The Ontological Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth D. Burns
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Rational Person ◽  
William Rowe

William Rowe claims that Anselm’s ontological argument, as restated by Alvin Plantinga, begs the question because, in order to know the truth of the key premise—“It is possible that God exists in reality”—we must know, independently of the argument, that God exists in reality. This chapter argues that Rowe focuses on Plantinga’s restatement of Anselm’s argument at the expense of Plantinga’s own version of the argument, and that Plantinga anticipates and addresses Rowe’s objection. Although Plantinga concedes that a rational person could reject his argument’s central premise, it might be possible to build on Plantinga’s argument by adding a further step derived from Iris Murdoch, which shows that the existence of God is not only possible but necessary, and therefore actual. This reconstruction is not an ontological argument in its purest form, but a fusion of elements from ontological, moral, and cosmological arguments for the existence of God.

scholarly journals Plantinga's God and other monstrosities

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Grim
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
New Form

In God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga presents a new form of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Though he has reservations concerning its evangelical efficacy, Plantinga considers the proof both valid and sound, and presents it as a defence of the rational acceptability of theism.

Waiting for Godo… and Godan: Completing Rowe’s Critique of the Ontological Argument

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Roslyn Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
William Rowe

In his critique of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence, William Rowe introduces the concepts of “magico” and “magican”—defining “magicos” as magicians that do not exist, and “magicans” as magicians that do exist—to help diagnose what may have gone wrong in Anselm’s argument. As I made my way through Rowe’s intriguing article, I found myself waiting for “Godo”—and for “Godan.” I expected Rowe to invoke these counterparts to his “magico” and “magican”—a non-existing God to correspond to his non-existing magician, and an existing God to correspond to his existing magician—to complete his argument. Alas, like Vladimir and Estragon, I waited in vain: neither Godo—nor Godan—ever appeared. In what follows I shall argue that their inclusion in Rowe’s argument would have settled the matter against Anselm far more decisively than do Rowe’s forays into the murky waters of question-begging.

Faith and Conscience—The Surest of Arguments for the Existence of God

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-268
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Grzesik
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
John Henry Newman ◽  
Existence Of God

In the first part of my paper, I shall consider how Anselm of Canterbury’s so-called ontological argument has been misapprehended by those treating it as a proof for the existence of God. In the second part, I shall focus on Chapter One of the Proslogion and on the Epistola de incarnatione Verbi to show what Anselm’s real purpose was regarding the problem of the existence of God. I shall support my view by referring also to the thought of John Henry Newman and Henri de Lubac.

The Ontological Argument Revisited: A Reply to Rowe

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Eric Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Existence Of God

Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument is perhaps the most intriguing of all the traditional speculative proofs for the existence of God. Yet, his argument has been rejected outright by many philosophers. Most challenges stem from the basic conviction that no amount of logical analysis of a concept that is limited to the bounds of the “understanding” will ever be able to “reason” the existence in “reality” of anything answering such a limited concept. However, it is not the intent of this paper to prove or disprove Anselm’s argument. Rather, in this paper we concern ourselves with arriving at a sound interpretation of Anselm’s leading critic—Immanuel Kant. Kant put forth perhaps the most vaunted criticism of Anselm’s argument. However, Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood objector to Anselm’s argument. This paper confirms that charge, simultaneously offering what I believe to be a sound interpretation of Kant’s criticism.

Kant’s Radical Critique of Ontotheology

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Real ◽  
Radical Critique ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines the way Kant’s revolutionary theory of modality radicalizes his critique of ontotheology in the Ideal of Pure Reason. First it shows how Kant’s downgrading of his own precritical ‘only possible argument’ from an objectively valid demonstration of the real necessity of the existence of God to a subjectively valid demonstration of the necessity of assuming the idea of such a being is due to his shift from an ontological to an epistemological interpretation of the actualist principle. Second, it argues that Kant’s refutation of the traditional ontological argument in the Ideal follows a multilayered strategy, consisting of a combination of two historical lines of objection, only the second of which presupposes his negative thesis that existence is not a real predicate, as well as an additional, third objection based on his further thesis that all existential judgments are synthetic, albeit in a peculiar sense.

Nihilism, metaphysical

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraldine Coggins
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Third ◽  
Concrete Objects

Metaphysical nihilism is an answer to the question ‘could there have been nothing?’ In recent analytic philosophy this tends to be interpreted as ‘could there have been no concrete objects?’ There are three ways of answering this question. The first is metaphysical nihilism, which answers in the affirmative: ‘there could have been nothing’. The second and third answers give negative replies. The second answer is based on the ontological argument for the existence of God. This argument leads us to claim that there is a necessarily existing object. If there is one object which must exist, then there could not have been nothing, there had to be this one object. The third answer also claims that there could not have been nothing but does not rely on the existence of a necessary object. This view is that whilst there had to be something, there is no one particular object which had to exist.

scholarly journals Second Sailing towards Immortality and God

Mnemosyne ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Rafael Ferber
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Structural Analogy ◽  
Immortality Of The Soul ◽  
Final Proof

Abstract This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.

Hume and Proofs for the Existence of God

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Bell
Keyword(s):  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Theory Of Ideas ◽  
Empiricist Theory

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.

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