Hume and Proofs for the Existence of God

Author(s):  
Martin Bell

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Saja Parvizian ◽  

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Uwe Meixner

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument (just like the conclusion of Thomas Aquinas’s causal argument) is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.


Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa

This chapter provides a precise definition of perfect being theism and compares it with alternatives such as atheism, polytheism, pantheism, and panentheism. The chapter then considers the historical and cognitive roots of perfect being theism. It argues, contrary to what is widely believed, that perfect being theism is not Anselm’s invention or an unnatural, scholarly artefact. The chapter then explains the philosophical merits of holding perfect being theism and considers the relationship between perfect being theism and prominent arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument and the design argument. It concludes with a discussion of three types of arguments against perfect being theism.


Author(s):  
Tim Bayne

Is it possible to prove that God exists? There is certainly no shortage of arguments that purport to establish God’s existence, but ‘Arguments for the existence of God’ focuses on three of the most influential arguments: the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from religious experience. Before examining these arguments, it first considers the very enterprise of attempting to establish God’s existence. What should we expect from an argument for God’s existence? What would it take for such an argument to be successful? The attempt to justify claims about the nature and existence of God on the basis of commonly accepted truths is known as natural theology.


Author(s):  
K. V. Sorvin

The article is devoted to the interpretation of the ontological argument as a theoretical construction that is connected with understanding of the reflexive relationship of thinking and existence. The author concludes that the consistent implementation of this approach requires an appeal to the historically transitory forms of the ontological argument which reconstructs the logic of the evolution of reflexive systems. The ontological argument is considered as a developing theoretical construct. Therefore, theoretical constructs conceptualized as non-classical versions of the ontological argument will constantly re-emerge. Emergence of the first non-classical version of the ontological argument is related to need of overcoming apriority of introduction of the idea of the absolute being which is typical for Cartesianism. This issue was realized in the Kantian doctrine of transcendental ideas, which presented mind as an independent essence that creates its own content. Thus, the metaphysical construction, conditionally referred to as “the moral proof of the existence of God,” is revealed in the paper as a non-classical variant of the ontological argument. However, while Kant could be content with faith in reality of other subjectivity as an object of moral action, Fichte’s scientific doctrine demanded a proof of objective reality of the concept of the other I. This issue was identical to a basic problem of an ontological argument. “The ontological argument of the other I” offered by Fichte was devoid of mysticism as it is indissolubly connected with the disclosure of the social nature of the human subjectivity. The last step in formation of the concept “non-classical version of the ontological argument” was taken in Hegelian philosophy, where the reflexive relations between the multitude of I’s were transformed to reflexive interconnection between God and man. The versions of ontological argument are considered in the paper as necessary stages which any theoretical model of reflexive systems has to pass in its formation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-84
Author(s):  
Domingos Faria

Abstract My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is (i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Jolley

This chapter addresses the issue of whether Locke’s own empiricist theory of ideas offers, as Locke often suggested, a more intelligible way of explaining human understanding than Malebranche’s doctrine of Vision in God. Drawing on Locke’s statements about the corpuscularian hypothesis, it argues that although the empiricist theory may satisfy some criteria of intelligibility, it is forced to recognize the existence of processes that are ‘incomprehensible’; to that extent, Locke’s theory of ideas runs parallel with his mature philosophy of matter. The epistemic status of the empiricist theory of ideas is thus more problematic than it is often taken to be.


2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedikt Paul Göcke

The existence of God is once again the focus of vivid philosophical discussion. From the point of view of analytic theology, however, people often talk past each other when they debate about the putative existence or non- existence of God. In the worst case, for instance, atheists deny the existence of a God, which no theists ever claimed to exist. In order to avoid confusions like this we need to be clear about the function of the term ‘God’ in its different contexts of use. In what follows, I distinguish between the functions of ‘God’ in philosophical contexts on the one hand and in theological contexts on the other in order to provide a schema, which helps to avoid confusion in the debate on the existence or non-existence of God.


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