept states from aggressively restricting access to abortion and contraception, and the Court hasn’t extended these reproductive freedoms to practices that introduce donors or surrogates into the mix. Besides, constitutional privacy applies only to misconduct by government actors: It offers no protection against wrongdoing by any nonstate clinic, pharmacy, or hospital.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 682-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Gabriel Manzo

Abstract Sentences against sovereign States are difficult to enforce in courts. The Court of New York, in “NML Capital Ltd. vs. Argentina” (NML), tried to solve this situation with an injunction that blocked the payments of Argentina’s sovereign debt. The specialized literature has theoretically predicted that this injunction would cause harm to third parties and problems with other States. This article empirically corroborates these predictions with the analysis of a trial derived from NML: the “Citibank Argentina” case. The analysis of this case confirms the restraints presented by the literature about the lack of proper consideration of the requirements that the American legal system imposes for the applicability of an injunction that affects third parties and operates extraterritorially. Similarly, this paper argues that there are solid legal reasons for the authorities of third countries to declare inadmissible the extraterritorial effects of an injunction, such as the one obtained by NML, when those effects fall on assets and agents located in these authorities jurisdiction.


Author(s):  
Munawar Haque

Abstract  The purpose of this article is to explore the views of Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ[1] on ijtihÉd.[2] It intends to trace the origins of MawdËdÊ’s ideas within the social, cultural and political context of his time, especially the increasing influence of modernity in the Muslim world.  The study will show that MawdËdÊ’s understanding of ijtihÉd and its scope demonstrates originality.  For MawdËdÊ, ijtihÉd is the concept, the process, as well as the mechanism by which the SharÊÑah,[3] as elaborated in the Qur’Én and the Sunnah[4] is to be interpreted, developed and kept alive in line with the intellectual, political, economic, legal, technological and moral development of society.  The notion of ijtihÉd adopted by MawdËdÊ transcends the confines of Fiqh[5] (jurisprudence) and tends therefore to unleash the dormant faculties of the Muslim mind to excel in all segments of life.   [1] Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ was born on September 25, 1903 in Awrangabad, a town in the present Maharashtra state of India in a deeply religious family.  His ancestry on the paternal side is traced back to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).  The family had a long-standing tradition of spiritual leadership, for a number of MawdËdÊ’s ancestors were outstanding leaders of ØËfÊ Orders.  One of the luminaries among them, the one from whom he derives his family name, was KhawÉjah QuÏb al-DÊn MawdËd (d. 527 AH), a renowned leader of the ChishtÊ ØËfÊ Order. MawdËdÊ died on September 22, 1979. See Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “MawlÉnÉ Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ: An Introduction to His Vision of Islam and Islamic Revival,”, in Khurshd Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari (eds.) Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of MawlÉnÉ Sayyid Abul A’lÉ MawdËdÊ,  (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation,1979), 360. [2]  In Islamic legal thought, ijtihÉd is understood as the effort of the jurist to derive the law on an issue by expending all the available means of interpretation at his disposal and by taking into account all the legal proofs related to the issue.  However, its scope is not confined only to legal aspect of Muslim society.  MawdËdÊ’s concept of ijtihÉd is defined as the legislative process that makes the legal system of Islam dynamic and makes its development and evolution in the changing circumstances possible.  This results from a particular type of academic research and intellectual effort, which in the terminology of Islam is called ijtihÉd.  The purpose and object of ijtihÉd is not to replace the Divine law by man made law.  Its real object is to properly understand the Supreme law and to impart dynamism to the legal system of Islam by keeping it in conformity with the fundamental guidance of the SharÊÑah and abreast of the ever-changing conditions of the world.  See Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ, The Islamic Law and Constitution, translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad, (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1983), 76.[3] SharÊÑah refers to the sum total of Islamic laws and guidance, which were revealed to the Prophet MuÍammad (peace be upon him), and which are recorded in the Qur’Én as well as deducible from the Prophet’s divinely guided lifestyle (called the Sunnah). See Muhammad ShalabÊ, al-Madkhal fÊ at-TaÑ’rÊf  b alil-Fiqh al-IslÉmÊ, (Beirut: n.p., 1968),.28.[4]Sunnah is the way of life of the Prophet (peace be upon him), consisting of his sayings, actions and silent approvals. It is also used to mean a recommended deed as opposed to FarÌ or WÉjib, a compulsory one.[5]  Originally Fiqh referred to deliberations related to one’s reasoned opinion, ra’y.  Later the expression Fiqh evolved to mean jurisprudence covering every aspect of Islam.  It is also applied to denote understanding, comprehension, and profound knowledge. For an excellent exposition on the meaning of Fiqh, see Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic law: The methodology of ijtihÉd, (Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1996), 20-22.


1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-74
Author(s):  
Alan Meisel

AbstractIn the 20 years that have passed since the Karen Quinlan case exposed a simmering clinical issue to the light of day — more precisely, to the press and to judicial process — a consensus has developed in American law about how end-of-life decisionmaking should occur. To be sure, there are dissenting voices from this consensus, but they are often (though not always) about minor issues. By illustrating how this consensus has evolved, this paper explores how law is made in the American legal system and the roles that different legal and extra-legal institutions play in lawmaking.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 126-133
Author(s):  
Vlad-Cristian SOARE ◽  

"The fundamental transformations through the Romanian state passed since the Revolution of December 1989, have also put their mark on the legal system. For this reason, there have been major changes in the content of administrative law. However, the regulation of the territorial-administrative subdivisions survived the change of political regime, due to Law 2/1968. Moreover, regulations on administrative-territorial subdivisions are also found in Law 215/2001 and in the 1991 Constitution, revised in 2003. This has led to problems of interpretation. Thus, on the one hand, we need to identify who has the right to constitute administrative-territorial subdivisions, and on the other hand, it must be seen whether the answer to the first question, leads to a possible interpretation that would be unconstitutional. At the same time, administrative-territorial subdivisions have created problems of interpretation regarding their legal capacity. Through this article, we have proposed to look at the issues mentioned above."


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Dang Dung

The paper analyzes some characteristics and advantages of the source of the Bristish-American legal system and earned experiences for Vietnam.


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