Financial Assistance to Non-Euro Area Member States

Author(s):  
Alexander Thiele

The historic financial crisis that began on the American housing market in 2007 and from there spread all over the globe had tremendous consequences for more or less every country worldwide, especially for their respective public finances. The overall public debt level skyrocketed due to the substantial economic downfall and the necessity to bail out hundreds of financial institutions that had suffered severe losses when the American subprime market collapsed and the money markets froze. Though the States were (with tremendous help by the European Central Bank) finally successful in preventing a complete breakdown of the major financial markets, their intervention left the national budgets and the balance of payments (BOP) of several of them in a devastating condition with insolvencies only being averted by massive external and mainly financial assistance by other States and institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). Some of these states facing such a financial calamity were Member States of the European Union (EU)—a fact having an important normative implication: Other Member States wanting to help financially were bound by the normative framework of the European Union Treaties. And the same was obviously true for the European Union itself where it wanted to initiate any form of (financial) assistance.

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 43-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

On 1 may 2004, 10 new Member States joined the European Union. This meant inter alia that, save for the express derogations provided for in the Act of Accession, the entire mass of Community secondary legislation became binding in the new Member States. This principle of the immediate effects of Community law in the new Member States was provided for in Article 2 AA: From the date of Accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions and the European Central Bank before Accession shall be binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in this Act.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
Michał Wielechowski

The aim of this article is the presentation and the attempt to analyse such phenomena as: an excessive general government deficit and public debt in EU Member States over the past 3 years. For the European Union the years 2008-2010 were the time when public finances of most member countries worsened dramatically. The average budget deficit in the EU increased during that period to a value of almost 7% compared to gross domestic product and public debt reached almost 80% of GDP. Referring the numbers to the principles of the budgetary policy in the Treaty on the European Union (the deficit should not exceed 3% in relation to GDP and public debt – 60% of GDP), the observance of budgetary discipline has been significantly violated. In consequence, the excessive deficit procedure has been initiated. in relation to almost all the countries of the EU, Its purpose was to force the member countries to take concrete actions to stabilize public finances. The economic crisis that began in the second half of 2007 in the United States of America which resulted in a significant deterioration of the finances of all the EU member countries might be regarded as the major source of violation of their budgetary discipline. The reactions of most governments TO the harmful effects caused by the financial crisis were to stimulate national economies and stem the decline of domestic demand. The higher level of public expenditures was simultaneously the cause of increased budget deficits,. To develop and present the problem of an excessive budget deficit and public debt in the EU countries some statistical methods were used and the data source statistics were mainly carried out by the European Commission and the European Statistical Office.


Author(s):  
Mónica Arenas Ramiro

Si bien la crisis económica que estamos viviendo afecta a todos los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, la manera de afrontarla de unos y otros varía considerablemente, sin que en ninguno de los casos parezcan producirse resultados óptimos. Por este motivo, desde la propia Unión, ante el peligro de que la ruptura económica y monetaria se produzca, se ha orientado el proceso de estabilidad fiscal aconsejando a sus Estados miembros introducir un límite al gasto público en sus textos constitucionales. Esta solución, adoptada por algunos países como Alemania, Francia, o España, ha sido recibida con cierta suspicacia y con pocas esperanzas. No obstante, este freno al endeudamiento público, esta «regla de oro fiscal», fue ya constitucionalizada por Suiza en el 2001 y los resultados son verdaderamente positivos. Su experiencia, y la semejanza con nuestra forma de organización territorial, puede arrojar un poco de luz a las medidas hasta ahora adoptadas.While the economic crisis affects all Member States in the European Union, the way to resist it varies considerably from each others, and nobody have the optimal results. For this reason, from the European Union faced with the danger of economic and monetary breakdown, has guided the process of fiscal stability recomending its Member States to introduce a debt brake in their national Constitutions. The solution adopted by countries like Germany, France, or Spain, has been greeted with suspicion and without hope. However, the public debt brake —the «financial golden rule»— was already constitutionalized by Switzerland in 2001 and the results were truly positive. His experience may shed some light on our steps.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 43-80
Author(s):  
Michal Bobek

On 1 may 2004, 10 new Member States joined the European Union. This meant inter alia that, save for the express derogations provided for in the Act of Accession, the entire mass of Community secondary legislation became binding in the new Member States. This principle of the immediate effects of Community law in the new Member States was provided for in Article 2 AA: From the date of Accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions and the European Central Bank before Accession shall be binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in this Act.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Marcello Barison

Starting from Michel Foucault?s considerations dedicated to economic knowledge (especially in Il faut d?fendre la soci?t? and Naissance de la biopolitique), this paper is about setting up a possible theoretical framework in which to situate the relationship between political power and neoliberalism as they appear in their modern articulation, analyzing in depth how international governmental organizations - such as, for example, the European Central Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund - are involved in this process.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-82
Author(s):  
Urszula Kosterna

The fiscal policy framework in the European Union was originally agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty 30 years ago. In the following years it has been supplemented (Stability and Growth Pact) and modified, influenced by the experience of its application practice and external shocks, such as the financial crisis. However, the essence of this framework remained the same - member states are obliged to conduct a disciplined fiscal policy, which, in a nutshell, is assessed by comparing the ratio of budget deficit and public debt to GDP in a given country to the reference values. Even before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the need to change the mechanisms for disciplining fiscal policy was widely recognized. High and persistent levels of public debt, pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, shortage of public investment and the complexity of fiscal rules and their weak enforceability are indicated as unfavorable features of public finance. In 2019 the COVID-19 pandemic came as the biggest shock to the world community since World War II. In the context of the provisions on fiscal discipline, in May 2020 the Commission and the Council activated the general escape clause of Stability and Growth Pact, for the first time ever. This has allowed member states to take the necessary fiscal measures to deal with the crisis. On 19 October 2021, the European Commission adopted a Communication relaunching the public consultation, put on hold in March 2020, on the EU?s economic governance framework. The new governance framework should be tailored to the challenges the EU is facing, including the challenge of achieving a fiscal stance that is appropriate for the euro area as a whole.  There is a fairly widespread belief in the need to move away from rigid reference values, which should be replaced by solutions that ensure the sustainability of public debt in the differing circumstances of member states. The proposed options for the revision of the EU fiscal framework, although justified in theory, have a fundamental flaw - they strengthen the position of supranational institutions and, moreover, open the door to discretion and potentially unequal treatment of member states. These proposals can be seen in a broader context - the federalization of the EU, which would limit the sovereignty of nation states.


10.26458/1636 ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Elena DASCALU

This article is an analysis of public debt, in terms of sustainability and vulnerability indicators, under a functioning market economy. The problems encountered regarding the high level of public debt or the potential risks of budgetary pressure converge to the idea that sustainability of public finances should be a major challenge for public policy.Thus, the policy adequate to address public finance sustainability must have as its starting point the overall strategy of the European Union, as well as the economic development of Member States, focusing on the most important performance components, namely, reducing public debt levels, increasing productivity and employment and, last but not the least, reforming social security systems. In order to achieve sustainable levels of public debt, the European Union Member States are required to establish and accomplish medium term strategic budgetary goals to ensure a downward trend in public debt.


Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima

Article 232 EC Should the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the European Central Bank, in infringement of the Treaties, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Union may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement established. This Article shall apply, under the same conditions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the Union which fail to act.


Author(s):  
Marcus Klamert

Article 291 EC The Union shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of its tasks, under the conditions laid down in the Protocol of 8 April 1965 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union. The same shall apply to the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-105
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kusztykiewicz-Fedurek

Political security is very often considered through the prism of individual states. In the scholar literature in-depth analyses of this kind of security are rarely encountered in the context of international entities that these countries integrate. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to key aspects of political security in the European Union (EU) Member States. The EU as a supranational organisation, gathering Member States first, ensures the stability of the EU as a whole, and secondly, it ensures that Member States respect common values and principles. Additionally, the EU institutions focus on ensuring the proper functioning of the Eurozone (also called officially “euro area” in EU regulations). Actions that may have a negative impact on the level of the EU’s political security include the boycott of establishing new institutions conducive to the peaceful coexistence and development of states. These threats seem to have a significant impact on the situation in the EU in the face of the proposed (and not accepted by Member States not belonging to the Eurogroup) Eurozone reforms concerning, inter alia, appointment of the Minister of Economy and Finance and the creation of a new institution - the European Monetary Fund.


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