Virtues in Scientific Practice*

This chapter relocates the debate about the theoretical virtues to the empirical level and argues that the question of whether the virtues (and what virtues, if any) have epistemic import is best answered empirically, through an examination of actual scientific theories and hypotheses in the history of science. As a concrete example of this approach, the chapter discusses a case study from the mid-nineteenth-century debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. It argues that this case shows that the virtues are at least sometimes epistemic, but also that neither scientific realists nor anti-realists get it quite right: the virtues, even if epistemic, are not necessarily truth-conducive, but neither are they merely pragmatic. It also argues that the discussion of puerperal fever shows that the virtue question, as it is currently featured in the scientific realism debate, ought to be reformulated. We should examine not just whether a given scientific theory has virtues or not, but rather how debates among competing theories, all of which have some virtues, get resolved.

Scientific Realism and Further Underdetermination Challenges

In an earlier article on this journal I argued that the problem of empirical underdetermination can for the largest part be solved by theoretical virtues, and for the remaining part it can be tolerated. Here I confront two further challenges to scientific realism based on underdetermination. First, there are four classes of theories which may seem to be underdetermined even by theoretical virtues. Concerning them I argue that (i) theories produced by trivial permutations and (ii) “equivalent descriptions” are compatible with the truth of standard theories; instead (iii) “as if” versions of standard theories are much worse from the point of view of theoretical virtues; finally (iv) mathematically intertranslatable theories either may become empirically decidable in the future, or can be discriminated by theoretical virtues, or realists may simply plead ignorance about their claims. Secondly, I consider Stanford’s underdetermination with respect unconceived alternatives, arguing that it essentially relies on the pessimistic meta-induction from the falsity of all past theories. Therefore, it can be resisted by (a) considering the radical advancement of present with respect to past science, and (b) arguing with selective realism that past successful theories, even if false, always included some true components.

What do climate change winners owe, and to whom?

Climate ethics have been concerned with polluter pays, beneficiary pays and ability to pay principles, all of which consider climate change as a single negative externality. This paper considers it as a constellation of externalities, positive and negative, with different associated demands of justice. This is important because explicitly considering positive externalities has not to our knowledge been done in the climate ethics literature. Specifically, it is argued that those who enjoy passive gains from climate change owe gains not to the net losers, but to the emitters, just as the emitters owe compensation to the net losers for the negative externality. This is defended by appeal to theoretical virtues and to the social benefits of generating positive externalities, even when those positive externalities are coupled with far greater negative externalities. We call this the Polluter Pays, Then Receives (‘PPTR', or ‘Peter') Principle.

The Epistemic Dignity of Knowledge Developed Through Nursing Practice

In this article, I revisit a philosophical idea from Intermodernism about generating knowledge through nursing practice and examine how this may enhance the epistemic dignity of knowledge. Epistemic dignity is an evaluation of knowledge (formalized in theories) as possessing quality and worth as scientific knowledge and as held in esteem by a disciplinary community and others. The philosophical turn toward the practice of science is discussed along with contemporary work on theoretical virtues as qualities of scientific theory. In addition, I suggest that what we may refer to as uniquely nursing knowledge is knowledge that is generated through nursing practice and ground in disciplinary perspective.

Competition, Technocracy and Inequality

The article present a brief analyze of theoretical virtues of free competition in relation with some visible limits and negative consequences observed in real economic life. Social intervention to correct (at least in part) those social failures and the new responses of the firms are discussed too. Possible motivations of these new actions are presented in connection with technocratic model of firm management. It seems that the model of professionalization of firm leadership created not only a new structure within the category of the intermediaries (one with extremely high powers), but later generated new interests typical for a social category. The intermediary develops his own agenda and seeks to control not only the market but also the business owners (which is possible in the conditions of the fragmentation of the large property). They have the power to distort and undermine normal competition (or at least to try it) and that conduct to some practices at legal and ethical borderline.

The Facts of the Matter

This chapter concerns the status of the conventionalist theory developed, argued for, and defended throughout the book. It begins by discussing the views that historical conventionalists had about their own conventionalist theories and addresses a recent controversy about whether Carnap was truly a conventionalist. The chapter then argues that conventionalism is the best explanation of the logical and mathematical facts, assessing it according to a number of different theoretical virtues. Then two metaobjections are considered, one based on philosophical progress, and the other based on peer disagreement. Despite the chapter’s defense of conventionalism, it ends by expressing some very personal doubts.

Theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition

Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.

Theoretical Virtues in Science

A theoretical virtue in science is a property of a scientific theory that is considered desirable. Standard theoretical virtues include testability, empirical accuracy, simplicity, unification, consistency, coherence, and fertility. First highlighted by Thomas S. Kuhn in a seminal paper in 1977, theoretical virtues have come to play an important role in a number of philosophical debates. A central bone of contention in many of these debates is whether theoretical virtues are epistemic, i.e., whether they are indicative of a theory’s correctness, or whether they are just pragmatic, concerning only the convenient use of a theory. Particularly contested virtues are simplicity and unifying power. In the scientific realism debate, in which philosophers argue about whether or not scientific theories allow us to uncover the reality behind the phenomena, scientific realists have argued that virtuous theories are more likely to be correct than a less virtuous ones, even when they accommodate the same data. In the closely related debate about the so-called Inference to the Best Explanation, realists have argued that not only can we determine the best explanation on the basis of its virtues, but we can also determine which explanation is the true one. In discussions about “theory choice” or “theory appraisal,” philosophers discuss which virtues might be most decisive in scientists’ deliberations about which theory they should adopt. Here a theory’s successful novel predictions, or novel successes for short, have been a particular focus. Philosophers have also discussed possible trade-offs between various virtues and the difficulties which these may pose for theory choice. Samir Okasha has argued recently that there cannot be any rational algorithm for theory choice. Theoretical virtues also play a role in philosophical accounts of the laws of nature. One extremely prominent account, namely David Lewis’ Best System Analysis, appeals to simplicity and unifying power to determine what generalizations qualify as genuine laws of nature (rather than just accidentally true generalizations). Even in philosophical theorizing about science, theoretical virtues have been appealed to: Rudolf Carnap believed that simplicity and fruitfulness were important desiderata guiding the explication of scientific concepts. Finally, psychologists have started to investigate the role of theoretical virtues in picking explanations. There is work that appears to show that children and adults have preferences for simple and broad theories.