Parfit’s Reorientation

This paper aims to show that between Reasons and Persons and On What Matters the orientation of Derek Parfit’s philosophy underwent a significant change. The approach of Reasons and Persons is largely revisionist, which is exemplified by his reductionist account of personal identity. This account is omitted in On What Matters apparently because it does not fit in with the conciliationist project of this work. The aim of the first two volumes of that work is to show that, on the basis of a non-naturalist theory of normative reasons, three supposedly irreconcilable moral theories—rule-consequentialism, Kantian and Scanlonian contractualism—could converge to form a single Triple Theory. In the third volume, the conciliationist approach is carried further by Parfit’s attempt to show both that his metaethical position is in essential agreement with rivals, such as Gibbard’s expressivism, and to reconcile parts of common-sense morality and consequentialism in order to bring them together in the Triple Theory. This chapter argues that the failure of these attempts as well as the fact that the most controversial revisionist claims in Reasons and Persons are left out throw doubt on the feasibility of Parfit’s conciliationalist undertaking.

Parfit’s Final Arguments in Normative Ethics

Principles and Persons ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192893994.003.0010 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 213-232

Author(s):

Brad Hooker

Keyword(s):

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Normative Ethics ◽

Final Part ◽

The Third ◽

Rule Consequentialism ◽

Final Volume ◽

Act Consequentialism ◽

This paper starts by juxtaposing the normative ethics in the final part of Parfit’s final book, On What Matters, volume iii (2017), with the normative ethics in his earlier books, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters, volume i (2011). The paper then addresses three questions. The first is, where does the reflective-equilibrium methodology that Parfit endorsed in the first volume of On What Matters lead? The second is, is the Act-involving Act Consequentialism that Parfit considers in the final volume of On What Matters as plausible as Rossian deontology? The third is, how is the new argument that Parfit puts forward for Rule Consequentialism supposed to work?

What Matters in Survival

10.1093/oso/9780192894717.001.0001 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Douglas Ehring

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

Special Kind ◽

Error Theory ◽

Normative Reason ◽

Normative Reasons ◽

Motivating Reasons ◽

What Matters In Survival ◽

Extreme View ◽

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

Utilitas ◽

10.1017/s0953820820000126 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 32 (4) ◽

pp. 416-426

Author(s):

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽

Peter Singer

Keyword(s):

Derek Parfit ◽

The Third ◽

Rule Consequentialism ◽

Limited Success ◽

Act Consequentialism ◽

AbstractIn the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

Towards a Unified Theory

10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0023 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Derek Parfit

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

Unified Theory ◽

Rule Consequentialism ◽

Plausible Hypothesis ◽

This chapter builds towards a wider theory combining a version of common sense morality with a particular rule consequentialist justification. It asks whether the most plausible principles of common sense morality can all be given some further justification, which may appeal to some feature that these principles have in common. On one plausible hypothesis, the best principles of common sense morality are also the principles whose acceptance would on the whole make things go best. We might justifiably accept this hypothesis. The two parts of this theory, furthermore, would achieve more by being combined. Rule consequentialism would be strengthened if this theory supports that seems to be the best version of common sense morality. This version of Common Sense Morality would be similarly strengthened if it can be plausibly supported in this rule consequentialist way.

Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions

10.1093/oso/9780190683450.003.0006 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Dana Kay Nelkin ◽

Samuel C. Rickless

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Common Sense ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Moral Significance ◽

Common Sense Morality ◽

And Control

Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For common-sense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions, even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. People who leave dogs in their car on a hot day or forget to pick something up from the store as they promised seem to be blameworthy. If moral responsibility requires awareness of one’s omission and its moral significance, it appears that the protagonists of these cases are not morally responsible. This chapter considers and rejects a number of influential views on this problem, including a view that grounds responsibility for such omissions in previous exercises of conscious agency, and “Attributionist” views that ground responsibility for such omissions in the value judgments or other aspects of the agents’ selves. The chapter proposes a new tracing view that grounds responsibility for unwitting omissions in past opportunities to avoid them.

Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality

10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0022 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Derek Parfit

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

Act Consequentialism ◽

This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking our promises to them, even when such acts would make things go better. The chapter then turns to deontic and non-deontic badness. These are different kinds of badness, as is shown by cases in which such acts are not wrong, because their non-deontic badness is outweighed by the goodness of their effects. Since these acts would have this intrinsic badness, though they would not be wrong, it could not be their wrongness that made them intrinsically bad.

Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Michael Slote

Ethics ◽

10.1086/292923 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 98 (1) ◽

pp. 168-172

Author(s):

Dale Jamieson

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

Michael Slote ◽

Placebos and Movies: What Do They Have in Common?

Current Directions in Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/09637214211003892 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 096372142110038

Author(s):

Fabrizio Benedetti

Keyword(s):

Everyday Life ◽

Common Sense ◽

Placebo Effect ◽

Psychological Factors ◽

General Framework ◽

Physiological Responses ◽

Therapeutic Effects ◽

Physiological Effects ◽

Placebo Effects ◽

Placebos are fake therapies that can induce real therapeutic effects, called placebo effects. It goes without saying that what matters for inducing a placebo effect is not so much the fake treatment itself, but rather the therapeutic ritual that is carried out, which is capable of triggering psychobiological mechanisms in the patient’s brain. Both laypersons and scientists often accept the phenomenon of the placebo effect with reluctance, as fiction-induced clinical improvements are at odds with common sense. However, it should be emphasized that placebo effects are not surprising after all if one considers that fiction-induced physiological effects occur in everyday life. Movies provide one of the best examples of how fictitious reality can induce psychological and physiological responses, such as fear, love, and tears. In the same way that a horror movie induces fear-related physiological responses, even though the viewer knows everything is fake, so the sight of a syringe may trigger the release of pain-relieving chemicals in the patient’s brain, even if the patient knows there is a fake painkiller inside. From this perspective, placebos can be better conceptualized as rituals, actions, and fictions within a more general framework that emphasizes the power of psychological factors in everyday life, including the healing context.

NOT SO PROMISING AFTER ALL: EVALUATOR-RELATIVE TELEOLOGY AND COMMON-SENSE MORALITY

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ◽

10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00265.x ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 87 (3) ◽

pp. 348-356 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

MARK SCHROEDER

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

I dropped a big stone on the water snake… Poetic and the Folk Image of a SNAKE

Vilnius University Open Series ◽

10.15388/vllp.2021.23 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 375-387

Author(s):

Magdalena Wołoszyn

Keyword(s):

Common Sense ◽

Folk Culture ◽

The Third ◽

Cultural Image ◽

Water Snake ◽

Polish Language ◽

Lyrical Subject ◽

Poetic Creation ◽

The Guardian ◽

Living Creature

The aim of the article is to reconstruct the linguistic and cultural image of the snake in Polish language and Polish folk culture, functioning within three different but complementary genre-based models: (a) mythological, which echoes are present in belief stories, records of beliefs, and descriptions of practices; (b) biblical (religious), Judeo-Christian, settled in aytiological legends, wedding speeches, religious and historical songs (c) colloquial (common sense), confirmed mainly in colloquial phraseology. In the first model, the snake appears as the guardian of the house and the enclosure, a living creature, friendly to people and animals, whose presence ensures happiness and prosperity; in the second – the serpent is a symbol of evil, sin and Satan; in the third, the most stabilized features of the snake are: wisdom, prudence, but the most of all cunning and sly. The features that emerge especially from the mythological and religious model are the basis for the interpretation of the poetic creation of a snake from Czesław Miłosz’s poem Rue Descartes, in which the lyrical subject combines all evil that has happened to him in his life with in breaking of the ban and just punishment for killing a water snake coiled in the grass.