Towards a Unified Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Plausible Hypothesis ◽  
Common Sense Morality

This chapter builds towards a wider theory combining a version of common sense morality with a particular rule consequentialist justification. It asks whether the most plausible principles of common sense morality can all be given some further justification, which may appeal to some feature that these principles have in common. On one plausible hypothesis, the best principles of common sense morality are also the principles whose acceptance would on the whole make things go best. We might justifiably accept this hypothesis. The two parts of this theory, furthermore, would achieve more by being combined. Rule consequentialism would be strengthened if this theory supports that seems to be the best version of common sense morality. This version of Common Sense Morality would be similarly strengthened if it can be plausibly supported in this rule consequentialist way.

Parfit’s Reorientation

2021 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Significant Change ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
What Matters

This paper aims to show that between Reasons and Persons and On What Matters the orientation of Derek Parfit’s philosophy underwent a significant change. The approach of Reasons and Persons is largely revisionist, which is exemplified by his reductionist account of personal identity. This account is omitted in On What Matters apparently because it does not fit in with the conciliationist project of this work. The aim of the first two volumes of that work is to show that, on the basis of a non-naturalist theory of normative reasons, three supposedly irreconcilable moral theories—rule-consequentialism, Kantian and Scanlonian contractualism—could converge to form a single Triple Theory. In the third volume, the conciliationist approach is carried further by Parfit’s attempt to show both that his metaethical position is in essential agreement with rivals, such as Gibbard’s expressivism, and to reconcile parts of common-sense morality and consequentialism in order to bring them together in the Triple Theory. This chapter argues that the failure of these attempts as well as the fact that the most controversial revisionist claims in Reasons and Persons are left out throw doubt on the feasibility of Parfit’s conciliationalist undertaking.

Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Kay Nelkin ◽  
Samuel C. Rickless
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
And Control

Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For common-sense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions, even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. People who leave dogs in their car on a hot day or forget to pick something up from the store as they promised seem to be blameworthy. If moral responsibility requires awareness of one’s omission and its moral significance, it appears that the protagonists of these cases are not morally responsible. This chapter considers and rejects a number of influential views on this problem, including a view that grounds responsibility for such omissions in previous exercises of conscious agency, and “Attributionist” views that ground responsibility for such omissions in the value judgments or other aspects of the agents’ selves. The chapter proposes a new tracing view that grounds responsibility for unwitting omissions in past opportunities to avoid them.

Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Common Sense Morality

This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking our promises to them, even when such acts would make things go better. The chapter then turns to deontic and non-deontic badness. These are different kinds of badness, as is shown by cases in which such acts are not wrong, because their non-deontic badness is outweighed by the goodness of their effects. Since these acts would have this intrinsic badness, though they would not be wrong, it could not be their wrongness that made them intrinsically bad.

Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Michael Slote

Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-172
Author(s):  
Dale Jamieson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Michael Slote ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Respect for persons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Moral Requirement ◽  
Race And Gender ◽  
Theoretical Status ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Common Sense Morality

The idea that one should treat persons with due respect is an important part of common sense morality, but opinions differ about when respect is called for, what it requires, and why. Respect for persons is also a central concept in many ethical theories. Some theories even hold respect for persons to be the foundation of all other moral duties and obligations. Respect is distinguished commonly, on one side, from fear and submission, and on another, from admiration, liking and affection. Respect for all persons as such is distinguished normally from esteem or special regard for persons of unusual merit. Some philosophers identify respect with agapē, a special kind of love, but respect is perhaps most often regarded as a distinct attitude that should constrain and complement the promptings of love. Kant, for example, held that the requirements of respect and love are different, though compatible, and that both are dependent upon the more general and fundamental idea that humanity in every person is an end in itself. Other key issues in discussions of respect for persons include: what moral requirement, if any, there is to respect all persons; what the grounds, scope, and theoretical status are of that requirement; whether one can forfeit all claim to respect as a person; what ‘respect for persons’ demands with regard to specific problems, such as conflicts rooted in race and gender differences; and whether there is the same ground and obligation to respect oneself as to respect others.

A Challenge to Common Sense Morality

Ethics ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff McMahan
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism

2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-118
Author(s):  
R. W. BEARDSMORE
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Sense Morality
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