Should the Mathematical Fictionalist Be a Moral Fictionalist, Too?

2020 ◽  
pp. 122-141
Author(s):  
Mary Leng
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Mathematical Objects ◽  
The Face ◽  
Key Questions ◽  
Moral Facts

On the face of it, the same motivations that lead some philosophers to adopt mathematical fictionalism seem also to push in the direction of moral fictionalism. In particular, to the extent that mathematical fictionalists are motivated by epistemological concerns about our ability to know truths about abstract mathematical objects, one might expect them to be similarly worried about our ability to know “queer” moral facts. However, the author argues that existing versions of moral fictionalism fare less well than existing versions of mathematical fictionalism in answering two key questions for fictionalists about a domain D, (1) what is it that the D-discourse is being used to do, and (2) why should we expect D-talk to be useful in this way if we do not believe our D-claims to be true? The author closes by presenting considerations that suggest that the combination of mathematical fictionalism with moral realism might be motivated on naturalist grounds.

Moral realism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Fact ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right ◽  
Natural Fact ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

The Hard Problem for Soft Moral Realism

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (10) ◽  
pp. 555-576
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Metaphysics ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
Moral Facts

Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a soft version of moral realism, according to which moral facts—though it is reasonable to postulate them—cannot metaphysically explain other facts (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is faced with what I call the “Hard Problem,” namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This paper reconstructs and examines three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the soft realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, and the third-factor approach. I then argue that none of them is successful.

Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russ Shafer-Landau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Theological Realism ◽  
Moral Facts

AbstractThere are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist.

scholarly journals On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Oxford University Press ◽  
Moral Facts

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

scholarly journals Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-402
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Contemporary Perspective ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content.

scholarly journals Riddled with holes: Understanding air space formation in plant leaves

PLoS Biology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. e3001475
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Whitewoods
Keyword(s):  
Molecular Mechanisms ◽  
Organic Molecules ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Plant Leaves ◽  
Air Space ◽  
The Face ◽  
Complex Chemistry ◽  
Light Capture ◽  
Complex Organic ◽  
Key Questions

Plants use energy from sunlight to transform carbon dioxide from the air into complex organic molecules, ultimately producing much of the food we eat. To make this complex chemistry more efficient, plant leaves are intricately constructed in 3 dimensions: They are flat to maximise light capture and contain extensive internal air spaces to increase gas exchange for photosynthesis. Many years of work has built up an understanding of how leaves form flat blades, but the molecular mechanisms that control air space formation are poorly understood. Here, I review our current understanding of air space formation and outline how recent advances can be harnessed to answer key questions and take the field forward. Increasing our understanding of plant air spaces will not only allow us to understand a fundamental aspect of plant development, but also unlock the potential to engineer the internal structure of crops to make them more efficient at photosynthesis with lower water requirements and more resilient in the face of a changing environment.

scholarly journals A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-207
Author(s):  
OLLE RISBERG ◽  
FOLKE TERSMAN
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Reasoning Skills ◽  
Moral Facts

AbstractMoral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is ‘fundamental’ moral disagreement—that is, disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonmoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the disagreement challenge is flawed as it stands. The reason is that the epistemic assumptions it requires are incompatible with the possibility of fundamental disagreement. However, we also present an alternative reconstruction of the challenge that avoids the problem. The challenge we present crucially invokes the principle that knowledge requires ‘adherence’. While that requirement is usually not discussed in this context, we argue that it provides a promising explanation of why disagreement sometimes leads to skepticism.

'Can a Philosophical Justification of Ethics Be Autonomous While Acknowledging the Role of God in Grounding Moral Facts?'

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-108
Author(s):  
Christoph Halbig
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Human Autonomy ◽  
Special Challenge ◽  
Autonomy Of Ethics ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Moral Facts

Autonomy and ethics are related to each other in complex ways. The paper starts by distinguishing and characterizing three basic dimensions of this relation. It proceeds by arguing for the compatibility of moral realism with a due respect for human autonomy. Nevertheless, supernaturalist moral realism seems to pose a special challenge for the autonomy of ethics as a self-standing normative realm. The paper ends with some considerations on the role of divine authority both in metaethics and in the general theory of value.

Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Anne Jeffrey
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Moral Facts

Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God’s relation to the natural world.

Moral realism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Fact ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right ◽  
Natural Fact ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document