Introduction

Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

The introductory chapter presents the relevance of the topic in the framework of the practice of international organizations and existing legal scholarship. In particular, it describes how scholars and practitioners do not share a common understanding of what an international organization is and the consequences of this absence of agreement. The main claim is that in order to conceptualize international organizations we have to look at the characteristics of the legal systems they develop and the legal nature of their rules. Four main theses are presented: functionalism (international nature), constitutionalism (internal nature), exceptionalism (only some organizations develop internal rules), and informalism (only some rules have an internal nature). Finally, it sets up the aim of the book: to analyse different conceptualizations, to assess the existence of a general regulatory framework, and to provide a definition of the concept of an international organization in international law.

Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

This chapter summarizes the main findings of the book. The concept of an international organization is defined by looking at the nature of the legal systems they develop. The notion of ‘dual legal nature’ describes how organizations create particular legal systems that derive from international law. This peculiar condition affects the law they produce, which is international and internal at the same time. The effects of the dual legal nature are discussed by analysing international responsibility, the law of treaties, and the validity of organizations’ acts. This conceptualization allows the development of a common legal framework applicable to all international organizations, despite their differences in terms of powers, membership, size, and other descriptive features. In particular, the most valuable consequence of this conceptualization is to rebut a frequent argumentative motif, under which organizations are either perceived as vehicles for member states’ interests or as autonomous entities.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

Despite their exponential growth in number and activities, international law lacks a comprehensive legal concept of an international organization. The book tackles this topic from the perspective of the legal nature of the legal systems developed by international organizations. It is the first comprehensive study of the different concepts under which international organizations’ legal systems are commonly understood: functionalism, constitutionalism, exceptionalism, informalism. It has a threefold purpose: to trace the historical origins of the different concepts of an international organization, to describe four families under which these different notions are subsumed, and to propose a theory which defines international organizations as ‘dual entities’. The concept of an international organization is defined looking at the nature of the legal systems they develop. The notion of ‘dual legal nature’ describes how organizations create particular legal systems that derive from international law. This peculiar condition affects the law they produce, which is international and internal at the same time. This conceptualization allows the development of a common legal framework applicable to all international organizations, despite their differences in terms of powers, membership, size, and other descriptive features. In particular, the most valuable consequence of this conceptualization is to rebut a frequent argumentative motif, under which organizations are either perceived as vehicles for member states’ interests or as autonomous entities. The effects of the dual legal nature are discussed, analysing international responsibility, the law of treaties, and the validity of organizations’ acts.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

This chapter describes the dual legal character of international organizations as discussed in practice and scholarship. It reviews every act mentioned by the International Law Commission in its definition of rules of international organizations: ‘the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of the international organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and established practice of the organization’. Moreover, it also includes agreements with third parties and judicial decisions, which the Commission mentioned only in the commentary to the articles on the responsibility of international organizations. Additionally, it considers general principles and customary law, not mentioned by the Commission but rules of international organizations nonetheless. The purpose is to present a variety of examples in which the dual legal character is either useful to shed new light on traditional debates or already acknowledged by practice and scholarship.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

The final consequence of the dual legal nature discussed in the book concerns the international responsibility of international organizations. In particular, this chapter describes how the absence of a common conceptualization affected the work of the International Law Commission, the International Law Institute, and the International Law Association. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the dual attribution of conduct to an international organization and to its member states. It contends that dual attribution is extremely important in practice and it reviews the cases in which it was at issue. After providing a set of principles on how to apply the dual attribution, it distinguishes between three sets of circumstances: dual attribution via institutional links, dual attribution via factual links, and exclusion of dual attribution when the conduct is attributable to only the organization or its member states. Finally, it discusses the effects of dual attribution in terms of joint responsibility.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3(16)) ◽  
pp. 381-408
Author(s):  
Enis Omerović

The first chapter of the paper elaborates the question of whether one of the constitutive elements of the internationally wrongful act and a precondition for responsibility could be embodied in an existence of damage that has to be inflicted upon participants with international legal personality. In this regards legal doctrine, the arbitral awards, international judgments as well as the works of the UN International Law Commission will be examined, particularly the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations from 2001 and 2011, respectively. An interesting question could be raised concerning the terms used in Law on Responsibility and that is whether there is a difference between damage, injury, and unlawful consequence. Punitive or penal damage and its application in Law on Responsibility will be further assessed. The author will begin its research with the definition of punitive damage, and will further take into consideration international legal doctrine, international arbitral awards, judicial decisions of international courts, decisions of various claims commissions as well as norms of general international law in supporting his hypothesis that international law does not entail reparations for punitive damages. One of the aims of this paper is to indicate the question of whether the existence of punitive damages in international law, if any, be linked to a legal nature of State and international organization responsibility, in the sense that application of punitive damages in international law would support the thesis on the very existence of criminal responsibility of the named subjects of international law? It is interesting to note that the criminal responsibility of states has been abandoned by the removal of Article 19 in the final Draft Articles on Responsibility of States.


Lex Russica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 72-90
Author(s):  
A. S. Gulasaryan

For the first time in the Russian science of international law the author of the paper performs a comprehensive analysis of the legal nature of international energy associations, their role in international administration in the sphere of energy.International energy associations are grouped into four categories depending on their legal nature: 1) associations in the form of public international organizations (IAEA; Eurato/ESAE; OPEC; EES CIS; CECH; EC; FEG; IRENA);2) associations functioning as a body of a public international organization (IEA OECD); 3) associations that can be considered as international non-governmental (transnational) organizations (WEC, IGU, IOC), (4) associations that can be classified as informal international associations (G7/G8; G20; IEF). It is noted that the international energy administration involves not only public international organizations, but also non-legal actors of international relations— international non-governmental(transnational) organizations and informal international associations. In order to determine the legal nature of international energy associations, the author considers constituent instruments, resolutions (decisions), headquarters agreements, agreements regarding privileges and immunities of international organizations, treaties and the contemporary doctrine of international law.Provisions, generalizations and conclusions provided for in the article, can be used for the development of strategies of interaction of the Russian Federation with the above-mentioned associations in the field of energy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Bouwhuis

Whilst the number of international organizations in the world has flourished in recent decades, attempts to analyse them have been hampered by disagreement as to how even to define what is an international organization. The International Law Commission’s recent work on the responsibility of international organizations addresses this absence by providing such a definition. This note tests that definition by applying it to one particular organization, the Commonwealth Secretariat, to see how it applies in practice and concludes with general observations on whether the definition might be used more broadly.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

This chapter presents a novel theory on the concept of an international organization. It discusses the meaning of legal systems in legal pluralism, against the background of the fragmentation of international law and interlegality. It relies on the analytical theory of Hart and the institutionalism of Santi Romano. Two notions are applied to international organizations: relative/absolute legality and original/derived legal systems. The absolute legality of the rules of international organizations is a combination of the derivative nature of the legal system that produces them and the point of view of the legal system in which the rules are implemented. The conclusion is that international organizations are dual entities: ‘international organization means an institution established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and capable of creating a legal system which derives from international law and that produces law which is at the same time internal and international’.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Ahlborn

AbstractThis paper discusses the role of the so-called 'rules of the organization' in the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), as adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on second reading in 2011. Although the rules of the organization occupy a central place in the ARIO, the ILC has decided not to take a “clear-cut view” on their legal nature as either international law or internal law of the organization. This paper argues that the ILC's indecision has left the ARIO with a fluctuating scope of application concerning various provisions such as the attribution of conduct, the breach of an international obligation, the obligation to make reparation, and countermeasures against an international organization. The term of art 'rules of the organization' was developed by the ILC in its work on the law of treaties but has rarely been addressed in legal scholarship. Part 1 therefore first examines the legal nature of the different components of the so-called 'rules of the organization': the constituent instruments, the acts, and the established practice of the organization. While the constituent instruments are contracts between States at the moment of the creation of an international organization, it will be contended that they also operate as constitutions during the life of the organization, giving it the autonomy to create internal law in force between the subjects of its legal order, including its member States. In analysing the ARIO on second reading, Part 2 accordingly suggests reconceiving the rules of the organization as 'internal law' of the organization as long as it functions effectively, so as to appropriately reflect its constitutional autonomy for purposes of international responsibility.


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