Expressivism and Propositions

2019 ◽  
pp. 113-128
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
General Account ◽  
Normative Logic ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation ◽  
Normative Judgments

A defense of a version of Allan Gibbard’s expressivist analysis of normative judgments, focusing on his account of what he calls “normative logic.” The version defended interprets his analysis in a way that is significantly different from his own interpretation, which ties expressivism to a deflationary notion of truth. It is argued that Gibbard’s general account blurs the line between expressivism and normative realism, and that a more robust notion of truth that draws a sharper line can be defended, and can be reconciled with his normative logic. The chapter concludes by considering the application of this expressivist account to epistemic norms, and more specifically to norms for assessing degrees of belief and measures of degree of confirmation.

scholarly journals Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. G. Meacham
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Epistemic Utility

Meacham takes aim at the epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief and where the norms encode ways of adopting non-dominated degrees of belief. He focuses on a particularly popular subclass of such views where epistemic utility is determined solely by the accuracy of degrees of belief. Meacham argues that these types of epistemic utility arguments for norms are (i) not compatible with each other (so not all can be correct), (ii) do not solely rely on accuracy considerations, and (iii) are not able to capture intuitive norms about how we ought to respond to evidence.

scholarly journals Normative Disagreements and Choice of Legal Concepts .

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 116-123
Author(s):  
MAXIM A. BELYAEV
Keyword(s):  
Legal Text ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Normative Judgments

The paper provides a commentary on the theses of the German jurist Lorenz Kähler on the formation of legal concepts. The author eliminates truth-characterization of normative judgments because there are no justification for these judgments. However, if we consider normative judgments as one of the factors in the choice of legal concepts in the formation of a legal text, then the subjects who find themselves in a situation of disagreement on any of the concepts should refer to the normative facts (values, reasons, and obligations). Therefore, by allowing this type of disagreement, we implicitly accept normative realism as true. The author did not indicate what a normative anti-realist should refer to in controversial situations. Since Lorenz Kähler himself is anti-realistic about normative facts, his position is either contradictory or not good elaborated for understanding.

scholarly journals A Problem for Credal Consequentialism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Caie
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Utility Values ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Trade Offs

Caie focuses on an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Caie argues that in a wide variety of cases this view says that all degreed beliefs are rational, or none are, or it issues no verdicts. This is, roughly, because an agent’s degrees of beliefs will often not encode the appropriate dependence hypotheses that are needed so that various beliefs have expected epistemic utility values. Caie thus argues the unintuitive verdicts of epistemic utility theory are not limited to the byzantine examples of epistemic trade-offs, but are much more widespread.

scholarly journals QBism and the limits of scientific realism

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Glick
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Interpretation Of Quantum Theory ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Subjective Belief

AbstractQBism is an agent-centered interpretation of quantum theory. It rejects the notion that quantum theory provides a God’s eye description of reality and claims instead that it imposes constraints on agents’ subjective degrees of belief. QBism’s emphasis on subjective belief has led critics to dismiss it as antirealism or instrumentalism, or even, idealism or solipsism. The aim of this paper is to consider the relation of QBism to scientific realism. I argue that while QBism is an unhappy fit with a standard way of thinking about scientific realism, an alternative conception I call “perspectival normative realism” may allow for a reconciliation.

Good Questions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Pérez Carballo
Keyword(s):  
North Dakota ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Intuitive Idea ◽  
Do So

Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that we must think of the value of epistemic states as consisting in more than simply accuracy. This sheds light on which questions it is most epistemically valuable to pursue.

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 877-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Normative Realism ◽  
David Enoch ◽  
Normative Judgments

AbstractIn response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.

Bayesian Philosophy of Science

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Reasoning ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
Intertheoretic Reduction ◽  
Old Evidence ◽  
Causal Strength ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation

“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. The basic idea is that the value of convincing evidence, good explanations, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, can all be captured by the effect it has on our degrees of belief. This idea is elaborated as a cycle of variations about the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities, and changing them by a particular rule (Bayesian Conditionalization). Partly, the book is committed to the Carnapian tradition of explicating essential concepts in scientific reasoning using Bayesian models (e.g., degree of confirmation, causal strength, explanatory power). Partly, it develops new solutions to old problems such as learning conditional evidence and updating on old evidence, and it models important argument schemes in science such as the No Alternatives Argument, the No Miracles Argument or Inference to the Best Explanation. Finally, it is explained how Bayesian inference in scientific applications—above all, statistics—can be squared with the demands of practitioners and how a subjective school of inference can make claims to scientific objectivity. The book integrates conceptual analysis, formal models, simulations, case studies and empirical findings in an attempt to lead the way for 21th century philosophy of science.

Elements for a General Organology

Derrida Today ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-94
Author(s):  
Bernard Stiegler
Keyword(s):  
Organic Matter ◽  
Planetary Scale ◽  
General Account ◽  
Inorganic Matter ◽  
History Of

These lectures outline the project of a general organology, which is to say an account of life when it is no longer just biological but technical, or when it involves not just organic matter but organized inorganic matter. This organology is also shown to require a modified Simondonian account of the shift from vital individuation to a three-stranded process of psychic, collective and technical individuation. Furthermore, such an approach involves extending the Derridean reading of Socrates's discussion of writing as a pharmakon, so that it becomes a more general account of the pharmacological character of retention and protention. By going back to Leroi-Gourhan, we can recognize that this also means pursuing the history of retentional modifications unfolding in the course of the history of what, with Lotka, can also be called exosomatization. It is thus a question of how exteriorization can, today, in an epoch when it becomes digital, and in an epoch that produces vast amounts of entropy at the thermodynamic, biological and noetic levels, still possibly produce new forms of interiorization, that is, new forms of thought, care and desire, amounting to so many chances to struggle against the planetary-scale pharmacological crisis with which we are currently afflicted.

Death of the General Account

1996 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-7
Author(s):  
Brian O'Neil
Keyword(s):  
General Account
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