Controls on Exports of Nuclear Commodities and on Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities

2021 ◽  
pp. 369-388
Author(s):  
Eric L. Hirschhorn ◽  
Brian J. Egan ◽  
Edward J. Krauland
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Regulatory Regimes ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

Chapter 4 covers two related sets of U.S. government controls on nuclear-related items that flow from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. One, administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), covers exports of nuclear hardware and nuclear materials. The other, called “Part 810” and administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy, covers assistance by U.S. persons (including transfers of nuclear-related technology) to foreign nuclear activities. The chapter explains: which items and activities are subject to the NRC and NNSA regulations; the basis and criteria for their restrictions; how to determine whether your commodity or activity is covered and, if so, whether you will need a license to export or reexport it; how to get a license if one is required; and the potential penalties for violating the rules. The chapter also explains how the NRC and NNSA rules relate to the regulatory regimes covered in other parts of the book.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Justification for Elevated Hydrogen Limits in Risk-Based Radioactive Waste Packages

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Elevated Concentration ◽  
Type B ◽  
Hanford Site ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Concentration Limits ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.

Liquid Metal Reactor Regulatory Framework Assessment

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. LaChance ◽  
Felicia A. Duran ◽  
Jesse Phillips ◽  
Robert Bari ◽  
Robert J. Budnitz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Liquid Metal ◽  
Fuel Cycle ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Liquid Metal Reactor ◽  
Available Technology ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

This paper summarizes an assessment of the regulatory framework and requirements for licensing a liquid metal reactor (LMR) for use in transmuting actinides, which was performed for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). Since the LMR designs currently under consideration are sodium-cooled, the assessment identifies and discusses requirements, issues, and topics important to the licensing process in general and those specific to sodium-cooled LMRs, as well as licensing options and associated recommendations. The goal of the regulatory framework assessment was to clarify and evaluate requirements that support the development of safe and cost-effective LMR designs. The scope of the assessment included an analysis of past and present licensing practices as well as an examination of possible future regulatory activities needed to support licensing LMR designs. Because this assessment included the identification of potentially problematic areas, a review of the past LMR licensing efforts was performed. Both technical and regulatory issues were identified and recommendations were made to address important issues. A review of the current regulatory framework for licensing a commercial reactor and the associated licensing schedules was performed as part of the assessment. In addition, specific options proposed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for licensing an LMR were also assessed with regard to their potential impacts on different stakeholders, which include the NRC, DOE, industry, and the public. In addition to the licensing of a commercial LMR, the assessment also identifies and evaluates licensing options for an LMR prototype. The regulatory assessment supports a conclusion that a safe, licensable LMR design is fully feasible. The knowledge applied in the LMR design will be reinforced by past experience and available technology. The licensing of an LMR is expected to be manageable, notwithstanding the uncertainties associated with regulatory, technical, and other issues. With forward-looking planning, effective management, and adequate resources, the process of obtaining a license for an LMR would be greatly facilitated.

scholarly journals Development of U.S. Regulations for the Transportation of Radioactive Materials: A Look Back Over the Past 40 Years

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald S. Hafner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
The Past ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Complex Approach ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

This paper describes an overview of the development of U.S. regulations for the transportation of radioactive materials over the past 40 years. In general, the primary focal points are multifaceted. In particular, however, this rather complex approach has been reduced to two major topical areas: 1) The detailed interactions that have long been in place between the U.S. Regulatory agencies involved, i.e., the older U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission and its more modern counterpart, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the older U.S. Atomic Energy Agency and its more modern counterpart, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and 2) the detailed interactions that have long been in place between the U.S. Regulatory agencies and those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although the primary time period covered in this work will be between 1965 and 2004, some of the discussion, by necessity, dates back to 1958.

scholarly journals Drop Test Results for the Combustion Engineering Model No. ABB-2901 Fuel Pellet Shipping Package

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald S. Hafner ◽  
Gerald C. Mok ◽  
Lisle G. Hagler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Preliminary Test ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Drop Test ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) contracted with the Packaging Review Group (PRG) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to conduct a single, 30-ft shallow-angle drop test on the Combustion Engineering ABB-2901 drum-type shipping package. The purpose of the test was to determine if bolted-ring drum closures could fail during shallow-angle drops. The PRG at LLNL planned the test, and Defense Technologies Engineering Division (DTED) personnel from LLNL’s Site-300 Test Group executed the plan. The test was conducted in November 2001 using the drop-tower facility at LLNL’s Site 300. Two representatives from Westinghouse Electric Company in Columbia, South Carolina (WEC-SC); two USNRC staff members; and three PRG members from LLNL witnessed the preliminary test runs and the final test. The single test clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the bolted-ring drum closure to shallow-angle drops—the test package’s drum closure was easily and totally separated from the drum package. The results of the preliminary test runs and the 30-ft shallow-angle drop test offer valuable qualitative understandings of the shallow-angle impact. • A drum package with a bolted-ring closure may be vulnerable to closure failure by the shallow-angle drop, even if results of the steep-angle drop demonstrate that the package is resistant to similar damage. • Although there exist other mechanisms, the shallow-angle drop produces closure failure mainly by buckling the drum lid and separating the drum lid and body, which the bolted ring cannot prevent. • Since the closure failure by the shallow-angle drop is generated mainly by structural instabilities of a highly discontinuous joint, the phenomenon can be rather unpredictable. Thus, a larger-than-normal margin of safety is recommended for the design of such packages. • The structural integrity of the bolted-ring drum closure design depends on a number of factors. To ensure that the drum closure survives the shallow-angle drop, the following general qualitative rules should be observed: – The drum closure components should be quality products made of ductile materials, and the torque value for tightening the bolted ring should be included in the SAR and operating procedures to ensure quality. – The package should not be too heavy. – The package internal structure should be impact-absorbent and resistant to disintegration and collapse under high compressive load. However, a strong internal structure may defeat the purpose of protecting the containment vessel from damage during a free drop. • If not previously tested, drum packages with bolted-ring drum closures should be drop-tested at shallow angles. Due to the unpredictable nature of the behavior, the demonstration should be completed by test and on a case-by-case basis. The test plan should take into account the behavior’s sensitivity to the details of the package design and the impact condition. • Because the shallow-angle drop can open the drum closure, organizations using these types of drum packages should assess the consequences of exposing the radioactive contents in the containment vessel to unconsidered external elements or conditions. This work was supported by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Department of Energy, and performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48.

scholarly journals Deployment and Operation of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
Dennis B. Miller
Keyword(s):  
National Laboratory ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Oak Ridge ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Transportation Research ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping, for disposition purposes, bulk quantities of fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material since the 1980s. However, the 6M does not conform to the packaging requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the DOE secure transportation system by the end of 2006. BWXT Y-12 developed and licensed the ES-3100 container to replace the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 was certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in April 2006. The process of deploying the new package began in June 2005 and is planned to be completed in July 2006. The package will be fully operational and completely replace the DOT 6M at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) by October 2006. This paper reviews the deployment process and the mock loading station that was installed at National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Specialized equipment, tools, and instrumentation that support the handling and loading operations of the ES-3100 are described in detail. Loading options for other user sites are explored in preparation for deployment of this new state-of-the-art shipping container throughout the DOE complex and the private sector.

Yucca Mountain Project Status

2002 ◽  
Vol 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Kiess ◽  
Stephen H. Hanauer
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Yucca Mountain ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Regulatory Standard ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
High Level ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACTThe Yucca Mountain site was designated in July 2002 as the United States' location for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. This site designation was a watershed event in the history of the project, enabling the U.S. Department of Energy to seek a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct and operate a geologic repository. Summarized below are the history and technical basis for this site designation and some key anticipated future events. Many of the significant events to date have been framed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (and Amendments) and the requirements of the regulatory standard.

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