Van Parijs’ Minimal Undominated Diversity

Chapter 6 examines Philippe Van Parijs’ requirement of minimal undominated diversity. According to the requirement of minimal undominated diversity, if one person’s bundle dominates another person’s bundle—that is, if everyone prefers the first bundle to the second—then goods must be redistributed to the dominated bundle. Yet once the bundle is no longer dominated—that is, once at least one individual weakly prefers the previously dominated bundle—redistribution must end. The solidarity solution, in contrast, would continue to redistribute goods until all bundles could be simultaneously chosen. Minimal undominated diversity thus permits less redistribution. Nonetheless, the bundles to which Van Parijs applies minimal undominated diversity are different from those to which the solidarity applies. Undominated diversity applies to comprehensive endowments; the solidarity solution, in contrast, applies to labor-income bundles. Chapter 6 rejects each of Van Parijs’ four justifications for minimal undominated diversity as applied to labor-income bundles.