Using Dempster-Shafer Belief Functions to Represent Degrees of Belief

1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Conley ◽  
Shawn P. Curley
1994 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn P. Curley ◽  
James I. Golden

Author(s):  
J. Robert G. Williams

What is representation? How do the more primitive aspects of our world come together to generate it? How do different kinds of representation relate to one another? This book identifies the metaphysical foundations for representational facts. The story told is in three parts. The most primitive layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of sensation/perception and intention/action, which are the two most basic modes in which an individual and the world interact. It is argued that we can understand how this kind of representation can exist in a fundamentally physical world so long as we have an independent, illuminating grip on functions and causation. The second layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of (degrees of) belief and desire, whose representational content goes far beyond the immediate perceptable and manipulable environment. It is argued that the correct belief/desire interpretation of an agent is the one which makes their action-guiding states, given their perceptual evidence, most rational. The final layer of representation is the ‘aboutness’ of words and sentences, human artefacts with representational content. It is argued that one can give an illuminating account of the conditions under which a compositional interpretation of a public language like English is correct by appeal to patterns emerging from the attitudes conventionally expressed by sentences. The three-layer metaphysics of representation resolves long-standing underdetermination puzzles, predicts and explains patterns in the way that concepts denote, and articulates a delicate interactive relationship between the foundations of language and thought.


Author(s):  
Jianping Fan ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Meiqin Wu

The two-dimensional belief function (TDBF = (mA, mB)) uses a pair of ordered basic probability distribution functions to describe and process uncertain information. Among them, mB includes support degree, non-support degree and reliability unmeasured degree of mA. So it is more abundant and reasonable than the traditional discount coefficient and expresses the evaluation value of experts. However, only considering that the expert’s assessment is single and one-sided, we also need to consider the influence between the belief function itself. The difference in belief function can measure the difference between two belief functions, based on which the supporting degree, non-supporting degree and unmeasured degree of reliability of the evidence are calculated. Based on the divergence measure of belief function, this paper proposes an extended two-dimensional belief function, which can solve some evidence conflict problems and is more objective and better solve a class of problems that TDBF cannot handle. Finally, numerical examples illustrate its effectiveness and rationality.


Author(s):  
Orakanya Kanjanatarakul ◽  
Philai Lertpongpiroon ◽  
Sombat Singkharat ◽  
Songsak Sriboonchitta

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 504-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Fiche ◽  
Jean-Christophe Cexus ◽  
Arnaud Martin ◽  
Ali Khenchaf

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Consider the frameS believes that—.Fill it with a conditional, sayIf you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke.what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances ofS believes (A→C)?In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple.Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained. It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief. It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained.


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