G. H. Lewes and Karl Pearson
Examining the cases of two further nineteenth-century empiricists, this chapter begins by considering how G. H. Lewes moved from an early position of neo-Comtean positivism which was avowedly anti-metaphysical to the advocacy of what he described as ‘empirical metaphysics’. An examination is made of five different ways in which Lewes moves beyond simple sensualism to a more sophisticated understanding of ‘the empirical’, before considering in detail three examples of his empirical metaphysics, respecting physical reality, mind, and causation. The discussion of Lewes concludes by reflecting upon the sense in which he remains hostile to what he describes as ‘metempirics’ including the notion of the unknowable thing-in-itself. The chapter concludes with a consideration of Karl Pearson’s philosophy which centre stages sense-impressions and champions both reductionism and scientism. But it is noted that even with Pearson we find willingness to engage in a degree of metaphysical speculation.