The Basic Law as a Barrier against a Transformation of the EU into a State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how Germany’s Basic Law can prevent the transformation of the European Union into a state. It begins with a discussion of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 2009 decision on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Basic Law. In particular, it highlights the message of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment: that European integration will not be hindered by Germany but finds it limits in the Basic Law. It then explains why, on the side of the EU, the German Court puts so much weight on the treaty character of the EU’s legal basis and why, on the side of the Member States, much emphasis is placed on sovereignty. It also considers the question of whether Germany would be allowed to join a federal European state if its democratic legitimacy were at the level required by Article 79(3) Basic Law.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

scholarly journals Euro-sceptical or Euro-phile? A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the process of European integration and decision-making

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>

scholarly journals «La integración europea a través del derecho». La contribución del Tribunal Constitucional Federal (alemán)

2017 ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Andreas Vosskuhle
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Muchos actores están involucrados en la implementación de la idea de comunidad jurídica, entre ellos, los parlamentos nacionales, administraciones y tribunales internos que son responsables de la puesta en práctica del Derecho de la Unión Europea. En este estudio se aborda la labor del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán en el desarrollo de la integración europea considerando diez impulsos centrales. Además, para finalizar, se aportarán algunas reflexiones realistas sobre las limitaciones del derecho en la solución de vicisitudes en el marco de la Unión Europea.Many stakeholders are involved in implementing the idea of legal community, including national parliaments, administrations and courts, which for their part are responsible for the implementation of European law. This study addresses the work of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the development of European integration by considering ten central impulses. In addition, to conclude, some realistic reflections on the limitations of the law in the solution of vicissitudes in the framework of the European Union will be provided.

scholarly journals Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act

21. Institutions of the European Union

Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 756-794
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

This chapter introduces the project of European integration and discusses the legal basis of the EU, which consists of treaties that authorize law-making. It will identify the principal executive institutions of the European Union and their functions. They will be classified under the headings of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The chapter will also examine the process of enacting legislation and the role of the European Parliament. Drawing on an understanding of similar institutions and processes in the UK, the discussion is particularly concerned with an assessment of the institutions in terms of public law values, such as legitimacy, accountability, and transparency.

German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

After the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) issuance of the Lisbon decision, a judgment that is generally considered to be a verdict critical of European integration as well as a measure to widen the scope of constitutional review of EU acts, many observers wondered what would happen next. Would the German court finally begin to look for an open conflict with the EU, or would the court's bark once again be worse than its bite? This had already seemed to be the case after the Maastricht decision, the slimmer and legally more coherent predecessor of the Lisbon judgment, after which the court deliberately missed the opportunity to take a shot at the Banana conflict between the EU and the WTO.

scholarly journals A Long Time Coming

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 944-949
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Economic Community ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.

A Demos for the European Union?

Politics ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mette Jolly
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Popular Support ◽  
Political Relationship ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Eu

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by – sometimes even confused with – the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes, whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?

The European Union as An Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1219-1240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Schorkopf
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Sixty years after the promulgation of the German constitution, which from the beginning was distinguished by its “visionary openness towards Europe,” the German Federal Constitutional Court reassessed the historic process of European integration. It reviewed the compatibility of the legal foundations of the European Union with the German Basic Law and provided a thorough overview. The Treaty of Lisbon and its sweeping, integrating reform of the European Union is compatible with the Basic Law, the Court's Second Senate ruled, so long as it is applied within the framework outlined by the Federal Constitutional Court. However, the Court found that the German implementation law is not consistent with the Basic Law. Accordingly, the Court made clear that Germany can continue with the ratification of the treaty only after introducing a new implementation law. The 147-page decision could be summarised in the following way: The European Union is an association of sovereign states and, hence, a secondary political area.

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