Modal Ignorance and the Limits of Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Theoretical Virtues ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 6 examines the implications of Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism for modally immodest philosophizing (that is, philosophizing that requires knowledge of metaphysical necessities): Modally immodest issues should be dismissed and philosophy reoriented. Alternatives to the method of cases are critically examined: We cannot gain the required modal knowledge by relying on intuition, by analyzing the meaning of philosophically significant words, and by appealing to alleged theoretical virtues like simplicity, generality, and elegance to choose between philosophical views. Alternative conceptions of philosophy are too deflationary to be satisfying, particularly because there is much philosophizing left once philosophy is reoriented.

Acquiring “Knowledge”—An Alternative Model

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
First Language ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
First Language Acquisition ◽  
Method Of Cases ◽  
Striking Fact

The chapter argues that empirical studies of first-language acquisition lend support to the Wittgensteinian-Merleau-Pontian conception of language as against the prevailing conception that underwrites the method of cases in either its armchair or experimental version. It offers a non-representationalist model, inspired by the work of Michael Tomasello, for the acquisition of “knowledge,” with the aim of showing that we could fully account for the acquisition of this and other philosophically troublesome words without positing independently existing “items” to which these words refer. The chapter also aims at bringing out and underscoring the striking fact that, whereas many in contemporary analytic philosophy regard and present themselves as open and attentive to empirical science, they have often relied on a conception of language that has been supported by no empirical evidence.

Internal Difficulties in Defending the Method of Cases, and the Claim of Continuity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Method Of Cases

The chapter examines Timothy Williamson’s and Herman Cappelen’s attempts to defend the method of cases in its traditional, “armchair” form, against the “cognitive diversity” and “calibration” objections. The aim of the chapter is to continue the work of Chapter One of exposing the internal difficulties that have presented themselves for those wishing to defend the method, and to begin to work toward establishing the book’s basic contention that the method of cases rests on substantive and (therefore) challengeable presuppositions about language. More specifically, the chapter argues that Williamson’s and Cappelen’s defense of the method rests entirely on the claim of continuity between our employment of words outside philosophy and what we do with them when we ask the theorist’s questions and give our answers to them.

Conceptual Analysis Rebooted

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Method ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Traditional Use ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Conceptual Engineering ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.

Fooled by Cognitive Artifacts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Artifacts ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 3 examines one of the two concerns often brought up against the method of cases: The judgments elicited by cases seem epistemically deficient. This concern is captured by the first argument against the method of cases, which I call “Unreliability”: Cases currently used in philosophy as well as those cases that would be particularly useful for some central philosophical purposes are likely to elicit unreliable judgments. Judgments elicited by typical philosophical cases are similar to experimental artifacts—outcomes of experimental manipulations that are not due to the phenomena experimentally investigated, but to the (often otherwise reliable) experimental tools used to investigate them. That is, they often are “cognitive artifacts.” Chapter 3 concludes that we ought to suspend judgment when confronted with a philosophical case.

Not In Their Name

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly Lawford-Smith
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Services ◽  
The State ◽  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Collective Agency ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Collective Agent ◽  
Social Metaphysics ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Given their size and influence, states are able to inflict harm far beyond the reach of a single individual. But there is a great deal of unclarity about exactly who is implicated in that kind of harm, and how we should think about both culpability and responsibility for it. The idea of popular sovereignty is dominant in classical political theory. It is a commonplace assumption that democratic publics both authorize and have control over what their states do; that their states act in their name and on their behalf. Not In Their Name approaches these assumptions from the perspective of social metaphysics, asking whether the state is a collective agent, and whether ordinary citizens are members of that agent. If it is, and they are, there is a clear case for democratic collective culpability. The book explores alternative conceptions of the state and of membership in the state; alternative conceptions of collective agency applied to the state; the normative implications of membership in the state; and both culpability (from the inside) and responsibility (from the outside) for what the state does. Ultimately, Not In Their Name argues for the exculpation of ordinary citizens and the inculpation of those working in public services, and defends a particular distribution of culpability from government to its members.

Fatherhood Among Youth Experiencing Homelessness

2020 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 484-497
Author(s):  
Jonathan Alschech ◽  
Stephanie Begun
Keyword(s):  
Pregnant Women ◽  
Service Provision ◽  
Exploratory Study ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Young Men ◽  
Intervention Development ◽  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Young Parents

Research on young parents experiencing homelessness has typically focused on mothers and pregnant women. Young homeless fathers’ tendencies to decline involvement throughout pregnancy and in their children’s lives have been documented and condemned; however, little is known about young men’s perspectives on these situations. This exploratory study engaged homeless young men in qualitative interviews regarding their perceptions and experiences of fathering. Respondents often viewed fatherhood as solely representing breadwinner responsibilities and as a burden that one dutifully carries or shamefully (yet commonly) shirks. Homeless young men’s beliefs about fathering, often steeped in guilt and shame, may suggest that encouraging alternative conceptions of competent fathering while young and homeless is an important area for further research, intervention development, and service provision.

scholarly journals Conscientious Objection in Healthcare and Moral Integrity

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK WICCLAIR
Keyword(s):  
Health Professionals ◽  
Conscientious Objection ◽  
Alternative Conceptions ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Specific Context ◽  
Moral Space ◽  
Social Component ◽  
Intellectual Integrity ◽  
Moral Convictions

Abstract:There are several reasons for accommodating health professionals’ conscientious objections. However, several authors have argued that among the most important and compelling reasons is to enable health professionals to maintain their moral integrity. Accommodation is said to provide “moral space” in which health professionals can practice without compromising their moral integrity. There are, however, alternative conceptions of moral integrity and corresponding different criteria for moral-integrity-based claims. It is argued that one conception of moral integrity, the identity conception, is sound and suitable in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation. According to the identity conception, one maintains one’s moral integrity if and only if one’s actions are consistent with one’s core moral convictions. The identity conception has been subject to a number of criticisms that might call into question its suitability as a standard for determining whether health professionals have genuine moral-integrity-based accommodation claims. The following five objections to the identity conception are critically examined: (1) it does not include a social component, (2) it is a conception of subjective rather than objective integrity, (3) it does not include a reasonableness condition, (4) it does not include any substantive moral constraints, and (5) it does not include any intellectual integrity requirement. In response to these objections, it is argued that none establishes the unsuitability of the identity conception in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation.

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