The Evolutionary Naturalist Challenge to Non-Naturalist Normative Epistemic Realism

In Chapter 12, the author presents and responds to Street’s evolutionary naturalist challenge to non-naturalist normative realism, especially as applied to non-naturalist normative epistemic realism. He begins by defining scientistic naturalism. Then he introduces a new conception of non-Platonist sensitivity to fundamental normative principles, especially fundamental epistemic principles. The author refers to this as probabilistic sensitivity. It is not any form of direct insight into the content of the fundamental epistemic principles; it is a sensitivity of our particular epistemic judgments, both explicit and implicit, to the requirements of those principles in particular cases. The author responds to Street’s challenge by arguing that her position, a form of scientistic naturalism, is subject to reliability defeat. He avoids reliability defeat for his own position by arguing that evolution selected for better learners over worse learners, and this selection produced beings with probabilistic sensitivity to the metaphysically necessary, fundamental principles of epistemic rationality, which are the principles for being a good learner.

QBism and the limits of scientific realism

QBism is an agent-centered interpretation of quantum theory. It rejects the notion that quantum theory provides a God’s eye description of reality and claims instead that it imposes constraints on agents’ subjective degrees of belief. QBism’s emphasis on subjective belief has led critics to dismiss it as antirealism or instrumentalism, or even, idealism or solipsism. The aim of this paper is to consider the relation of QBism to scientific realism. I argue that while QBism is an unhappy fit with a standard way of thinking about scientific realism, an alternative conception I call “perspectival normative realism” may allow for a reconciliation.

Normative Disagreements and Choice of Legal Concepts .

The paper provides a commentary on the theses of the German jurist Lorenz Kähler on the formation of legal concepts. The author eliminates truth-characterization of normative judgments because there are no justification for these judgments. However, if we consider normative judgments as one of the factors in the choice of legal concepts in the formation of a legal text, then the subjects who find themselves in a situation of disagreement on any of the concepts should refer to the normative facts (values, reasons, and obligations). Therefore, by allowing this type of disagreement, we implicitly accept normative realism as true. The author did not indicate what a normative anti-realist should refer to in controversial situations. Since Lorenz Kähler himself is anti-realistic about normative facts, his position is either contradictory or not good elaborated for understanding.

The Normative Pluriverse

According to a certain pluralist view in philosophy of mathematics, there are as many mathematical objects as there can coherently be. Recently, Justin Clarke-Doane has explored what consequences the analogous view on normative properties would have. What if there is a normative pluriverse? Here I address this same question. The challenge is best seen as a challenge to an important form of normative realism. I criticize the way Clarke-Doane presents the challenge. An improved challenge is presented, and the role of pluralism in this challenge is assessed.

What’s Wrong with Relaxing?

In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way round the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory fail either for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism or expressivism. In this contribution, I show that this is false: we can avoid this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about the fate of other metaethical positions, then, relaxed realism remains immune to the problems he raises.

Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new ‘reduction’ argument against non- reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his ‘simple moral theory’ version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

Expressivism and Propositions

A defense of a version of Allan Gibbard’s expressivist analysis of normative judgments, focusing on his account of what he calls “normative logic.” The version defended interprets his analysis in a way that is significantly different from his own interpretation, which ties expressivism to a deflationary notion of truth. It is argued that Gibbard’s general account blurs the line between expressivism and normative realism, and that a more robust notion of truth that draws a sharper line can be defended, and can be reconciled with his normative logic. The chapter concludes by considering the application of this expressivist account to epistemic norms, and more specifically to norms for assessing degrees of belief and measures of degree of confirmation.

Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?

Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological objections to moral (and, in fact, normative) realism.