A Demos for the European Union?

Politics ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mette Jolly

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by – sometimes even confused with – the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes, whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?

Author(s):  
Geert De Baere

The present chapter considers the position of the European Union in other international organizations. It is based on the premise that the Union, while arguably also a federal or quasi-federal structure, is legally still itself an international organization. From the perspective of international law, that explains at least partly the complexities involved in an international organization such as the EU acquiring a status in—let alone membership of—another international organization. The term ‘status’ or ‘position’ is understood here as the influence the Union can exercise, either formally or informally, in decision-making processes in other international organizations. As an ever-increasing number of decisions having an impact on the Union’s policies originate in international organizations, its position in such fora matters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danai Petropoulou Ionescu ◽  
Mariolina Eliantonio

The increased recourse to soft law by the European Union (EU) as a flexible solution to complex social and policy issues has raised several questions about the democratic legitimacy of decision-making at the EU level. With the aim to provide a normative direction for future empirical assessment of EU soft law, this article explores the democratic credentials that EU soft law measures should fulfil to ensure their legitimacy. Drawing from the intersections of liberal, republican and deliberative conceptions of democracy, this article proposes four democratic legitimacy standards for the evaluation of soft law measures in practice: parliamentary involvement, transparency, participatory quality and reviewability.


Author(s):  
Maja Kluger Dionigi ◽  
Anne Rasmussen

The ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), previously known as co-decision, has marked a significant milestone in the development of the European Union (EU) and transformed the way its institutions interact. What was initially seen as a cumbersome decision-making procedure subject to considerable criticism ended up being quite successful. The workings of the OLP have gradually developed, including both informal and formal rule changes to ensure a smoother functioning of the procedure. While the EU Council is still seen as the strongest body in the interinstitutional balance, the European Parliament (EP) is a co-legislator in most policy areas. After introducing the option to conclude legislation at first reading, so-called early agreements have become the norm in the OLP. The increase in early agreements by means of trilogues has speeded up decision-making but has not come without costs. Concerns have been raised about the transparency of trilogues and the accountability of the actors involved. Not surprisingly, these concerns have led to a shift in the research of the OLP from an emphasis on the powers of the different EU institutions to early agreements and their consequences for democratic legitimacy. Our careful review of the EU institutions’ own rules and practices governing trilogue negotiations shows that the rules and procedures for the conduct of negotiations have been adapted significantly over time. While there is a continued need for the EU to keep enforcing openness in its procedures, OLP interinstitutional bargaining does not operate in a rule-free environment. Yet most democratic scrutiny has been directed at the internal decision-making processes in the EP rather than at maximizing openness on the Council side or with respect to input from interest groups in the negotiation processes.


Author(s):  
Běla Plechanovová ◽  
Madeleine O. Hosli ◽  
Anatolij Plechanov

This chapter studies voting and representation in the European Union, specifically the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, over time. The authors assess the linkages between decision-making and democratic legitimacy, and then focus on potential alternatives to decision-making in the Council. They discuss development of the double-majority rule in view of aspects such as democratic representation, efficiency, and equitability and then offer analyses for different scenarios for the EU’s future, assuming different membership constellations and changes in member-states’ population sizes. They offer new calculations on voting power, the institution’s capacity to act, and equitability. Equitability, also with new rules incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and effective as of November 2014, still deviates from the ideal value and with this, might induce the need for a rule change again in the future.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sacha Garben

An assessment of the balance between ‘the market’ and ‘the social’ by reference to the areas of social policy, the internal market and economic governance – Imbalance resulting from a consitutional displacement of the legislative process (EU and national) and instead decision-making by the judiciary and the executive – Proposals to address the imbalance by reinforcing the role of the EU legislative process and limiting other forms of European integration.


Author(s):  
Gerald Schneider ◽  
Anastasia Ershova

Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) conceives of European integration as the outcome of three interplaying forces—interests, information, and institutions. Cooperation in the European Union (EU) is thus based on collective choices among a diverse set of actors ranging from voters to member states that disagree over the potential outcome of the decision-making process, are uncertain about the motives and resources of other players, and are exposed to decision-making rules with varying distributional consequences. RCI distinguishes between two fundamental choices the supranational organization can make. EU actors can in this perspective either decide how the EU should be governed (“decision-making about rules”) or how a policy should be changed with the help of a given rule (“decision-making within rules”). The first perspective deals largely with the intergovernmental conferences during which the European Union has changed the rules that structure the interactions among the member states. The latter viewpoint addresses how the relevant decision makers of the European Union have amended or prevented policy changes alone or in collaboration with other actors. Both perspectives draw on the standard assumptions of the rational choice research program that actors engage into means-ends calculations in a consistent way, process new information efficiently, and are aware of the preferences and rationality of other relevant actors. This implies, in the context of EU decision-making, that the adoption of new rules and polices is the consequence of the strategic behavior of those players who possess the power to influence the collective choice. The application of the RCI approach to EU integration has resulted in a multitude of studies seeking to explain its capacity for institutional reform, policy change, or absorption of new members. While the European Parliament, like any other legislature, concludes its deliberations through voting, other EU decision-making bodies mainly decide either through bargaining or through delegating certain tasks to a subordinate actor. RCI has adopted different workhorse models borrowed from game theory to reflect the variety of decision-making modes: the spatial theory of voting, non-cooperative bargaining theory, and principal-agent models have become the standard approaches to study European integration. RCI research has faced several challenges since becoming a mainstream approach in the study of EU decision-making. The first set of criticism focuses on the axiomatic basis of the RCI research program in general and questions its usefulness for understanding the evolution of an organization as complex and large as the EU. Other objections that are frequently raised refer to the empirical tests of the hypotheses derived from the game-theoretic models. Finally, critics of the approach question the ability of the RCI program to deal with the role of informal institutions.


Author(s):  
Kh. Rionidze

The topicality of this issue is related to the fact that the EU is founded on a set of values, including equality. Nowadays the attitude towards women in the society is significantly different from that of men. Unfortunately, inequality does not decline over time. The basic idea of gender equality is to provide both women and men with the same rights, opportunities and conditions for full-fledged development. The article is devoted to the dimensions of the principle of gender equality in the European Union, which is important for Ukraine due to the conditions of European integration. The dimensions of gender equality cover the political, economic, civil, social and cultural spheres of our live activity, including achieving gender equality in employment, equal pay for equal work, gender balance in decision making, harmonization of professional and family life, education and «gender mainstreaming». That is why research and analysis of gender equality's dimensions in the EU and defining the legal aspects of their regulation are relevant to the legal system of Ukraine. Over the past few decades, the EU has notably worked for equal treatment legislation, gender mainstreaming and specific measures for the advancement of women. Moreover, the EU has defined the following dimensions of gender equality: equal economic independence for women and men; equal pay for work of equal value; equality in decision-making; dignity, integrity and ending gender-based violence; and promoting gender equality beyond the EU. The dimension of gender equality is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and the inequality is not perpetuated. Although the EU has achieved positive results in protecting human rights, the work is still continuing in this direction. The idea of gender equality is an integral part of equality as a general principle, development and peace in the world. Without this principle, it is impossible to establish the basis for democracy, freedom, justice and tolerance. Recently, the principle of gender equality is getting paramount importance for Ukraine, as one of the conditions for successful European integration.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
LIESBET HOOGHE

The European Union is a polity in the making, where political actors contend about basic questions of governance. While students have begun to map contention between public parties and private interests, little attention has been paid to how office-holders in the Commission conceive of European integration. Using interview data collected from 140 senior officials of the Commission, I identify contention along four dimensions: whether the EU should have supranational or intergovernmental institutions; whether it should use democratic or technocratic decision making; whether it should promote regulated capitalism or market liberalism; and whether the elite should defend the European public good or be responsive to various interests. My findings challenge EU theories that conceive of the Commission as a unitary actor with a pro-integration agenda.


Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm

This chapter examines how Germany’s Basic Law can prevent the transformation of the European Union into a state. It begins with a discussion of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 2009 decision on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Basic Law. In particular, it highlights the message of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment: that European integration will not be hindered by Germany but finds it limits in the Basic Law. It then explains why, on the side of the EU, the German Court puts so much weight on the treaty character of the EU’s legal basis and why, on the side of the Member States, much emphasis is placed on sovereignty. It also considers the question of whether Germany would be allowed to join a federal European state if its democratic legitimacy were at the level required by Article 79(3) Basic Law.


This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the withdrawal agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the European Union to create the legal framework for Brexit. Building on a prior volume, it overviews the process of Brexit negotiations that took place between the UK and the EU from 2017 to 2019. It also examines the key provisions of the Brexit deal, including the protection of citizens’ rights, the Irish border, and the financial settlement. Moreover, the book assesses the governance provisions on transition, decision-making and adjudication, and the prospects for future EU–UK trade relations. Finally, it reflects on the longer-term challenges that the implementation of the 2016 Brexit referendum poses for the UK territorial system, for British–Irish relations, as well as for the future of the EU beyond Brexit.


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