The Publian President in the Twenty-First Century
Many Americans place special emphasis on the arguments presented by James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, under the name “Publius,” in The Federalist. Often, these are presented in the context of debates about “constitutional interpretation,” that is, the best way to give meaning to disputed passages of the U.S. Constitution. And, often, these are linked with “originalist” approaches that give distinctive weight to the views expressed by Publius. One of the central themes of The Federalist is the necessity of creating a strong national government, with potentially “unlimited” powers, sufficient to meet the challenges, often described as “exigencies,” that will inevitably face the nation. Most obvious, of course, are what we would today describe as “national security” challenges. The question is not only the possession of potentially unlimited powers by the national government as an abstract (and complex) entity. Much of the discussion necessarily involves the degree to which one person, that is, the president, should instantiate this basically unlimited power. There is also a question of “constitutional design”: that is, if one recognizes the necessity for occasional “constitutional dictatorships,” does the United States Constitution present a desirable model for such a powerful executive, especially if we take Publius seriously with regard to the ubiquitous presence of political “ambition” attached to institutional power?