Internal Difficulties in Defending the Method of Cases, and the Claim of Continuity

Author(s):  
Avner Baz

The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of cases in its traditional, “armchair” form, against the “cognitive diversity” and “calibration” objections. The aim of the chapter is to continue the work of Chapter One of exposing the internal difficulties that have presented themselves for those wishing to defend the method, and to begin to work toward establishing the book’s basic contention that the method of cases rests on substantive and (therefore) challengeable presuppositions about language. More specifically, the chapter argues that Williamson’s and Cappelen’s defense of the method rests entirely on the claim of continuity between our employment of words outside philosophy and what we do with them when we ask the theorist’s questions and give our answers to them.

Author(s):  
Avner Baz

The chapter argues that empirical studies of first-language acquisition lend support to the Wittgensteinian-Merleau-Pontian conception of language as against the prevailing conception that underwrites the method of cases in either its armchair or experimental version. It offers a non-representationalist model, inspired by the work of Michael Tomasello, for the acquisition of “knowledge,” with the aim of showing that we could fully account for the acquisition of this and other philosophically troublesome words without positing independently existing “items” to which these words refer. The chapter also aims at bringing out and underscoring the striking fact that, whereas many in contemporary analytic philosophy regard and present themselves as open and attentive to empirical science, they have often relied on a conception of language that has been supported by no empirical evidence.


Author(s):  
Edouard Machery

Chapter 6 examines the implications of Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism for modally immodest philosophizing (that is, philosophizing that requires knowledge of metaphysical necessities): Modally immodest issues should be dismissed and philosophy reoriented. Alternatives to the method of cases are critically examined: We cannot gain the required modal knowledge by relying on intuition, by analyzing the meaning of philosophically significant words, and by appealing to alleged theoretical virtues like simplicity, generality, and elegance to choose between philosophical views. Alternative conceptions of philosophy are too deflationary to be satisfying, particularly because there is much philosophizing left once philosophy is reoriented.


Author(s):  
Edouard Machery

Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.


Author(s):  
Edouard Machery

Chapter 3 examines one of the two concerns often brought up against the method of cases: The judgments elicited by cases seem epistemically deficient. This concern is captured by the first argument against the method of cases, which I call “Unreliability”: Cases currently used in philosophy as well as those cases that would be particularly useful for some central philosophical purposes are likely to elicit unreliable judgments. Judgments elicited by typical philosophical cases are similar to experimental artifacts—outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not due to the phenomena experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them. That is, they often are “cognitive artifacts.” Chapter 3 concludes that we ought to suspend judgment when confronted with a philosophical case.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Nadežda Jankelová ◽  
Zuzana Joniaková ◽  
Juraj Mišún

The aim of our paper is to examine whether the support of innovative work behavior by management is positively related to business performance and at the same time, whether this relationship is mediated by the teamwork climate and cognitive diversity of teams. Cognitive diversity is defined as differences in knowledge and perspective, which arise from professional diversity and account for its positive effects. A teamwork climate represents staff perceptions of collaboration between personnel. Business performance is defined by the level of sales. Our sample consisted of 211 managers of companies operating in Slovakia, and data collection took place in the form of a questionnaire. The main tool for examining the mechanism of operation of the investigated relationships is mediation using regression analysis and the Sobel test to determine the significance of the indirect effect of mediation variables. The findings point to a significant direct relationship between the innovative work behavior of company employees and business performance. The intensity of this relationship can be partly influenced by promoting cognitive diversity, especially in the area of knowledge and ways of thinking. The significant role of a teamwork climate was not demonstrated in the examined model.


Author(s):  
Avner Baz

The article presents, clarifies, defends, and shows the contemporary relevance of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as a general approach to the understanding and dissolution of at least very many traditional and contemporary philosophical difficulties. The first section broadly characterizes OLP, points out its anticipation in Immanuel Kant’s dissolution of metaphysical impasses in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, and then shows its contemporary relevance by bringing its perspective to bear on the recent debates concerning the philosophical ‘method of cases’. The second section responds to a series of common objections to, and misunderstandings of, OLP.


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