Locke on Substance, Spirit, and the Idea of God

This chapter considers Locke’s discussion of ideas of substance in Essay 2.23. Locke’s discussion is examined in the light of More’s discussions in The Immortality of the Soul. The chapter first argues that Locke is proposing a view about how one thinks about substances (not a view about their metaphysical structure) and that this view involves the idea of a so-called bare substratum. An argument against bare substratum readings (given by Michael Ayers and Robert Pasnau) is opposed, using evidence from the comparison with More. The chapter then considers arguments about the ideas of matter and spirit, arguing that Locke gives basically the same argument for the coherence of the idea of spirit that More gave against Hobbes. Finally, the chapter considers Locke’s account of the origin of the idea of God.

THE CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN PLATO AND IN PATRISTIC THOUGHT

This article is focuses on Plato's conception of the soul, through which man as a psycho-physical being, lives with the perspective of immortality. The pre-existence and immortality of the soul is in fact the basis of Platonic philosophy. Plato presents the existence of the soul in the Phaidon Dialogue starting from the hypothesis that something called the soul has existence in the form of pre-existence and post-existence and has an intelligible nature, similar to the structure of Eidos (Ideas). The second part of the research considers the transition from ontology to metaphysics, focused on a different perspective given the patristic thinking in which man is created in his divine image, as a personal being composed of body and soul, a synthesis of the intelligible world with the material.

FROM DIGITAL PROFILE TO DIGITAL IMMORTALITY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE PROBLEM FIELD

Идея смерти и бессмертия всегда волновала человечество и всегда была предметом философского осмысления, в связи с этим в философии существует множество различных концепций бессмертия: бессмертие как воспроизводство своего рода (бессмертие в потомках); сохранение (мумификация) тела; религиозное бессмертие души; бессмертие как результат творчества или совершения каких-либо значимых действий. Стремительное развитие технологий влечет за собой формирование нового типа мышления и вносит изменения в социокультурные отношения. Рассматриваемая в данной статье концепция «цифрового бессмертия» является предметом исследования философии науки не только потому, что современные технологии оказывают воздействие на сознание человека, но и в связи с тем, что данное направление исследований ставит своей целью сохранение, копирование, возможно воссоздание сознания человека. The idea of death and immortality has always attracted people’s attention and has always been the subject of investigation, the fact that gave birth to many different concepts of immortality in philosophy: immortality as family reproduction (immortality in descendants), preservation (mummification) of the body, religious immortality of the soul, immortality as a result of creativity or the performance of any significant actions. The rapid development of technology entails the formation of a new type of thinking and introduces a change in socio-cultural relations. The concept of «digital immortality» considered in the present paper is the focus of research in the philosophy of science, not only because modern technologies have an impact on human consciousness, but also due to the fact that this line of research aims to preserve, copy and recreate human consciousness.

The Image of Death in the Texts of the Ket Linguoculture

A fragment of the linguistic view of the world of the Kets, a minority ethnos, whose language is going through a period of shift, is reconstructed. The category of mortality is implicated on the basis of vocabulary united by the meanings “death”, “to die”. Through the analysis of contexts, including this vocabulary, the peculiarities of the linguistic representation of ideas about the category of death are revealed and cognitive-figurative models that order these representations are identified. As a result of the study, it is found that metaphorization and description of visual signs in the Ket language act as key mechanisms for the linguization of the phenomenon of death, and the meanings expressed in discourse reveal an ambivalent and antinomic character. Along with such metaphors as “eternal sleep,” “withdrawal into another world,” the Ket discourse of death also contains direct descriptions of objective ones, i.e. visible manifestations of the category under discussion - cessation of breathing, inability to move, etc. An analysis of the Ket discourse of death indicates that the belief in the immortality of the soul and the other world, expressed in it, is intended to neutralize the fear of death. On the other hand, plots are revealed that express the possibility of struggle and victory over death. This indicates that death is understood as an undesirable, frightening phenomenon that opposes the successful course of a person’s life events.

Philosophical Background

This chapter provides a brief overview of certain elements of Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology that are essential background for understanding certain features of his ethical theory. In particular, it presents Kant’s distinction between the ‘world of sense’ or ‘phenomenal world’ and the ‘world of understanding’ or ‘noumenal world’ as a basis for explaining the limits of theoretical cognition which rules out theoretical cognition and knowledge of God, immortality of the soul, and freedom of the will, yet allows Kant to affirm their reality on moral grounds, needed to explain how the highest good is possible. Of importance for understanding certain claims in his work on virtue is the distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world as it applies to human beings. The chapter concludes with reflections on the relation between Kant’s ethics and his metaphysical and epistemological commitments.

Revisiting the Mystery of Life in the Hereafter: Reflections of Fr Augustine Urayai of Zimbabwe

The quest for knowledge regarding life after death is indispensable and paramount to most cultures and religions, including African spiritualties and mystery cults. Fr Augustine Urayai was a Roman Catholic priest and exorcist and this paper critically examines his theological reflections on death and life after death, particularly his idea of the “liminal/transitional phase” in the upward movement of spirits from earth to heaven for restoration and re-unification with God. The compulsory “liminal phase” or “zones” (magedhe) where all spirits pass through before their fate is ascertained comprises the resting, treatment, judgment, and feasting respectively. The article first examines the milieu in which Fr Urayai’s theology emerged and developed. As a way of analysis, it explores the age-old question of the immortality of the soul and its link with other religions, cultural and philosophical traditions. As it probes deeper, the article critically examines the ramifications and impact of Fr Urayai’s new theology on the Zimbabwe Christian landscape. The main argument developed in this article is that, even though Fr Urayai’s theory of life in the hereafter appears to be a breakaway from celebrated mainstream theological formulations, it has the potential to hatch useful insights into possible new areas of theological reflection in the ongoing discourses on the link between Christian anthropology and different African spiritualties.

John Locke and Catharine Cockburn on Personal Identity

John Locke's account of personal identity (Essay 2.27) is one of his most discussed theories. Opposing the Cartesian ontology of mind, Locke argued that the soul does not always think - for thinking is simply one of its operations, but not its essence -, and that personal identity consists in consciousness alone. Against Locke, an anonymous commentator published the Remarks upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding (1697-99) charging Locke's view with possible immorality. Catharine Cockburn rebuffed the Remarker's objections, in her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay (1702), depicting his view as more dangerous for morality than Locke's. This paper shifts the focus from Cockburn's defence of Locke's moral thought, to her apology for his theory of personal identity, including his probabilistic arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. This shift of focus yields an alternative account of Cockburn's originality: first, because she offered a non-substance interpretation of Locke's theory of personal identity, that, for its time, was unusual, and remains relevant for contemporary philosophical debates over Locke; and second, because, following Kristeller, in the very act of defending and articulating anew Locke's theory, Cockburn in some sense appropriated it.

The Third Paralogism

This chapter analyses the third paralogism of ‘personality’ (or, equivalently, of ‘personhood’), situating the paralogistic argument in its Wolffian context. The chapter contends that Kant treats personality as an epistemic state. It offers accounts of Kant’s envisaged ‘practical use’ of the concept of a person and of his conception of what immortality would have to consist in if there were to be such a state. It scrutinizes in detail Kant’s criticisms of the separate arguments of Moses Mendelssohn and of David Fordyce for the immortality of the soul. Finally, it examines Kant’s sympathetic adaptation of Fordyce’s argument to his own, rather less ambitious, purposes—namely, the justification, or, more accurately, production and stabilization, of a ‘doctrinal belief’ in an afterlife. It offers an evaluation of the argument when it is so construed.