No Theory of Justice Can Ground Health Care Reform

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 598-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
Griffin Trotter

The “Father of the United States Constitution,” James Madison, once described justice as “the end” of both government and of civil society. Yet curiously, Madison said little about justice in elaborating the principles of American federalism in The Federalist Papers and elsewhere. His fundamental concerns, to the contrary, were in contriving a system of separated, countervailing powers and in establishing a first federal principle of enumerated powers — in which federal powers “are few, and defined.” This strategy, for Madison, was the most feasible way of checking the innate tendency of political power to accumulate, centralize, and trample on citizens’ liberties.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  

Americans typically view the United States as a democracy and are rightly proud of that. Of course, as those of a more precise nature, along with smug college students enrolled in introductory American government classes, are quick to point out, the United States is technically a republic. This is a bit too clever by half since James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, defined a republic the way most people think of a democracy—a system of representative government with elections: “[The]… difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.” What the framers thought of as democracy is today referred to as direct democracy, the belief that citizens should have more direct control over governing. The Athenian assembly was what the framers, Madison in particular, saw as the paragon of direct democracy—and as quite dangerous. While direct democracy has its champions, most Americans equate democracy with electing officials to do the business of government.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl M. Felice

AbstractThe Federalist Papers are a set of eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay during the founding era of the United States, with the purpose of persuading the states to adopt the Constitution as the replacement for the Articles of Confederation. The Papers were some of the most impressive political writings of the time, and are still cited frequently today by the United States Supreme Court. The arguments set forth in the Papers attempted to defend the Constitution's aristocratic characteristics against its opponents, the Anti-Federalists, while also attempting to normalize an anti-democratic, representative form of government in the minds of the American people. The clever advocacy and skillful rhetoric employed by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay led to the eventual ratification of the Constitution, and consequently the creation of the most powerful and prosperous nation on the planet. This paper examines the differences between the traditional forms of government, the political philosophies of the Papers’ authors, the anti-democratic, aristocratic nature of the government proposed by the Constitution, and the arguments for and against its adoption, as articulated in the Papers and various other writings.


Author(s):  
Sanford Levinson

Many Americans place special emphasis on the arguments presented by James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, under the name “Publius,” in The Federalist. Often, these are presented in the context of debates about “constitutional interpretation,” that is, the best way to give meaning to disputed passages of the U.S. Constitution. And, often, these are linked with “originalist” approaches that give distinctive weight to the views expressed by Publius. One of the central themes of The Federalist is the necessity of creating a strong national government, with potentially “unlimited” powers, sufficient to meet the challenges, often described as “exigencies,” that will inevitably face the nation. Most obvious, of course, are what we would today describe as “national security” challenges. The question is not only the possession of potentially unlimited powers by the national government as an abstract (and complex) entity. Much of the discussion necessarily involves the degree to which one person, that is, the president, should instantiate this basically unlimited power. There is also a question of “constitutional design”: that is, if one recognizes the necessity for occasional “constitutional dictatorships,” does the United States Constitution present a desirable model for such a powerful executive, especially if we take Publius seriously with regard to the ubiquitous presence of political “ambition” attached to institutional power?


1960 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-76
Author(s):  
Herbert J. Spiro

When the American Founding Fathers set about the task of perfecting the constitution of their union, they turned to the theory and practice of the Old World for counsel and illustration. The Federalist Papers contain many references to Hume and Montesquieu, the British Constitution and ancient leagues. However, it was not copying from foreign examples that made such an outstanding success of the Constitution of the United States. Rather it was the authors' imaginative creativity that gave to this oldest of the still operating written constitutions its unique combination of stability and flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency.


Author(s):  
Therese M. Donovan ◽  
Ruth M. Mickey

The “Author Problem” provides a concrete example of Bayesian inference. This chapter draws on work by Frederick Mosteller and David Wallace, who used Bayesian inference to assign authorship for unsigned Federalist Papers. The Federalist Papers were a collection of papers known to be written during the American Revolution. However, some papers were unsigned by the author, resulting in disputed authorship. The chapter provides a very basic Bayesian analysis of the unsigned “Paper 54,” which was written by Alexander Hamilton or James Madison. The example illustrates the principles of Bayesian inference for two competing hypotheses, including the concepts of alternative hypothesis, prior probability distribution, posterior probability distribution, prior probability of a hypothesis, likelihood of the observed data, and posterior probability of a hypothesis.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Antonio Miranda García ◽  
Javier Calle Martín

<em>The Federalist Papers</em> stand out as an excellent proving ground in the field of authorship attribution, being nowadays considered a breaking issue in literary detection. The crucial point of the <em>Federalist Papers</em> is the set of the <em>Disputed Papers</em>, twelve articles traditionally attributed either to Alexander Hamilton or James Madison. This authorial obscurity, together with the existence of undisputed samples, surely explains the proliferation of studies trying to spot the hand responsible for the <em>Disputed Papers</em>, particularly throughout the second half of the 20th century, both with traditional and non-traditional approaches. Since the publication of Mosteller and Wallace’s masterpiece, there has been a consensus as to consider them exclusively Madisonian (Mosteller &amp; Wallace 1963: 300; 1964: 16). Notwithstanding this incessant activity on the <em>Federalist Papers</em> as a test probe for authorial purposes, the use of Burrows’ Delta is still deemed a desideratum in the field, a technique proposing that the salient features which characterize an author’s style can be obtained from the hierarchy of the most common function words (Burrows 2002: 267-87; 2003: 5-32). The present paper then proposes the testing of Burrows’ model in a twofold version: a) modified Delta; and b) simplified Delta. The results come to corroborate the lexical differences between Hamilton and Madison, a fact allowing us to validate the hypothesis of the Madisonian composition of the <em>Disputed Papers</em>, exception being made of Paper 55.


Author(s):  
Francisco Fernández Segado

The first eleven years of the United States Supreme Court show us a plural mosaic of feelings, perhaps even contradictory each other, with regard to the evaluation of the organ and its decisions. The view of a devaluated Court it is the frist feeling. The Circuit riding’s duty of the Supreme Court Justices, the short-lived of its sessions and the reduced number of its opinions are some of the reasons of this devaluation. Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the contents of some decisions, it is possible to change the feelings. Certainly, in this initial stage we don’t find noted cases nor impact opinions, but we think that it’s indisputable that some decisions contributed to the frist forging of the American constitutional system. With regard to the judicial review of the constituonality of the acts passed by Congress, we shall not be so audacious to question the Marbury v. Madison Myth, but we think that Marbury opinion involves only the formal establishment of a doctrine whose theoretical grounds and historical precedents are present not only in the No. LXXVIII of the «Federalist papers» but also in several decisions of the «pre- Marshcall Court» and in different dogmatic expositions of the first stage’s Supreme Court Justices.Los primeros once años del Tribunal Supremo norteamericano nos muestran un plural mosaico de sensaciones, quizá incluso contradictorias, en orden a la calaboración del órgano y sus decisiones. La primera de ellas es la que nos encontramos ante un órgano devaluado. La participación de los Jueces de la Corte Suprema en los Tribunales de Circuito, la corta duración de sus sesiones y el reducido número de sus sentencias, son algunas de las razones de esa devaluación. Sin embargo, si atendemos al contenido de algunas de sus decisiones, las sensaciones pueden llegar a cambiar. Desde luego, en esta etapa inicial del tribunal no nos encontramos con casos célebres ni con decisiones impactantes, pero creemos que es indiscutible, que algunas decisiones contribuyeron a la primera forja del sistema constitucional norteamericno. En relación a la revisión judicial de la constitucionalidad de las leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, no vamos a ser tan atrevidos, como para cuestionar el mito de Marbury v. Madison (1803), pero sí pensamos que la sentencia Marbury entraña tan sólo el establecimineto formal de una doctrina cuyos fundamentos teóricos se hallan presentes no sólo en el Nº LXXVIII del «Federalista», sino también en varias decisiones de la Corte anterior a Marshall y en diferentes planteamientos dogmáticos de los Jueces de esta primera etapa del Tribunal.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document