With Power Comes Responsibility

Reasoning ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 178-202
Author(s):  
Magdalena Balcerak Jackson ◽  
Brendan Balcerak Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Rational Status

Philosophers often take it for granted that the requirements of rationality are universal, that whatever rationality requires of a subject’s reasoning is exactly what it would require of any other subject’s reasoning. This is plausible for some requirements: we all ought to respect modus ponens in our reasoning, for example. However, this chapter argues that many important cases are not like this. These are cases where the rational status of one’s reasoning depends on whether one has a certain cognitive capacity that one is in a position to exercise. The reasoning of one thinker who has a certain cognitive capacity can be rationally appropriate, while the exact same reasoning would not be rationally appropriate for subjects who lack that capacity. If this is correct then what rationality requires of a thinker depends (in part) on what cognitive capacities she possesses. Certain cognitive powers bring with them certain distinctive rational responsibilities.

Cognitive Impairment after Small-dose Ketamine Isomers in Comparison to Equianalgesic Racemic Ketamine in Human Volunteers

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst G. Pfenninger ◽  
Marcel E. Durieux ◽  
Sabine Himmelseher
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Impairment ◽  
Small Dose ◽  
Primary Memory ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Test Time ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Study Objective ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Brain Functions ◽  
Racemic Ketamine

Background Ketamine is increasingly used in pain therapy but may impair brain functions. Mood and cognitive capacities were compared after equianalgesic small-dose S(+)-, R(-)-, and racemic ketamine in healthy volunteers. Methods Twenty-four subjects received intravenous 0.5 mg/kg racemic, 0.25 mg/kg S(+)-, and 1.0 mg/kg R(-)-ketamine in a prospective, randomized, double-blind, crossover study. Hemodynamic variables, mood, and cognitive capacities were assessed for 60 min. Results Transient increases in blood pressure, heart rate, and catecholamines were similar after administration of all drugs. At 20 min after injection, subjects felt less decline in concentration and were more brave after S(+)- than racemic ketamine. They reported being less lethargic but more out-of-control after R(-)- than racemic ketamine. Ketamine isomers induced less drowsiness, less lethargy, and less impairment in clustered subjective cognitive capacity than racemic ketamine for the 60-min study. Objective concentration capacity [test time, S(+): 25.4 +/- 15.2 s, R(-): 34.8 +/- 18.4 s, racemic ketamine: 40.8 +/- 20.8 s, mean +/- SD] and retention in primary memory [test time, S(+): 4.6 +/- 1.2 s, R(-): 4.2 +/- 1.4 s, racemic ketamine: 4.0 +/- 1.4 s, mean +/- SD] declined less after S(+)- than either R(-)- or racemic ketamine at 1 min. At 5 min, immediate recall, anterograde amnesia, retention in primary memory, short-term storage capacity, and intelligence quotient were less reduced after the isomers than racemic ketamine. Speed reading and central information flow decreased less after S(+)- than racemic ketamine. Conclusions Early after injection, ketamine isomers induce less tiredness and cognitive impairment than equianalgesic small-dose racemic ketamine. In addition, S(+)-ketamine causes less decline in concentration capacity and primary memory. The differences in drug effects cannot be explained by stereoselective action on one given receptor.

scholarly journals Bridging Connectionism and Relational Cognition through Bi-directional Affective-Associative Processing

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Lowe ◽  
Alexander Almér ◽  
Christian Balkenius
Keyword(s):  
Associative Learning ◽  
Real World ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Affective Processing ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Learning Capabilities ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Fully Connected ◽  
System 1

Abstract Connectionist architectures constitute a popular method for modelling animal associative learning processes in order to glean insights into the formation of cognitive capacities. Such approaches (based on purely feedforward activity) are considered limited in their ability to capture relational cognitive capacities. Pavlovian learning value-based models, being not based purely on fully connected feedforward structure, have demonstrated learning capabilities that often mimic those of ‘higher’ relational cognition. Capturing data using such models often reveals how associative mechanisms can exploit structure in the experimental setting, so that ‘explicit’ relational cognitive capacities are not, in fact, required. On the other hand, models of relational cognition, implemented as neural networks, permit formation and retrieval of relational representations of varying levels of complexity. The flexible processing capacities of such models are, however, are subject to constraints as to how offline relational versus online (real-time, real-world) processing may be mediated. In the current article, we review the potential for building a connectionist-relational cognitive architecture with reference to the representational rank view of cognitive capacity put forward by Halford et al. Through interfacing system 1-like (connectionist/associative learning) and system 2-like (relational-cognition) computations through a bidirectional affective processing approach, continuity between Halford et al’s cognitive systems may be operationalized according to real world/online constraints. By addressing i) and ii) in this manner, this paper puts forward a testable unifying framework for system 1-like and system 2-like cognition.

How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Thinking ◽  
Moral Stance

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

Boosting the Cognitive Capacity and Mental Health of Working Australians

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Borness ◽  
Judith Proudfoot ◽  
Susan Miller ◽  
Michael Valenzuela
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Cognitive Capacity

Hilbert-style proof Calculus for Propositional Logic in ABC notation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matheus Pereira Lobo
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Inference Rule ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Axiomatic System ◽  
First Contact

All nine axioms and a single inference rule of logic (Modus Ponens) within the Hilbert axiomatic system are presented using capital letters (ABC) in order to familiarize the beginner student in hers/his first contact with the topic.

Numerical Formats within Risk Disclosures and the Moderating Effect of Investors' Concerns about Management Discretion

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 1149-1168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark W. Nelson ◽  
Kathy K. Rupar
Keyword(s):  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Persuasion Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Model ◽  
Accounting Disclosures ◽  
Financial Disclosures ◽  
Risk Judgments ◽  
Risk Disclosures

ABSTRACT We report the results of two experiments that provide evidence that investors' risk judgments are affected by the numerical format used to describe outcomes within accounting disclosures. Consistent with prior research in psychology, investors assess higher risk in response to dollar-formatted disclosures than to equivalent percentage-formatted disclosures. Consistent with the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994), this effect is moderated when investors have both (1) awareness that management has discretion over format, and (2) sufficient cognitive capacity to consider its implications. Our results provide insight about the effects of current disclosure formats and suggest implications for managers who choose formats, investors who interpret formatted information, and regulators who consider whether to further prescribe the formats that are used in financial disclosures.

Concluding Summary

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carrie Figdor
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Conceptual Foundation ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Research ◽  
Internal And External Factors ◽  
Conceptual Confusion

Chapter 10 provides a summary of the argument of the book. It elaborates some of the benefits of Literalism, such as less conceptual confusion and an expanded range of entities for research that might illuminate human cognition. It motivates distinguishing the questions of whether something has a cognitive capacity from whether it is intuitively like us. It provides a conceptual foundation for the social sciences appropriate for the increasing role of modeling in these sciences. It also promotes convergence in terms of the roles of internal and external factors in explaining both human and nonhuman behavior. Finally, it sketches some of the areas of new research that it supports, including group cognition and artificial intelligence.

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