Noncompetes

2021 ◽  
pp. 91-114
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Employee covenants not to compete, which bar workers who leave their jobs from working for a competing employer for a period of time, should be subject to heightened antitrust enforcement. While noncompetes may serve legitimate purposes, they also create entry barriers and reduce labor market competition. The threat to competition has been highlighted by new research, which suggests that employers overuse noncompetes and that noncompetes reduce labor market competition. A likely explanation is the inadequacy of the existing legal regime. Antitrust law nominally applies to noncompetes, but courts have eviscerated it by imposing an excessive burden of proof on plaintiffs who challenge noncompetes. An appropriate doctrinal framework for evaluating noncompetes under antitrust law would shift the burden of proof to employers. Employers would be permitted to rebut challenges to their noncompetes only by showing that the noncompetes raise wages for their own workers and workers in the broader labor market.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

In this article, I introduce the interaction between intellectual property(IP) and antitrust law. I describe the ways in which these two importantareas of government regulation are and are not in tension, and discuss thehistory of the relationship between these laws. I argue that IP andantitrust have cycled between over- and under-protection, and that we arecurrently (and mistakenly) conditioned to think of private property andprivate ordering as efficient in and of themselves, rather than asefficient only in the context of robust market competition. Further, Iargue that antitrust can serve the goals of innovation and dynamicefficiency directly in circumstances in which competition, not monopoly,serves as a spur to innovation. The goal of the IP and antitrust lawsshould be to seek a robust balance between competition and monopoly in theservice of dynamic efficiency. When IP laws are strong, antitrust lawsshould also be strong, and vice versa.


2021 ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Employers collude in labor markets in a variety of ways. They fix wages, agree not to poach each other’s workers, and exchange information. They also collude with employees by entering covenants not to compete. All of these actions are anticompetitive and they often violate the antitrust laws, but it is difficult for workers to challenge them in court, and few cases have been successful. When workers challenge covenants not to compete, courts defer to the relatively lax common law standard, under which employers do not pay penalties. And strict antitrust standards developed to address product market cases doom labor market cases, where collusion is both easier for employers and easier to hide from authorities. Regulators and courts should be more attentive to the peculiarities of labor markets and more open to antitrust actions.


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