Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

2019 ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Laura A. Dickinson
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Tort Liability ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Weapons Systems

The rise of lethal autonomous weapons systems creates numerous problems for legal regimes meant to ensure public accountability for unlawful uses of force. In particular, international humanitarian law has long relied on enforcement through individual criminal responsibility, which is complicated by autonomous weapons that fragment responsibility for decisions to deploy violence. Accordingly, there may often be no human being with the requisite level of intent to trigger individual responsibility under existing doctrine. In response, perhaps international criminal law could be reformed to account for such issues. Or, in the alternative, greater emphasis on other forms of accountability, such as tort liability and state responsibility might be useful supplements. Another form of accountability that often gets overlooked or dismissed as inconsequential is one that could be termed “administrative accountability.” This chapter provides a close look at this type of accountability and its potential.

‘Guilty of Having Been Obedient’

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Sarpong Owusu
Keyword(s):  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
War Crimes Trials ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Abstract One of the most debated subjects among academics and experts in the fields of International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law is the principle of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes. Even more contentious is that aspect of the principle relating to crimes committed under superior orders – a legal strategy employed by many defendants at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. This paper contributes to the debate by establishing the extent to which Article 33 of the Rome Statute, which adopts the conditional liability approach, is justified. The article achieves its objective by critically discussing the subject from a combination of legal, psychological and moral philosophical perspectives. It presents a historical account of the superior orders defence, highlighting how two conflicting liability doctrines, absolute liability and conditional liability, have traditionally been applied by the courts, and taking a stance in favour of the latter. The article, however, underlines some pressing questions that Article 33 raises. It offers a brief exegesis of the emotion of fear to show how it may destroy voluntariness, arguing that as a modifier of voluntariness, grave fear, in certain circumstances, should exculpate perpetrators in claims of crime under superior orders, even where the orders were manifestly unlawful.

The Crime of Indiscriminate Attack and Unlawful Conventional Weapons: The Legacy of the icty Jurisprudence

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ponti
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, which encompasses either ‘indiscriminate attacks’ stricto sensu and the so-called ‘disproportionate attacks’, is at the heart of the law governing the conduct of hostilities, as it aims to implement two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law (ihl), distinction and proportionality. This contribution examines the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty) establishing the individual criminal responsibility for indiscriminate attack. The author considers the possible rationale to illustrate why the icty has never adjudicated neither indiscriminate attacks nor disproportionate attacks per se, as separate, autonomous offences under customary international law. It is submitted that a possible reason to explain the prudency of the icty judges when dealing with the crime of indiscriminate attack is that from an international criminal law perspective it is more than a challenge to apply these ihl principles of distinction and proportionality. The author contends that the icty jurisprudence that practically examined the principle of prohibiting indiscriminate attacks by means of unlawful conventional weapons confirm such difficulties. In particular, because the icty failed to fully clarify to what extent an attack by means of indiscriminate and/or inaccurate weapons violating fundamental principles of the conduct of hostilities, such as distinction and proportionality, may amount to the crime of indiscriminate attack.

scholarly journals Normative Epistemology for Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

2021 ◽  
pp. 237-258
Author(s):  
S. Kate Devitt
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Systems ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Ethical Justification ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
Development Evaluation ◽  
Normative Epistemology ◽  
Weapons Systems

The rise of human-information systems, cybernetic systems, and increasingly autonomous systems requires the application of epistemic frameworks to machines and human-machine teams. This chapter discusses higher-order design principles to guide the design, evaluation, deployment, and iteration of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) based on epistemic models. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Epistemic models consider the role of accuracy, likelihoods, beliefs, competencies, capabilities, context, and luck in the justification of actions and the attribution of knowledge. The aim is not to provide ethical justification for or against LAWS, but to illustrate how epistemological frameworks can be used in conjunction with moral apparatus to guide the design and deployment of future systems. The models discussed in this chapter aim to make Article 36 reviews of LAWS systematic, expedient, and evaluable. A Bayesian virtue epistemology is proposed to enable justified actions under uncertainty that meet the requirements of the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law. Epistemic concepts can provide some of the apparatus to meet explainability and transparency requirements in the development, evaluation, deployment, and review of ethical AI.

‘We Demand Dignity for the Victims’ – Reflections on the Legal Qualification of the Indecent Disposal of Corpses

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 896-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fournet ◽  
Nicole Siller
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Trafficking In Human Beings

‘We demand dignity for the victims’. Such was the pledge of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs following the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight mh17 in rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine and the looting of the corpses of the 298 victims. Although not an isolated instance, the indecent disposal of the corpses of the victims seems to have escaped legal scrutiny. Drawing from this and other case studies, this article addresses the legal qualification of acts of mistreatment perpetrated against the corpses of victims of international crimes. It analyses all relevant dispositions pertaining to international humanitarian law, international criminal law and the law of trafficking in human beings. While these provisions fail to legally characterize such acts, the judiciary however tends to recognize their criminality; a recognition which, in the authors’ views, could make its way into the text of international (criminal) law.

V Omission, in Particular Command Responsibility

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ambos Kai
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
General Principle ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Foundational Work ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility ◽  
General Explanation

This chapter continues the effort of this Volume to combine both comparative legal concepts with unique features of International Criminal Law. It is thus a direct result of the foundational work in Chapter II: International Criminal Law’s focus on individual criminal responsibility leads to an expressive purpose of punishments that again requires a criminalization of remote behavior by commanders and State leaders. This criminalization is based on the centuries old debate revolving around liability for omission. The chapter thus starts with a general explanation of the concept of omission vis-á-vis action. The author answers the question of whether a general omission liability exists in International Criminal Law affirmatively, recognizing a general principle of law, albeit with strict requirements. Drawing on the results from Chapter II, the author argues in favor of a criminalization of omission based on the prevention of harm and the protection of important legal goods/interests. The basis for this criminalization/liability is the respective person’s duty to act.

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