Yucca Mountain Project Status

2002 ◽  
Vol 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Kiess ◽  
Stephen H. Hanauer

ABSTRACTThe Yucca Mountain site was designated in July 2002 as the United States' location for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. This site designation was a watershed event in the history of the project, enabling the U.S. Department of Energy to seek a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct and operate a geologic repository. Summarized below are the history and technical basis for this site designation and some key anticipated future events. Many of the significant events to date have been framed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (and Amendments) and the requirements of the regulatory standard.

Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.


Author(s):  
Jerry McNeish ◽  
Peter Swift ◽  
Rob Howard ◽  
David Sevougian ◽  
Donald Kalinich ◽  
...  

The development of a deep geologic repository system in the United States has progressed to the preparation of an application for a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The project received site recommendation approval from the U.S. President in early 2002. The next phase of the project involves development of the license application (LA) utilizing the vast body of information accumulated in study of the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Development of the license application involves analyses of the total system performance assessment (TSPA) of the repository, the TSPA-LA. The TSPA includes the available relevant information and model analyses from the various components of the system (e.g., unsaturated geologic zone, engineered system (waste packaging and drift design), and saturated geologic zone) (see Fig. 1 for nominal condition components), and unites that information into a single computer model used for evaluating the potential future performance or degradation of the repository system. The primary regulatory guidance for the repository system is found in 10 CFR 63, which indicates the acceptable risk to future populations from the repository system. The performance analysis must be traceable and transparent, with a defensible basis. The TSPA-LA is being developed utilizing state-of-the-art modeling software and visualization techniques, building on a decade of experience with such analyses. The documentation of the model and the analyses will be developed with transparency and traceability concepts to provide an integrated package for reviewers. The analysis relies on 1000’s of pages of supporting information, and multiple software and process model analyses. The computational environment represents the significant advances in the last 10 years in computer workstations. The overall approach will provide a thorough, transparent compliance analysis for consideration by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in evaluating the Yucca Mountain repository.


2004 ◽  
Vol 824 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Pickett ◽  
William M. Murphy

AbstractWe model preferential release of 237Np, 234U, 230Th, 226Ra, and 210Pb from disposed commercial spent nuclear fuel as a result of alpha recoil damage, using the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Total-system Performance Assessment (TPA) model for the potential repository at Yucca Mountain. Time-dependent augmentation of the ingrown component is simulated by increasing the initial parent inventory; we have used a factor of five increase, based on natural system observations. For 237Np, the magnitude of preferential release is subject to solubility limits. Stochastic TPA runs show a significant effect on modeled dose of preferential 237Np release, but low impact from the other four radionuclides. The mechanism could be ineffective if 237Np is incorporated into secondary phases. While our results are exploratory in nature, this approach to modeling decay-related enhancement of release can be applied in other nuclear waste disposal settings.


Author(s):  
Ronald S. Hafner ◽  
Gerald C. Mok ◽  
Lisle G. Hagler

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) contracted with the Packaging Review Group (PRG) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to conduct a single, 30-ft shallow-angle drop test on the Combustion Engineering ABB-2901 drum-type shipping package. The purpose of the test was to determine if bolted-ring drum closures could fail during shallow-angle drops. The PRG at LLNL planned the test, and Defense Technologies Engineering Division (DTED) personnel from LLNL’s Site-300 Test Group executed the plan. The test was conducted in November 2001 using the drop-tower facility at LLNL’s Site 300. Two representatives from Westinghouse Electric Company in Columbia, South Carolina (WEC-SC); two USNRC staff members; and three PRG members from LLNL witnessed the preliminary test runs and the final test. The single test clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the bolted-ring drum closure to shallow-angle drops—the test package’s drum closure was easily and totally separated from the drum package. The results of the preliminary test runs and the 30-ft shallow-angle drop test offer valuable qualitative understandings of the shallow-angle impact. • A drum package with a bolted-ring closure may be vulnerable to closure failure by the shallow-angle drop, even if results of the steep-angle drop demonstrate that the package is resistant to similar damage. • Although there exist other mechanisms, the shallow-angle drop produces closure failure mainly by buckling the drum lid and separating the drum lid and body, which the bolted ring cannot prevent. • Since the closure failure by the shallow-angle drop is generated mainly by structural instabilities of a highly discontinuous joint, the phenomenon can be rather unpredictable. Thus, a larger-than-normal margin of safety is recommended for the design of such packages. • The structural integrity of the bolted-ring drum closure design depends on a number of factors. To ensure that the drum closure survives the shallow-angle drop, the following general qualitative rules should be observed: – The drum closure components should be quality products made of ductile materials, and the torque value for tightening the bolted ring should be included in the SAR and operating procedures to ensure quality. – The package should not be too heavy. – The package internal structure should be impact-absorbent and resistant to disintegration and collapse under high compressive load. However, a strong internal structure may defeat the purpose of protecting the containment vessel from damage during a free drop. • If not previously tested, drum packages with bolted-ring drum closures should be drop-tested at shallow angles. Due to the unpredictable nature of the behavior, the demonstration should be completed by test and on a case-by-case basis. The test plan should take into account the behavior’s sensitivity to the details of the package design and the impact condition. • Because the shallow-angle drop can open the drum closure, organizations using these types of drum packages should assess the consequences of exposing the radioactive contents in the containment vessel to unconsidered external elements or conditions. This work was supported by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Department of Energy, and performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48.


1995 ◽  
Vol 412 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. H. Pigford

AbstractThe proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive waste needs an official standard to protect the public from release of radioactivity. Standards proposed by the U.S. Congress, the nuclear industry (NEI), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the TYMS Committee of the National Research Council (NRC) are reviewed. Each of these proposals would introduce a degree of leniency not heretofore experienced in radiation protection. No adequate scientific justification is presented. Some scientifically invalid proposals are said to be justified on the grounds of policy. Most leading industrial nations are designing geologic repositories to meet the traditional criteria for safety and for protecting public health, including quantitative calculations of doses for the periods when significant doses can occur, rather than stopping calculations at 10,000 years as many in the U.S. would have us do. There is no evidence that they are seriously seeking more lenient standards for public health protection. The U.S. has the resources and skills to protect future people from our waste with the same care that we now protect the public from radiation. We should assert our will to do so. The Yucca Mountain project will be seriously damaged if it is directed to depart from the traditional conservative criteria for determining safety and protection of public health, criteria that are adopted in other countries working on geologic disposal.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Harold Adkins ◽  
Judith Cuta ◽  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
...  

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, at the interchange known as the “MacArthur Maze.” The accident involved a double tanker truck of gasoline overturning and bursting into flames. The subsequent fire reduced the strength of the supporting steel structure of an overhead interstate roadway causing the collapse of portions of that overpass onto the lower roadway in less than 20 minutes. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has analyzed what might have happened had a spent nuclear fuel transportation package been involved in this accident, to determine if there are any potential regulatory implications of this accident to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper provides a summary of this effort, presents preliminary results and conclusions, and discusses future work related to the NRC’s analysis of the consequences of this type of severe accident.


Author(s):  
William H. Lake ◽  
Nancy Slater-Thompson ◽  
Ned Larson ◽  
Franchone Oshinowo

Technology development activities are being conducted by the Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to support spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transport to the federal repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada in 2010. The paper discusses the motivation for pursuing transport technologies for a private sector operated transportation program, and describes some of the current technologies being pursued.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.


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