Van Parijs’ Minimal Undominated Diversity

Chapter 6 examines Philippe Van Parijs’ requirement of minimal undominated diversity. According to the requirement of minimal undominated diversity, if one person’s bundle dominates another person’s bundle—that is, if everyone prefers the first bundle to the second—then goods must be redistributed to the dominated bundle. Yet once the bundle is no longer dominated—that is, once at least one individual weakly prefers the previously dominated bundle—redistribution must end. The solidarity solution, in contrast, would continue to redistribute goods until all bundles could be simultaneously chosen. Minimal undominated diversity thus permits less redistribution. Nonetheless, the bundles to which Van Parijs applies minimal undominated diversity are different from those to which the solidarity applies. Undominated diversity applies to comprehensive endowments; the solidarity solution, in contrast, applies to labor-income bundles. Chapter 6 rejects each of Van Parijs’ four justifications for minimal undominated diversity as applied to labor-income bundles.

Fair Pay and the Gender Wage Gap*

Chapter 8 uses the solidarity solution to address the gender wage gap. The chapter first lays to rest a common conservative argument by showing that, even if the gender wage gap were entirely attributable to individual choice, choice alone does not justify inequalities. The chapter then speculates on ways in which the state’s choice of regulatory regime could potentially bias wages in favor of men, resulting in an unfair option set. Finally, after explaining why the solidarity solution does not justify the existing gender wage gap, the chapter concludes by arguing that proponents of pay equity or comparable worth are in fact implicitly relying on the solidarity solution—or something very much like it.

Fleurbaey’s Egalitarian Equivalent Approach

Chapter 7 critiques Marc Fleurbaey’s egalitarian equivalent approach. A distribution is egalitarian equivalent when each individual is indifferent between her actual bundle of goods and a reference bundle that is the same for everyone. This chapter raises three objections to the approach: first, the outcome crucially depends on the choice of reference bundle; second, there is no foolproof argument for a particular reference bundle; and third, any choice of reference bundle inevitably permits dominated bundles. The chapter examines Fleurbaey’s responses to each of the above charges and ultimately concludes that, in contrast to the solidarity solution, the egalitarian equivalent approach lacks a coherent foundation.

A New Criterion of Fairness

Chapter 2 begins with envy-freeness as a possible criterion of fairness and then refines it. A distribution is envy-free when no one prefers someone else’s bundle of goods to her own. Yet eliminating envy is not always possible, and minimizing envy when it cannot be eliminated is not always fair. In response to these problems, this chapter distinguishes two types of envy: personal envy depends on the assignment of bundles; impersonal envy does not. The chapter then argues that the two types of envy are not normatively equivalent: claims based on impersonal envy but not personal envy satisfy the requirement of mutual justifiability. The upshot is a new criterion of fairness: impersonal envy-freeness.

The Task

Chapter 1 introduces the main question of the book: What is a fair income distribution? The empirical literature seems to assume that equal income would be fair. Consider, for example, the Gini coefficient. The reason researchers report the deviation from equality is presumably because they take equal income to have normative significance. Yet the equal income answer faces two objections. First, equal income is likely to be inefficient. This book sets aside efficiency concerns as a downstream consideration. The second objection—pointed out by both leftist political philosopher G. A. Cohen and conservative economist Milton Friedman—is that equal income is unfair to the hardworking. The question that needs answering, then, is: If equal income is unfair, what distribution of income would be fair?

The Labor Auction

Chapter 3 investigates whether a thought experiment proposed—and rejected—by Ronald Dworkin can be used to identify impersonal envy-free labor-income bundles. In the thought experiment, everyone is equally talented and thus free to choose any job. The labor-income bundles that would arise in such a thought experiment would be sensitive to each individual’s choices, but insensitive to each individual’s place in the distribution of natural talents, satisfying Dworkin’s two desiderata of ambition-sensitivity and endowment-insensitivity. Dworkin, however, rejects the thought experiment as unworkable. This chapter clarifies Dworkin’s objection to the thought experiment and then shows that there is, in fact, an easy fix. The revised thought experiment identifies impersonal envy-free labor-income bundles.

Freedom and Taxation

Chapter 9 invokes the solidarity solution to explain why some taxes are morally permissible while others are not. Take, for example, the endowment tax. Unlike the traditional earnings tax based on the individual’s actual income, the endowment tax is based on the individual’s maximum potential income. Although, intuitively, the endowment tax impermissibly interferes with freedom of occupational choice, it is difficult to explain why it impermissibly interferes while other taxes do not. After showing that the well-known attempts of John Rawls, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel fail, chapter 9 puts forward a new solution: the endowment tax is impermissible not because it forecloses more options but rather because it forecloses options to which individuals have a stronger moral claim. The solidarity solution identifies these options.

Dworkin’s Hypothetical Underemployment Insurance

Chapter 5 explains and then rejects Ronald Dworkin’s hypothetical underemployment insurance scheme and the family of views—commonly dubbed luck egalitarianism—it inspired. This chapter argues that Dworkin and his followers were motivated in large part by the idea that it is not unfair for those who work harder to receive more pay. Yet as the chapter shows, Dworkin’s insurance scheme cannot accommodate this intuition, and a similar problem infects the views of Dworkin’s followers. In order to accommodate the intuition, their accounts must be supplemented, and once so supplemented, choice no longer plays a justificatory role. Thus, luck egalitarians must choose: either choice justifies income inequalities but the hard-work intuition cannot be accommodated, or else the hard-work intuition can be accommodated but choice does not justify income inequalities.

Solidarity as a Relational Ideal

Chapter 4 argues that impersonal envy-free labor-income bundles can be derived from a relational ideal. The chapter begins by introducing Elizabeth Anderson’s and Samuel Scheffler’s distinction between relational and distributive egalitarianism. The chapter then proposes the following mutual justifiability requirement: when someone claims that her bundle should be sweetened at someone else’s expense, she must be able to give a reason that an individual standing in the shoes of a free and equal individual who regards everyone else as free and equal could not reasonably reject. Call this the solidarity solution. The chapter concludes by showing that the solidarity solution requires impersonal envy-free labor-income bundles.